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The State Blaine Amendments are provisions in thirty-seven state constitutions 
that restrict persons’ and organizations’ access to public benefits on religious grounds.  
They arose largely in the mid- to late-1800s in response to bitter strife between an 
established Protestant majority and a growing Catholic minority that sought equal 
access to public funding for Catholic schools.  After the failure to pass a federal 
constitutional amendment—the “Blaine Amendment”—that would have sealed off public 
school funds from “sectarian” institutions, similar provisions proliferated in state 
constitutions.  These “State Blaines” have often been interpreted, under their plain 
terms, as erecting religion-sensitive barriers to the flow of public benefits that exceed the 
church-state separation demanded by the Establishment Clause.  Today, the State Blaines 
are becoming increasingly relevant as the Supreme Court has progressively softened 
federal constitutional barriers to religious access to public funds.  This article examines 
the history, language, and general operation of the State Blaines.  It concludes that the 
State Blaines generally raise explicit, religion-sensitive barriers to the allocation of 
otherwise available public benefits and, consequently, that the operation of the State 
Blaines would typically violate the religious non-persecution principle of the First 
Amendment.
I.  Introduction
Larry Witters was a blind man who wanted to attend college.  In 1979, he applied for vocational 
funds that Washington State provided for the visually handicapped.  Witters was eligible for the funds, 
and he intended to use them to study to be a minister at a Christian college.  But his plans met resistance.  
In 1984, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the federal Establishment Clause barred Witters’ use 
of the funds for religious training.2  Witters sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court, and won:  in 1986, 
the Court ruled that the Establishment Clause presented no impediment to his private decision to apply 
1
     Associate-in-law and LL.M. Candidate, 2002-04, Columbia University School of Law; J.D., 1997, Paul 
M. Hebert Law Center at Louisiana State University.  I am grateful to Kent Greenawalt, Ira C. Lupu, and Jay S. 
Bybee for their helpful suggestions.  This article is dedicated to my wife, Martha.
2 See Witters v. Comm’n for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 55-56 (1984) (Witters I).  The religion clauses of the 
First Amendment—“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof”—textually restrain the federal Congress only, but have been applied against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise); Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause); see also generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 163-214 (1998). In Witters I, the Washington Supreme Court applied the 
Supreme Court’s Lemon test—at that time the doctrinal framework for evaluating Establishment Clause cases—and 
found that Witters’ use of the state aid for ministry training would have the “primary effect of advancing religion” 
and was therefore unconstitutional. See 689 P.2d at 56 (applying Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
2the funds to religious education.3  But Witters would never use those funds for that purpose.  Three years 
later, the Washington Supreme Court decided on remand that Witters’ plans violated a clause of the 
Washington State Constitution that prohibited “public money” from being “applied to any religious … 
instruction.”4  The U.S. Supreme Court, over one dissent, declined to hear Witters’ subsequent claim that 
Washington’s constitution effectively punished him for pursuing his faith and therefore violated his right 
to free exercise of religion.5
Thus, at the end of a decade-long odyssey that included a unanimous victory in the Supreme 
Court, Witters was left with nothing.  Had Witters planned to use the scholarship funds to study 
chemistry, American history, international law, or—interestingly—religion from a purely secular 
viewpoint, he would have enjoyed Washington’s financial assistance in pursuing his studies.  But 
precisely because Witters wanted to use the funds to prepare for the ministry—i.e., to lay the theological 
and pastoral groundwork for a career inspired by and in service of his religious faith—he was denied that 
assistance.
The provision that ultimately blocked Witters’ claim belongs to a class of state constitutional 
provisions that appear in over thirty state constitutions and are known collectively as “State Blaine 
Amendments.”  While the State Blaines take various forms,6 almost all can be fairly read to thwart plans 
like Witters’—i.e., to bar the use of generally available public benefits precisely because the recipient is a 
3 See Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Serv’s for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (Witters II).
4 See Witters v. State, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989) (Witters III) (relying on WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11).  
That provision states in full:  “No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious 
worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.”  See infra note __. 
5 See 493 U.S. 901, 903-04 (White, J., dissenting from denial of petition for certiorari).  In dissent, 
Justice White argued that the Washington Supreme Court’s interpretation of its state constitution “presents 
important federal questions regarding the free exercise rights of citizens who participate in state aid programs that 
permit recipients a private choice in using funds received and regarding the extent to which state involvement with 
religion that does not violate the Establishment Clause is required by the Free Exercise Clause.”  Id.
6 See generally Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 ED. LAW REP. 1 (1997) 
(canvassing the various State Blaine Amendments); Linda S. Wendtland, Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause:  
Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625 (1985).
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person who wants to put them to a religious use or is itself a religiously affiliated organization.  These 
provisions have largely slumbered in state constitutions for over a century,7 but they are likely to awake 
now that the Supreme Court has relaxed federal constitutional barriers to public funding of religious 
activities.  This article will explore the question the Supreme Court declined to take up in Witters and has 
never squarely addressed:  if a state interprets its Blaine Amendment to erect a religion-sensitive barrier to 
public funding—public funding that is permissible under the Establishment Clause—does the state violate 
any principle in the federal Constitution?8
To answer this question, we must first understand where the State Blaines come from and what 
they do.  I will therefore examine their history, their language (and whether that varies in a relevant way 
from state to state), and how courts have interpreted them.  Their historical origins will be more fully 
addressed below.  In brief, however, the State Blaines arose largely in the mid- to late-1800s at a time 
when it was fashionable in America to hate and fear Roman Catholics.  At that time, American public 
schools were overwhelmingly and explicitly Protestant and private schools were predominantly Catholic.  
Many people wanted to keep public school funds as far from Catholic schools as possible, a project 
7 But see, e.g., Walter Gellhorn & Kent Greenawalt, The Sectarian College and the Public Purse (1970) 
(analyzing Fordham University’s compliance with the N.Y. Blaine Amendment).
8 See Jay S. Bybee and David W. Newton, Of Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada’s “Little Blaine 
Amendment” and the Future of Religious Participation in Public Programs, 2 NEV. L. J. 551, 574 (2002) (noting 
that “the U.S. Supreme Court has never had before it a challenge to the constitutionality of a Little Blaine 
Amendment”); see also Rebecca G. Rees, “If We Recant, Would We Qualify?”: Exclusion of Religious Providers 
from State Social Service Voucher Programs, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1291, 1296 (1999) (observing that “[t]he 
United States Supreme Court … has never addressed the possibility of a conflict between the First Amendment and 
a state Blaine provision that excludes a religious group or individual from a general government program or 
benefit”).  This may change soon, however.  On May 19, 2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Davey v. 
Locke, a Ninth Circuit decision that rejected Washington’s Blaine Amendment as justification for a state scholarship 
program that excludes students seeking theology degrees.  See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075, 71 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. May 19, 2003) (No. 02-1315).  I discuss Davey below in part __.  
The issue of the State Blaines’ constitutionality has generated its share of recent attention from the media.  See, e.g.,
Tony Mauro, Voucher Advocates Plan Next Push to High Court, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002; Rob Boston, The 
Blaine Game, CHURCH & STATE, Sept. 2002; Mark Walsh, Latest Front for Fight on Choice: Washington State, 
EDUCATION WEEK, Oct. 2, 2002; George F. Will, School Choice: The Ugly Opposition, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
Nov. 12, 2002; see also Adam Liptak, Courts Weighing Rights of States To Curb Aid for Religion Majors, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003 (discussing Davey case).  The Becket Fund—an ardent opponent of the State Blaines—
catalogues much of this media attention on its website, www.becketfund.org.
4pursued with a zeal both religious and legislative.  In 1875, a powerful political opportunist, Congressman 
James G. Blaine of Maine, sponsored a federal constitutional amendment that would have sealed off 
public funds from “sectarian” organizations.9  The federal amendment narrowly missed passage in the 
Senate, but junior versions of that amendment—the State Blaines—spread in state constitutions like 
kudzu.10  A representative provision—this one from the 1885 Florida Declaration of Rights—reads thus:  
“No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public 
treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any 
sectarian institution.”11
The tale of the State Blaines is somewhat anti-climactic, or at least incomplete, because over the 
last century state courts have applied them infrequently.  The reason is not neglect but superfluity:  states 
have not had to rely on State Blaines to achieve a rigorous separation between public funds and religious 
institutions, because the Supreme Court has interpreted the federal religion clauses to achieve largely that 
result.  As late as the 1980s, only a trickle of public funds could flow to religious students or religious 
schools (especially elementary and secondary schools) through the sieve of a rigidly separationist 
interpretation of the federal Constitution.12  The State Blaines have simply lacked occasion for robust 
9 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality op.) (linking the term “sectarian” with 
the anti-Catholic hostility surrounding the attempted passage of the federal Blaine Amendment, and noting that “it 
was an open secret that ‘sectarian’ was code for ‘Catholic’”) (citing Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment 
Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. L. HIST. 38 (1992)); Gerard V. Bradley, An Unconstitutional Stereotype: Catholic Schools 
as “Pervasively Sectarian,” 7 TEX. R. L. & POL. 1, 5 (2002) (observing that “Justice Thomas noted in Mitchell that 
the term was ‘coined’ when it ‘could be applied almost exclusively to Catholic parochial schools’”) (citations 
omitted); see also Richard L. Baer, The Supreme Court’s Discriminatory Use of the Term ‘Sectarianism,’ 6 J.L. & 
POL. 449, 456-60 (1990) (discussing historical provenance of term “sectarian”).
10
     Some Blaine-like state provisions, as I will detail below, predated the federal Blaine Amendment, but 
the majority of the State Blaines arose in the succeeding three decades.  See infra __.
11 FLA. DECL. OF RTS. § 6 (1885); see FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
12 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu and Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 56 (2002) (“American Separationism reached its high water mark in the 
early 1970s, when the United States Supreme Court laid down rules that essentially precluded any direct government 
assistance to the educational program of religiously affiliated elementary and secondary schools.”).
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application.  But “[t]he time may have arrived” when they can blossom.13  Over the last two decades, the 
Supreme Court has eased constitutional restrictions on religious access to public funds,14 and, as 
happened in Witters III, this will force state courts to ask whether State Blaines place stricter limitations 
on public funding for the religious.15  Inevitably, courts will have to say whether the nature of those 
limitations can withstand scrutiny under the federal Constitution.
That latter inquiry is the subject of this article.  Beyond what likely motivated the State Blaines’ 
passage, the more significant foundational question is what they purport to do.  It is not enough to bring 
an indictment of anti-Catholicism against the State Blaines.  No one would doubt that many if not most 
State Blaines were driven by legislators’ desires to penalize a disfavored religious group.  But, for my 
purposes, the key question will be how those motives translated into visible legal form in the language 
and operation of the State Blaine Amendments.  The State Blaines’ history, consequently, provides a 
useful context for understanding their operation, but it is only the beginning of the constitutional inquiry.
The religious dynamics of the State Blaines are different today than in the nineteenth century.  
Public schools are no longer Protestant or indeed traditionally religious at all—the Supreme Court’s 
religion jurisprudence since the mid-1960s has scoured American public schools of all formal religious 
13
     Bybee & Newton, supra, at 574.
14 See, e.g., Lupu Distinctive Place, supra, at 57 (“Over the past fifteen years, the prophylactic character 
of strict Separationism has been under siege.”); Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State 
Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 121, 122-23 (2001) (explaining that, while “[c]hurch-state separation reached its 
height in the 1960s and 1970's decisions forbidding public school prayers and aid to private religious schools, … in 
the 1980s and 1990s, this strain of separationism lost ground, particularly with respect to school aid”).
15
     The Supreme Court’s recent validation of a school voucher program allowing substantial participation 
of religious schools should accelerate this process.  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).  Charles 
Fried has noted that, whether or not the five-Justice majority in Zelman endures, “opponents of school choice are 
increasingly turning to state constitutions that contain a so-called ‘Blaine Amendment’—a provision that insists on a 
more stringent and clear-cut separation between church and state than the Supreme Court requires under its First 
Amendment jurisprudence—to support their legal strategy.”  See Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the 
School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 174-75 & n.55 (2002).
6practice.16  Private schools, while significantly religious, are no longer overwhelmingly Catholic.17  Anti-
Catholic bias may no longer be ascendant,18 but our public institutions have embraced, in Justice 
Goldberg’s memorable phrase, a “brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular” that instinctively 
confines serious religion to the private sphere and recoils from its intrusion into the public sphere.19
Against this reshuffled social and religious backdrop, the non-specific textual references to “religion,” 
“sects” or “sectarian” in the State Blaines will operate to restrict, not only Catholic schools or Catholic
organizations, but religious schools and organizations generally.20 Thus, the most obvious function of the 
16 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer); Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Lord’s Prayer and Bible reading); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Ten 
Commandments); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (certain moment of silence laws); Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577 (1992) (prayers at high school graduation); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prayer 
at high school football game).
17 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 279, 337-39 (2001).
18 See generally Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 122-23, 163-72.  At the same time, Berg explains that 
“[a]lthough negative attitudes toward Catholicism certainly remain significant, they are less widely held, are less 
focused on Catholic schools as such, and are only part of a broader distrust of politically active social conservatives, 
including evangelical Protestants.  Id. at 123.  See also Lupu Distinctive Place, supra, at 67 (commenting that a 
traditional “no-aid” position on government assistance to religious schools “in practice, meant but one thing—no 
state assistance to Catholic elementary and secondary schools.  Most happily, such sentiment is, for a variety of 
reasons, no longer intellectually respectable in the United States.”).
19 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring); 
see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 120 (1992) 
(criticizing the Warren and Burger Courts’ “tendency to press relentlessly in the direction of a more secular society” 
and “to view religion as an unreasoned, aggressive, exclusionary, and divisive force that must be confined to the 
private sphere”); Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 151-52 (arguing that “[b]y invalidating officially sponsored 
prayers in state schools in 1962 and Bible readings the next year, the Warren Court questioned the generalized civil 
religion that the 1950s had affirmed” and that “the Burger Court, in a series of decisions in the 1970s … severely 
limited government aid to religious elementary and secondary schools and their students”) (citations omitted); see 
also RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 79-82 (2d ed. 
1997) (discussing secularizing drift of Supreme Court’s jurisprudence).
20 I do not, of course, mean to suggest that the State Blaines’ language could ever have been correctly 
interpreted to apply only to Catholic schools or organizations.  I know of no commentator or court having advocated 
that interpretation, nor—given the general references in the State Blaines to “religions,” “denominations,” and 
“sects”—does such an interpretation seem plausible.  In any event, interpreting them that way would open the State 
Blaines to a charge of plain denominational discrimination under the free exercise clause.   See, e.g., Larson v. 
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).  That said, I do think the history that I recount in this article strongly suggests that 
there was a hope or expectation behind the enactment of State Blaines that their operation would disproportionately 
impact Catholic organizations.  But, as I explain throughout, that question of subjective legislative motive for the 
State Blaines is legally distinct from the question of whether their objective operation is unconstitutional.  My 
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State Blaines will be to separate the religious from the “secular” in the allocation of public funds, raising 
explicit barriers against the use of public assistance for a variety of, if not all, religious ends and 
religiously affiliated organizations.21
If that is how the State Blaines operate, then they will violate the religious freedom guarantees of 
the First Amendment.  Laws may not attach a civil disability to lawful behavior, status, or association 
because, and only because, they are motivated by religious impulses or connected to religious belief or 
observance.  On this account, State Blaines are “laws that by their terms impose disabilities on the basis 
of religion.”22  The State Blaines unconstitutionally “punish” religious status, behavior, and association by 
selectively disqualifying them from generally available public assistance. That conclusion goes to the 
deepest roots of American religious freedom: as Michael McConnell has observed, “[f]rom the outset [of 
the United States], the prevention of persecution, penalties, or incapacities on account of religion has 
served as a common ground among all the various interpretations of religious liberty.”23
argument for the State Blaines’ unconstitutionality does not depend on the anti-Catholic animus that brooded over 
their births.
21
     My observation here accords with a broader point made by Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle (commenting 
on Justice Breyer’s dissent in Zelman) in a recent piece.  See Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: 
Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917 (2003).  
Dismissing Justice Breyer’s anachronistic concerns about “sectarian strife,” Lupu and Tuttle observe that “[t]he 
religious wars in the United States in the earliest 21st century are not Protestant vs. Catholic, or Christian vs. Jew, or 
even the more plausible Islam vs. all others.  They are instead the wars of the deeply religious against the forces of a 
relentlessly secular commercial culture.”  Id. at 954-55; see Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2502-08 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22
    Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 557 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)).  For a recent article reaching a similar conclusion about 
the operation of most State Blaines, see Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine 
Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 556 (2003) 
(arguing that “many, if not most, state Blaine Amendments violate the First Amendment’s provisions regarding 
religious liberty and free speech because they unlawfully discriminate against religious believers”).
23
     Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1474 (1990).
8This article will focus on the Free Exercise Clause as a primary, but not exclusive, source of 
principles that prohibit the discriminatory operation of the State Blaine Amendments.24  The free exercise 
violation reaches deeply to the historical and normative roots of that clause—as originally conceived, the 
clause would have applied most vigorously to federal laws aimed at religious exercise.25 Moreover, even 
laboring under the inconsistency of its religion jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has consistently (and 
unanimously) held that laws targeting religiously motivated behavior, status, or association because of 
their religious content or connection are presumptively unconstitutional.  Beyond free exercise, aspects of 
the Court’s non-establishment and free speech jurisprudence reinforce the constitutional prohibition 
against invidious government classification of religion and the religious.
Thus, a major theme in this article is non-discrimination.  The First Amendment forbids 
government from selectively demoting those who act on religious conviction to second -class citizenship 
in the distribution of public benefits.26  A second theme is federalism.  The Free Exercise, Establishment 
and Free Speech Clauses apply to the states because they are “incorporated” into the Fourteenth 
24
    There are other plausible approaches to attacking the State Blaines.  See, e.g., DeForrest, supra, at 617-
25 (free speech); Rees, supra, at 1313-28 (free speech); Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 962 n.204, 967-71 (free 
speech, anti-Catholic animus, or congressional legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Heytens, 
supra, at 140-52 (equal protection).  But my approach, which I defend throughout this article, is that the Free 
Exercise Clause is the most apt locus, both historically and doctrinally, of principles condemning the State Blaines.
25 See, e.g., McConnell Origins, supra, at 1474; see also Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free 
Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 N.W. L. REV. 1106, 1108, 1109, 1113 
& 1114 (1994) (explaining that the original free exercise clause “[a]t most … prevented the federal government 
from passing laws targeting religion qua religion” and that “even if the original Free Exercise Clause could be read 
as an expression of individual rights, it would prohibit only those laws that directly targeted religion”); Amar BILL 
OF RIGHTS, supra, at 42 (arguing that “[i]f the phrase ‘Congress shall make no law’ really meant that Congress 
simply lacked enumerated power to intrude into religious freedom in the several states, the kind of intrusion 
prohibited must have been a congressional law that sought to abridge religious exercise as such—a congressional 
law targeted at the free exercise of religion”) (emphasis in original).
26 See, e.g., DeForrest, supra, at 609 (arguing that, with reference to State Blaines, “the fundamental 
principle of equality of citizenship found at the heart of liberal democracy” implies “a right not to be treated as a 
‘second-class’ citizen, not only in regard to politics, but in ‘society’s common project’”) (quoting Paul Weithman, 
Religious Reasons and the Duties of Membership, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 515 (2001)).
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Amendment.27  Before incorporation of the religion clauses, the states presumably could discriminate 
against religion generally, or against certain faiths, as much as they liked.28 But incorporation of the First 
Amendment has taken religious discrimination at any level of government off the table.29
27
     I will explore below some of the cognitive problems presented by “applying” the Establishment Clause
“against” the states, and how they might impact the State Blaines.  Michael McConnell argues that application of 
either religion clause to the states is “somewhat anachronistic” given that the First Amendment explicitly applies 
only to Congress, but he allows that “[b]ecause the free exercise clause at the federal level was itself modeled on 
free exercise provisions in the various state constitutions, … no structural distortions arise from assuming that, for 
modern purposes (after ‘incorporation’), the free exercise clause means the same thing for states that it has always 
meant for the federal government.”  McConnell Origins, supra, at 1485.  Not so with the establishment clause.  Its 
incorporation against the states, argues McConnell, “presents far more serious interpretive difficulties, since there 
existed no national consensus on the question of government aid to religion, other than to leave the question to the 
states.”  Id. at 1485 n.384.  Akhil Amar has demonstrated what many commentators have long maintained: the 
Establishment Clause was originally understood only as a structural limitation on the power of the federal Congress 
to prevent it from meddling with, or disestablishing, state establishments.  Amar BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 32-42; 
accord William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (1990).  Mechanistic incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states, 
consequently, is incoherent.  See Amar BILL OF RIGHTS 33-34, 41, 251-54 (criticizing mechanistic incorporation, but 
advocating “refined” incorporation of Establishment Clause; see also Kurt T. Lash, The Second Incorporation of the 
Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1085, 1135-36, 1151-53 
(1995) (describing difficulties with incorporating original Establishment Clause, but proposing a “reconstructed” 
clause more amenable to incorporation).
Of the current Justices, only Justice Thomas has expressed a willingness to revisit the establishment-
incorporation issue.  See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2480-82 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Thomas has suggested that the 
Establishment Clause, even if incorporated, should bind the states “on different terms than … the Federal 
Government.”  Id. at 2481.  Picking up on arguments made by the second Justice Harlan and more recently by Akhil 
Amar, Thomas suggests that states should be freer to pass laws “that include or touch upon religion” provided they 
“do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual religious liberty interest.”  Id. (citing, inter alia, Walz v. 
Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 699 (Harlan, J., concurring); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 
YALE L. J. 1131, 1159 (1991); see also Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 948 (observing that Justice Thomas has 
“urged the Court to limit its intervention into religious liberty issues arising under state law to those properly 
cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause”).  These arguments will be relevant to my discussion of incorporation’s 
impact on the State Blaines.  See infra __.
28
     In 1845 the Supreme Court first held explicitly that “[t]he Constitution makes no provision for 
protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and 
laws; nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on the states.”  
Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845).  For a general discussion of Permoli, see, e.g., Jay 
S. Bybee, Taking Liberties With the First Amendment:  Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1571-73 (1995); Jay S. Bybee, Substantive Due Process and Free Exercise of 
Religion:  Meyer, Pierce and the Origins of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 887, 912-13 (1996).  As Bybee 
observes, “[t]he Court has reaffirmed this position, both prior to and subsequent to the ratification of the 14th 
Amendment.”  Bybee Meyer, supra, at 913 & n.125 (citations omitted).
29 See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground:  Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the 
First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251, 327 (2000) (“Although the First Amendment applies, by its terms, to 
Congress alone, the Court’s jot-for-jot incorporation has brought the First Amendment to the States on precisely the 
same terms.  The First Amendment, applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, 
10
The effects of incorporating the religion clauses foreclose a general conceptual objection to my 
argument.  This objection, addressed below in Part V.A, is posited on a federalism rationale that states 
may, through their more restrictive Blaine Amendments, legitimately “define [a] vision of religious 
freedom as one completely free of governmental interference.”30  In the course of my argument, I will 
demonstrate that the settled application of the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses to 
the States significantly restrains States in how they pursue this elusive vision of a society where religion 
and government are “completely free” from one another.  Specifically, States cannot further such a goal 
by erecting, on the basis of their Blaine Amendments, “secular” or “non-religious” as a motivational, 
behavioral or associational requirement for access to generally available public benefits.  If the origins 
and operation of the State Blaines are properly understood, then the principle of non-persecution 
embedded in the First Amendment will strictly circumscribe, if not completely nullify, their impact on the 
freedom of religious persons and organizations to participate equally in public benefits. 
II.  History
America’s collective obsession with public schooling began in the early 1800s, when a fever of 
enthusiasm in the form of the “common school” movement swept the nation.  The idea of public 
education was closely linked to the idea of moral education—and that in turn was linked with religious 
training—and so, unsurprisingly, American public schools had a distinctive religious flavor marked by 
the majority Protestant ethos of the day.  This dismayed the growing number of American Catholics, who, 
with increasing volume and intermittent success, began asking for public money for their own private 
schools.  But the Protestant majority was alarmed in turn, fearing its tax dollars being siphoned off for 
dark Catholic purposes, and so cries went up for laws to prevent public money going to “sectarian” 
has become a subject matter disability to the states as well.  Incorporation has blurred both the federalism and 
separation of powers aspects of the original First Amendment.”).
30 See Davey v. Locke, 299 F. 3d 748, 761 (9th Cir. 2002) (McKeown, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 123 
S. Ct. 2075, 71 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. May 19, 2003) (No. 02-1315).  See infra __.
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organizations.31  The movement culminated, disappointingly for Protestants, in the narrow defeat of a 
federal constitutional amendment—the Blaine Amendment— in 1875.  But rising from the ashes of the 
federal attempt, a host of like-minded state constitutional provisions flourished over the next quarter-
century.  Thus were the State Blaines born.32
A. Common schools
Before the middle third of the 1800s, there was no public education in America to speak of.  
Education was largely administered by churches and clergy and was intertwined with religious 
instruction.33  But in the 1830s, riding the tide of a “massive evangelical resurgence,” the common-school 
movement took hold.34  Its leading figure was Horace Mann, Massachusetts’ secretary of education from 
1837-49, who championed the infusion of common schools with explicitly religious moral instruction—a 
curriculum whose theological content evidenced a “pan-Protestant compromise, a vague and inclusive 
Protestantism” designed to tranquilize conflict among Protestant denominations.35  Daily reading, without 
31 See, e.g., Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 130 (“The Protestant majority was always particularly 
intense and united in opposing state aid to religious schools, which were historically primarily Catholic.”).
32 Another recent retelling of the State Blaines’ genesis can be found in DeForrest, supra, at 556-76.
33 See, e.g., Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake:  School Choice, the First Amendment, and State 
Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 663 (1998) (citing BERNARD BAILYN, EDUCATION IN THE 
FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1960); RICHARD J. GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
(1937)).  Viteritti notes Tocqueville’s statement that, in America, “[a]lmost all education is intrusted to the clergy.”  
Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 663 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 320 n.4 
(Phillips Bradley ed., Random House 1945) (1839)).  Philip Hamburger clarifies that Tocqueville’s observation was 
likely suggested by his American editor, John C. Spencer, and referred to Protestant clergy.  See PHILIP 
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 220 n.75 (2002).
34 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra, at 297 (citing 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 242 (1950); DAVID B. TYACK, Onward Christian Soldiers:  Religion in the American Common 
School, in HISTORY AND EDUCATION:  THE EDUCATIONAL USES OF THE PAST 212, 217 (Paul Nash, ed., 1970)).
35 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra, at 299 (citing ROBERT MICHAELSON, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 78-79 
(1970)).  Jeffries and Ryan explain that the architects of the common school, Mann chief among them, kept religion 
in the schools and controversy out by “promoting least-common-denominator Protestantism and rejecting 
particularistic influences.”  Id. at 298; see also Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 144 (explaining that “the state-
operated, or ‘common,’ schools had been created to overcome the division between Protestant denominations during 
the first nineteenth century wave of Catholic immigration—to educate those various Protestant children (and, 
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divisive commentary, of the King James Bible—along with recitation of the Lord’s Prayer and the 
singing of hymns—thus became the foundation of religious instruction in the common schools.36  So 
entrenched was this vague Protestant ethos that educators like Mann could claim that the common 
schools’ religious content was not “sectarian,” insofar as the curriculum excluded doctrines “peculiar to 
specific denominations but not common to all.”37  Only in this narrow liberal Protestant sense could 
American public schools in the mid-1800s be fairly characterized as “religious but nonsectarian.”38  But 
the common consensus supporting the common schools’ religious and moral foundations plainly excluded 
Catholics, other non-mainstream believers (Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the like), and non-
believers.39
B. Growing Catholic population and influence
At this time, American Catholics were increasing in numbers and political influence.  Through 
immigration mostly from Ireland and Germany, the Catholic population in the United States increased 
ultimately, it was hoped, their Catholic counterparts) in ‘common’”) (citing JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING 
EQUALITY:  SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 147-56 (1999)).
36 See id. at 298 (“Mann insisted on Bible reading, without commentary, as the foundation of moral 
education.”) & n.86 (noting that “the first textbook used in the United States, the Hornbook” contained only the 
alphabet and the Lord’s Prayer); see also Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 666-67 (noting that “Mann’s schools 
required daily reading from the King James version of the Bible … [t]he recital of prayers and the singing of 
hymns”); Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 34 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 38, 41 (1992) (noting the 
“obvious evangelical Protestant overtones to public education”); Hamburger, supra, at 220 (describing Protestant 
character of instruction in New York City public schools of this period); see also Bybee Meyer, supra, at 894 
(observing that “[t]he public schools had long been the domain of Protestant Americans.  Bible readings and prayers 
in school reflected Protestant beliefs.  Both Protestants and Catholics regarded each other with the suspicion that 
their respective school systems were tools for propaganda and evangelization.”).
37 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra, at 298.  Mann, a theologically liberal Unitarian, clashed with more 
conservative Massachusetts denominations, such as orthodox Congregationalists, Baptists, and Methodists.  He 
dismissed criticism of the common-schools’ watered-down Protestant theology, and demands for more substantive 
religious content, as “sectarian.”  Id.  Viteritti highlights the essentially intolerant character of this kind of 
universalism:  “The common-school curriculum promoted a religious orthodoxy of its own that was centered on the 
teachings of mainstream Protestantism and was intolerant of those who were non-believers.”  Viteritti Blaine’s 
Wake, supra, at 666.
38
     Jeffries & Ryan, supra, at 299  (observing that “[f]rom its inception … American public education was 
religious but nonsectarian”).
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sharply from a mere 1% of the population during the Revolution to about 3.3% in 1840, 10% in 1866, and 
12.9% by 1891.40  These Catholic immigrants, poor and unfamiliar with American society, flooded into 
major northern cities such as New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, and Cincinnati.41  They were 
easy targets for discrimination by the “nativist” Protestant population, and such sentiments readily 
blended with religious hatred.  As Philip Hamburger writes:  “Fearful of the foreigners, many native-born 
Protestants self-consciously identified themselves with America and its native population and, on this 
basis, these ‘nativists’ opposed foreign immigration, especially by Irish Catholics.  Yet even this sort of 
secular ethnic and class animosity often blended into the religious prejudice that would do so much to 
popularize the separation of church and state.”42 Nonetheless, through sheer numbers, ethnic cohesion 
and religious identity, American Catholics gained increasing political influence.43  The Protestant-
dominated public school system would furnish the inevitable political battleground, pitting Catholics’ 
desires for educational and societal equality against nativist Protestants’ fears of Catholic influence.
39 Id.; see also Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 666 (observing that, while “[t]he American common 
school was founded on the pretense that religion has no legitimate place in public education, … in reality it was a 
particular kind of religion that its proponents sought to isolate from public support”).
40 See Toby J. Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 135 & nn.101-110 
(2000) (providing statistical overview of U.S. Catholic population from 1789 through 1921) (relying primarily on 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 14 Series A 6-8 (1975); JAMES 
HENNESEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS:  A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1981)).  See also Bybee & Newton, supra, at 555 (same statistics); Jeffries & Ryan, supra, at 299-300 & 
nn.98-103 (similar statistics).
41 See, e.g., Hamburger, supra, at 202; Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 669.
42
     Hamburger, supra, at 202; see also Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 130 (discussing “long history” of 
American anti-Catholicism).
43 See, e.g.,  Bybee & Newton, supra, at 555; Green, supra, at 42-43; Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 
669.  Bybee & Newton observe that “by 1876, it was generally assumed that the Catholic vote had ‘determined the 
results of elections since 1870.’”  Bybee & Newton, supra, at 555 (quoting Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, The Blaine 
Amendment of 1875:  Private Motives for Political Action, 42 CATH. HIST. REV. 15, 32 (1957)).  
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C. Conflict over school funding
The explicit religious practices widespread in American public schools of this period were a 
direct affront to Catholics’ religious beliefs.44  Not only did the Catholic Church not recognize the King 
James translation of the Bible—the only officially approved English translation of the Bible was the 
Douay version—but daily “[u]naccompanied Bible reading, which was a cornerstone of the Protestant 
consensus,” violated Catholic conviction that scripture should be read only in the context of the Church’s 
authoritative doctrinal tradition.45  Textbooks, moreover, often denigrated Catholics and their faith.46
Catholics responded by exercising their growing political power to oppose Protestant religious practices 
in public schools and, beyond that, to request public funds for their own schools.47  This provoked from 
the Protestant establishment “a display of majoritarian politics of unprecedented brutality.”48  Catholics’ 
44 See, e.g., Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 668 (although Massachusetts was the only state to mandate 
Bible reading in public schools by law, “between seventy-five and eighty percent of the schools in the country 
voluntarily followed the practice”).  Viteritti discusses the 1854 decision in Donahue v. Richards, in which the 
highest court in Maine ruled that students’ being required to read the King James Bible in public schools was “not 
an infringement of religious freedom,” thereby upholding the expulsion of a Catholic teenager for refusing to read 
the Bible in class.  Id. (discussing Donohue v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854)).
45 See, e.g., Jeffries & Ryan, supra, at 300 (observing that “the very fact of a direct and unmediated 
approach to God contradicted Catholic doctrine,” that the Douay Bible—aside from being the Church’s approved 
translation—“also [provided] authoritative annotation and comment,” and that, according to Church teaching, 
“[r]eading the unadorned text invited the error of private interpretation”).
46 See, e.g., Hamburger, supra, at 220 (observing that the New York City “Public School Society,” which 
received public funds, operated ostensibly nondenominational schools that “required children to read the King James 
Bible and to use textbooks in which Catholics were condemned as deceitful, bigoted, and intolerant”); id. at 223 
(noting that the Public School Society later attempted to bolster the claim that its schools were nonsectarian “by 
offering to black out the most bigoted anti-Catholic references in its textbooks”); id. at 223 n.83 (discussing the 
report of a special school committee that, while generally defending the nonsectarian character of New York City 
public schools, nonetheless reported as “not wholly unfounded” charges that “the books used in the public schools 
contain passages that are calculated to prejudice the minds of children against the Catholic faith”).
47 See, e.g., Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity 
Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 113, 145 (1996) (“Church leaders in Philadelphia, 
Boston, Baltimore, and New York City resisted the blatant Protestantism that had dominated the public school 
curriculum in the form of prayers, hymn, and bible reading (the King James version, of course) and eventually began 
to set up their own schools.”); see also Bradley Stereotype, supra, at 9 (stating that “a separate Catholic school 
system was started in this country to protect Catholic children from the scandal of aggressive Protestantism in the 
public schools”).
48 See Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 669.
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request for school funds inflamed latent Protestant fears of Catholic domination:  for instance, the Board 
of Assistants of New York City—a focal point for the school funding controversy—issued a “widely 
disseminated report” that invoked fears of “[r]eligious zeal, degenerating into fanaticism and bigotry, 
[that] has covered many battle-fields with its victims” as well as macabre images of “the stake, the gibbet, 
and the prison.”49  Such rhetoric provoked mob violence against Catholics, as, for example, when the 
residence of the Catholic Bishop of New York City, John Hughes, was destroyed and the militia were 
enlisted to defend St. Patrick’s Cathedral.50
49 See Hamburger, supra, at 222 (reproducing the New York City Board of Assistants’ report rejecting the 
Catholics’ petition for school funding); see generally Hamburger, supra, at 219-29 (discussing the New York City
school funding controversy).  Partly fueling Protestant fears was the belief—understandable in light of Papal 
statements of the period criticizing the separation of church and state and religious liberty—that Catholic doctrines 
were incompatible with American ideals of freedom and individual conscience. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO,
DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 61 (2000) (observing that 
America’s “core principles of individual freedom and democratic equality” were seen to be threatened by the 
Catholic Church’s “authoritarian institutional structure, its long-standing association with feudal or monarchial 
governments, its insistence on close ties between church and state, its endorsement of censorship, and its rejection of 
individual rights to freedom of conscience and worship”); see also Jeffries & Ryan, supra, at 302 (stating that 
“Rome hampered attempts by American Catholics to abandon the Church’s legacy by issuing reactionary 
pronouncements ideally suited to confirm the rankest prejudice,” and discussing attacks by Pope Gregory XVI and 
Pius IX on secular education and freedom of conscience); Bybee & Newton, supra, at 555 (noting that “[t]he 
Vatican Decree of Papal Infallibility of 1870 added to the anti-Catholic sentiment during this time) (citing ANSON 
PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 329 (1964)); see also generally
Hamburger, supra, at 229-34 (discussing American Protestant reactions to Papal condemnation of separationism, 
especially Gregory XVI’s 1832 encyclical Mirari Vos).  Indeed, as Thomas Berg explains, as late as the 1950s 
Protestants continued to be plausibly threatened by the Vatican’s official position that “religious freedom was not a 
moral ideal in itself, but at most a prudential accommodation to the fact of diversity in religious beliefs,” and that the 
ideal was “a Catholic confessional state with support for the Church and at least some restrictions on the educational 
and evangelistic activities of other faiths.”  Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 133-34.  With the Second Vatican 
Council of the 1960s, however, the Vatican clearly recognized religious freedom as a human right in its Declaration 
on Religious Freedom, which was strongly influenced by the work of John Courtney Murray.  Id. at 136-37 (citing
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., GOVERNMENTAL REPRESSION OF HERESY (1948); JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., 
THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1965)); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 333 (1998) (discussing Murray’s conflicts with the Vatican over 
the question of religious freedom).
50 See Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 669; see also Hamburger, supra, at 216-17 (“Aroused by religious 
prejudice, fears about political and mental liberty, and fantasies about sexual violation, American mobs violently 
attacked Catholics.”)  Hamburger points to the Protestant practice in the 1830s of “burning down Catholic churches, 
their most notorious achievement being the destruction in 1834 of the Ursuline convent in Charlestown, 
Massachusetts.”  Id. at 216.  Thomas Berg notes that “[a]nti-Catholicism has a long history in America, from 
outbreaks of mob violence in the mid-1800s against Catholic immigrants in Philadelphia and New York, to the 
nativist, anti-immigrant campaign in the 1920s to make private schools illegal.”  Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 
16
A more systematic reaction arose in the form of legislation “prohibiting sectarian control over 
public schools and the diversion of public funds to religious institutions.”51  Roughly by the time of the 
attempted federal Blaine Amendment in 1875, some fifteen states had passed state laws—some in the 
form of constitutional amendments—to seal off public funds from “sectarian” control.52  Emblematic was 
the 1840s New York law (a direct precursor at an 1894 provision in the New York Constitution) that 
prohibited public funding of any school where “any religious sectarian doctrine or tenet shall be taught, 
inculcated, or practiced.”53
D. The Federal Blaine Amendment
The bitter fight over school funding gave rise to an abortive attempt to amend the federal 
Constitution in 1875.  The amendment, sponsored by Maine Congressman James G. Blaine, would have 
incarnated in the Constitution the dominant nativist Protestant desire to segregate public funds from 
“sectarian” schools and organizations, while preserving the Protestant establishment’s ability to maintain 
explicit religious content in public schools.  Politically, the amendment was an attempt to strengthen the 
foundering Republican Party by uniting a coalition of nativist Protestants (who were pro-religious but 
anti- Catholic) and a growing number of “secularists” (who were either atheists or simply opposed to all 
organized religions).  While the political motivations behind the amendment sought to combine these 
largely irreconcilable forces, the substance of the amendment itself was decidedly a product of the 
majority Protestant establishment.  The secularists (who styled themselves “Liberals”) put forward their 
130 (citing LLOYD JORGENSEN, THE STATE AND THE NONPUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825-1925, at 69-110 (1987); Viteritti 
Choosing Equality, supra, at 151).
51 See Green, supra, at 43; see also Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 669 (describing the drafting, in the 
1854 Massachusetts legislature controlled by the anti-Catholic “Know Nothing” Party, of “the first state laws to 
prohibit aid to sectarian schools”).
52 See Green, supra, at 43; Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 130.
53 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra, at 301; see also Viteritti Choosing Equality, supra, at 146 n.176 (dating 
New York law from 1844); see 1844 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 320 § 12.
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own proposed amendments, which were far more separationist and anti-religious than the proposed Blaine 
Amendment and which ultimately failed to attract serious support.
On September 30, 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant gave an important speech in which he 
capitalized on Protestant alarm at perceived Catholic incursions into American education.  Delivered in 
Des Moines, Iowa, to a convention of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, Grant’s address 
palpitated with anti-Catholic implications:
If we are to have another contest in the near future of our national existence, I predict that 
the dividing line will not be Mason and Dixon’s, but it will be between patriotism and 
intelligence on one side, and superstition, ambition and ignorance on the other.  In this 
centennial year, the work of strengthening the foundation of the structure laid by our 
forefathers one hundred years ago, should be begun.  Let us all labor for the security of 
free thought, free speech, and pure morals, unfettered religious sentiments, and equal 
rights and privileges for all men, irrespective of nationality, color or religion.  Encourage 
free schools, and resolve that not one dollar appropriated to them shall be applied to the 
support of any sectarian school.  Resolve that neither the State or nation, nor both 
combined, shall support institutions of learning other than those sufficient to afford every 
child in the land the opportunity of a good common school education, unmixed with 
atheistic, pagan, or sectarian tenets.  Leave the matter of religion to the family altar, the 
church, and the private schools, supported entirely by private contribution.  Keep the 
Church and State forever separate.54
Grant’s speech was an obvious partisan move to shore up his Republican party, which had been 
wounded by corruption and had lost significant political capital in the last national election.55  The speech 
effectively allied the Republicans with mainstream Protestants and with a popular, anti-Catholic form of 
church-state separation.56  Less than three months later, in his annual message to Congress on December 
7, 1875, Grant proposed a constitutional amendment
54 See Hamburger, supra, at 322 (reproducing text of Grant’s speech) (emphasis added); see also Green, 
supra, at 47-48 (discussing Grant’s speech); Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 670 (same).
55 See Green, supra, at 48-49.
56 Id. at 48; see also Hamburger, supra, at 322 (observing that in the speech, Grant “made separation part 
of the Republicans’ agenda”); Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 670 (Grant’s speech, followed by his proposal for a 
constitutional amendment, “would align the Republican party with the anti-Catholic wing of the public-school 
lobby”).
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making it the duty of each of the several States to establish and forever maintain free 
public schools … forbidding the teaching in said schools of religious, atheistic, or pagan 
tenets; and prohibiting the granting of any school funds or taxes, or any part thereof, 
either by the legislative, municipal, or other authority, for the benefit or in aid, directly or 
indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination, or in aid or for the benefit of any other 
object of any nature or kind whatever.57
Grant ornamented his proposal with warnings that, lacking adequate intelligence and education, “ignorant 
men [may] sink into acquiescence to the will of intelligence, whether directed by the demagogue or by 
priestcraft.”58  A less remarked part of the proposal advocated the taxation of church property—Grant 
provided an exaggerated estimate of expected revenues—hinting darkly that “[t]he contemplation of so 
vast a property as here alluded to, without taxation, may lead to sequestration without constitutional 
authority and through blood.”59  Grant’s proposal was hailed by the New York Times and Tribune, by 
Harper’s Weekly, and by the Chicago Tribune.60  But, as Philip Hamburger describes, not everyone was 
so sanguine about the amendment’s assault on federalism:  “The proposed amendment’s intrusion into 
traditional state powers provoked astonishment among such Americans as were not utterly blinded by 
anti- Catholicism.”61
Unfazed by such subtleties, Congressman James G. Blaine of Maine eagerly picked up Grant’s 
gauntlet when, one week later on December 14, 1875, Blaine proposed a constitutional amendment 
embodying the most popular of Grant’s ideas.62  Having lost the House Speaker’s chair in the Republican 
congressional reversals of 1874, Blaine had set his sights on the Republican presidential nomination for 
57 See Green, supra, at 52; Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 670.
58 See Bybee & Newton, supra, at 555 (quoting Grant’s proposal to Congress); see 4 CONG. REC. 175 
(1875).
59 See Hamburger, supra, at 323-24; see also Green, supra, at 53 n.95 (noting that only the Catholic 
World criticized the taxation proposal).
60
     Green, supra, at 52-53.
61
     Hamburger, supra, at 323 & n.93.
62 See id. at 324.
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the 1876 election.63  The substance of Blaine’s proposed amendment met with widespread approval 
(except, of course, from Catholics), but “few people were fooled by Blaine’s motives.  Blaine was 
running for President, and the school amendment was recognized as a means of garnering support.”64
Blaine himself—whose own mother was Catholic and whose daughters went to Catholic boarding 
schools—denied any anti -Catholic motivations and explained in an open letter that his proposal was 
merely designed to suppress “conflict between religious denominations” by settling the school question in 
“some definite and comprehensive way.”65  Blaine was more likely engaged in rank political 
opportunism.  Once it was clear that Blaine had lost the presidential nomination to Rutherford B. Hayes, 
he lost all interest in the amendment, participated in none of the congressional debates, and—strikingly, 
since Blaine had assumed a seat in the Senate by the time that body considered the amendment—did not 
even show up for the Senate vote on the proposal, which failed to pass by only four votes.66
Blaine’s proposed amendment “rewrote the First Amendment to apply it to the states and to 
specify a single logical consequence of separation—the one most popular with anti-Catholic voters”:
No state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of 
public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted 
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so 
raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.67
63 See Green, supra, at 49.
64 Id. at 53-54; see also Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 671 (noting that “Blaine’s transparent political 
gesture against the Catholic Church provoked considerable press commentary,” including denunciations from the 
Catholic World).  Even The Nation, sympathetic to Blaine’s cause, conceded that the “anti-Catholic excitement was, 
as everyone knows now, a mere flurry” and that “all Mr. Blaine means to do or can do with the amendment is, not to 
pass it but to use it in the campaign to catch anti-Catholic votes.”  Id.; see also Green, supra, at 54.
65 Id. at 49-50, 54 & n.103.
66 See id. at 54 & n.107, 67-68; Bybee & Newton, supra, at 557 n.31.
67
     Hamburger, supra, at 297-98; see 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875); see also Green, supra, at 53 n.96 (text of 
amendment); Bybee & Newton, supra, at 551-52, 557 & n.31 (same).
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The proposed amendment passed the House, with an addendum specifying that it did not “vest, enlarge, 
or diminish legislative power in the Congress,” by a vote of 180 to 7.68  During the more extensive Senate 
debate on the proposal, some senators expressed confusion about the scope and application of its 
language.69  The Senate subsequently proposed a more absolutist version that would have categorically 
prohibited any “[p]ublic property,” “public revenue” or “loan of credit” from being “appropriated to or 
made or used for the support of any school or other institution under the control of any religious or anti-
religious sect, organization, or denomination” or where the “creed or tenets” of such groups were taught.70
Notably, the Senate proposal provided that its language “shall not be construed to prohibit the reading of 
the Bible in any school or institution.”71  The Senate version of the failed to garner the required two-thirds 
majority by a mere four votes—twenty-eight to sixteen (with twenty-seven members not present, 
including Blaine himself)—and failed.72
A final political wrinkle, developed in detail in Philip Hamburger’s recent work, deserves 
mention.73  Whereas the 1830s-50s surge in anti-Catholicism was almost exclusively fueled by nativist 
Protestants, the 1860s-70s surge that culminated with the failed Blaine Amendment included a significant 
additional motivating force:  the “secularists” or “Liberals.”  This diverse group united a wide variety of 
atheists, theists, and spiritualists in a common resentment and mistrust of Christianity’s influence on 
68 See Green, supra, at 58-59; Bybee & Newton, supra, at 557 & n.32; 4 CONG. REC. 5189-92 (1876).
69 See Bybee & Newton, supra, at 557-58.  There appeared to be confusion over whether the language 
prohibited only certain sources of public funds from being applied to sectarian education, and also whether public 
funds might still used for other sectarian activities besides education.  Id.
70 See id. at 558 & n.37 (discussing text of Senate proposal); 4 CONG. REC. 5453 (1876); see also Jeffries 
& Ryan, supra, at 302 (stating that “[t]he [Senate’s] final version laboriously attempted to close every possible 
loophole through which public money might flow to religious schools”).
71 See Bybee & Newton, supra, at 558 n.37.
72
     4 CONG. REC. 5595 (1876).  See Bybee & Newton, supra, at 558; see also Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, 
supra, at 672 & n.72 (citing Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939, 
942, 944 (1951)); Green, supra, at 67.
73 See generally Hamburger, supra, at 287-334.
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government.74 They were best exemplified by the Free Religious Association, in its central publication, 
The Index, and by the founder of The Index, Francis Ellingwood Abbot.75   The Liberals were fueled in 
part by the misguided efforts of some Protestants, under the banner of the National Reform Association, 
to pass a “Christian Amendment” to the U.S. Constitution.  Abbot formed the National Liberal League—
devoted to “the absolute separation of church and state”—to fight the Christian Amendment with 
secularizing counter-proposals.76  He distilled Liberal philosophy into the 1872 publication, “The 
Demands of Liberalism,” which presciently tracked many of the most difficult church-state issues that the 
Supreme Court would face in the twentieth century, including church tax-exemptions, legislative 
chaplains, Sunday laws, and Bible reading in public schools.77  Significantly, Abbot included in his 
“Demands” that “all public appropriations for sectarian educational and charitable institutions shall 
cease,” and that in both the federal and state constitutions, “no privilege or advantage shall be conceded to 
Christianity or any other special religion” and that “our entire political system shall be founded and 
administered on a purely secular basis.”78
Liberals did not think the Blaine Amendment went nearly far enough in extirpating all vestiges of 
religion from government.  They viewed it merely as “an anti-Catholic measure that still permitted a 
generalized Protestantism in public schools as long as this was not the Protestantism of any one sect.”79
The competing amendment proposed by Liberals in 1876 contained more explicit and comprehensive 
safeguards than the Blaine Amendment (particularly the House version).  For instance, the Liberal 
74 See id. at 288-90.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 290-93.
77 See id. at 294-95 & n.21.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 298.
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amendment would have prohibited “taxing the people of any State, either directly or indirectly, for the 
support of any sect of religious body or of any number of sects or religious bodies”; it would have 
protected a person’s right not to be “required be law to contribute directly or indirectly to the support of 
any religious society or body of which he or she is not a voluntary member”; and, reminiscent of the 
absolutist language that would appear sixty years later in the seminal Everson decision,80 it would have 
prevented any governmental unit from “levy[ing] any tax, or mak[ing] any gift, grant or appropriation, for 
the support, or in aid of, any church, religious sect, or denomination,” or any religious school or charity.81
As such proposals show, the Liberal ethos took separationism to its logical extreme.  “Liberals,” 
writes Philip Hamburger, “viewed all Christians with the same fear and horror Protestants reserved for 
Catholics.”82  All government connections to religion must be uprooted.  Significantly, “[e]ven 
government benefits distributed on purely secular grounds could not be given to religious 
organizations.”83  This principle would have excluded all neutrally available public appropriations for 
religious education or religious charities.  Interestingly, the Liberals seemed to make an exception for 
appropriations to individuals who were religious, but not for religious groups.84
But the Liberals’ radically secular project was a political failure.85  It was the traditionally 
Protestant, anti-Catholic version of separationism that proved to be more politically viable, even if it, too, 
did not achieve ultimate national success in the federal Blaine Amendment.  The narrower House version 
of the amendment in particular, as well as the Bible-reading proviso of the more rigorous Senate version, 
80 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (claiming that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to 
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called , or whatever form they adopt to teach or 
practice religion”).
81 Id. at 294 n.21.
82 Id. at 302.
83 Id. at 304-05 & n.43.
84 Id. at 305.
85 See generally Hamburger, supra, at 321-28.
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plainly departed from Liberal secularist dogma.86  Consequently, in the wake of the federal Blaine 
Amendment’s defeat, the nativist Protestants were more successful at securing passage of local versions 
in state constitutions.87  The Liberals, who had made themselves distasteful to mainstream Americans 
through their rigid, fundamentalist attachment to separation and secularism, “had little choice but 
piecemeal lobbying and cultural agitation” to spread their cause.88  Yet, it will be useful to keep in mind 
the Liberals’ radical secularist agenda, when considering some of the similarly absolutist approaches in 
many of the State Blaine Amendments.
E. The Spread of State Blaines
Charles Russell, one of James Blaine’s biographers, provided this bleak summary of Blaine’s 
accomplishments:  “No man in our annals has filled so large a space and left it so empty.”89  But from the 
perspective of actual laws passed, Blaine’s real legacy lay in the numerous state constitutional 
amendments spawned after the failure of his federal amendment.90  The nativist Protestant version of 
separationism had gradually become part of the Republican agenda and thus, while many states adopted 
Blaine Amendments voluntarily, many others were required to incorporate some form of a “non-
sectarian” provision into their state constitutions as a price for entering the union.91  The actual substance 
86 See note __, supra.
87 See Hamburger, supra, at 335, 338.
88 Id. at 338.
89 See Marvin Olasky, Breaking Through Blaine’s Roadblock, WORLD, Aug. 2002 (quoting Charles 
Russell’s 1933 biography of Blaine).
90 See, e.g., Viteritti Choosing Equality, supra, at 146; see also Bybee & Newton, supra, at 559 (“What 
Congress failed to adopt for the nation, most of the states enacted for themselves.”).
91 See Hamburger, supra, at 322 (Grant’s 1875 speech “made separation part of the Republicans’ 
agenda”); Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 672-73 (Republican agenda to force new states to enact Blaine 
Amendments focused primarily on new western states); Bybee & Newton, supra, at 559 (noting that “Congress 
began requiring new states, as a condition of their entering the union, to include some kind of Little Blaine 
Amendment in their constitution”).
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of the various state provisions will be discussed in Part III, below, but this section will generally trace the 
legal and historical mechanisms that resulted in the proliferation of the State Blaines.
The general rise and spread of State Blaines can be charted as follows.  The school funding 
controversy beginning in the 1830s gave rise to increasing state legislation restricting religious school 
funding, sometimes in the form of state constitutional amendments.  The failed attempt in the 1870s to 
pass the federal Blaine Amendment lent momentum to this anti-funding movement, resulting in a 
proliferation of state constitutional amendments in the closing years of the nineteenth century.  As 
discussed above, New York adopted a restrictive funding law in the 1840s, and, by 1876, fourteen other 
states had “joined New York in passing measures prohibiting the division of public school funds, often in 
the form of constitutional amendments.”92
During the 1870s alone, twelve states—Illinois, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Alabama, Nebraska, 
Colorado, Texas, Georgia, New Hampshire, Minnesota, California and Louisiana—adopted provisions 
similar to the federal Blaine Amendment.93  Following the defeat of the federal Blaine Amendment, 
Congress also began to require newly admitted states to adopt some form of an anti-sectarian amendment 
in their own constitutions.94  For example, the 1889 Enabling Act that ushered North Dakota, South 
92
     Green, supra, at 43; see notes ___, supra.
93
    My primary source for the texts of State Blaine Amendments from 1848-1909 is the 1909 edition of the 
Thorpe treatise.  See generally 1-7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS (Francis Newton Thorpe, ed. 1909) (“FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS”); cf. Viteritti Blaine’s 
Wake, supra, at 673 n.78 (citing LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825-1925, at 
114 (1987)); see also Bybee & Newton, supra, at 559 & n.44; Green, supra, at 43 (citing W. Blakey, American State 
Papers 237-266 (1890)).  Other commentators have estimated that only eight or nine states enacted anti-funding 
provisions in the 1870s.  See, e.g., Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 673 n.78; Bybee & Newton, supra, at 559 n.44.  
My count—which, as explained below, takes the view that a relevant provision is one that explicitly bars access to 
public funds on religious grounds—shows twelve states.  I do not find that any anti-funding provision was added to 
the New Jersey Constitution in the 1870s, as other commentators have stated.  See 7 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 4186-4204; Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 673 n.78.  Also, I would mention the 
Alabama provision of 1875, the Georgia and New Hampshire provisions of 1877, and the Louisiana provision of 
1879, which seem to often escape notice.  Finally, I do not include Nevada’s anti-funding provision in the 1870s 
because it was not finally approved until the Nevada general election of 1880.  Bybee & Newton, supra, at 566.
94 See Bybee & Newton, supra, at 559 & n.45; Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 673 & n.76; see also
Hamburger, supra, at 335 (observing that “[n]ativist Protestants … because of the strength of anti-Catholic feeling, 
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Dakota, Montana and Washington into the union required that those states’ constitutional conventions 
“provide, by ordinances irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of said States 
… for the establishment and maintenance of systems of public schools, which shall be open to all the 
children of said States, and free from sectarian control.”95  The same requirement was contained in the 
Enabling Acts authorizing the statehood of Utah, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona and Wyoming.96  By 
1890, twenty-nine states in all had incorporated into their constitutions “prohibitions against the transfer 
of public funds” to sectarian schools or other institutions.97
managed to secure local versions of the Blaine amendment in a vast majority of the states”); id. at 338 (“Not only 
did [nativist Protestants] renew their efforts to obtain state constitutional prohibitions on the distribution of benefits 
to sectarian-controlled schools, but they also demanded that Congress require such clauses in the constitutions of 
territories seeking admission to the Union.”).
95 See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 220 & n.9 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)).  One should be cautious in making too much of congressional “compulsion.”  As the language of the 
Enabling Acts indicates, Congress did not specify that the newly-admitted states must adopt Blaine-type 
formulations in their constitutions.  But see DeForrest, supra, at 573-74 (stating that “Congress did compel the 
inclusion of Blaine Amendment language in some state constitutions,” and referring to the 1889 Enabling Act) 
(citing Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, supra, at 673).  But the heightened national sensitivity to Catholic incursion into 
education, was, I think, evidenced by Congress’ requirement that public school systems be “free from sectarian 
control.”  The states presumably could have complied with such a directive through a variety of constitutional 
formulations—most obviously, by providing that state public schools would be “free from sectarian control.”  But, 
as detailed below, in response to the Enabling Acts, the states went further, adopting explicit religion-sensitive 
restrictions in their constitutions that either tracked or went beyond the federal Blaine Amendment.  See infra __.
96 See McCollum, 330 U.S. at 220 n.9 (citing 28 STAT. 107, 108 (Utah); 34 STAT. 267, 270 (Oklahoma); 
36 Stat. 557, 559, 570 (New Mexico and Arizona); WYO. CONST., 1889, Ordinances, § 5); see also Viteritti Blaine’s 
Wake, supra, at 673 (discussing requirement for inclusion of State Blaine Amendment in New Mexico Constitution); 
cf. Bybee & Newton, supra, at 560 (discussing earlier Nevada Enabling Act, which required Nevada to secure in its 
constitution “perfect toleration of religious sentiment” and that “no inhabitant of said state shall ever be molested in 
person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship”) (quoting 13 STAT. 31, § 4 (1864)).  Bybee & 
Newton note that “Congress placed similar restrictions in the enabling acts for the constitutions of Arizona, Idaho, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Washington.”  Bybee & Newton, supra, at 560 n.51 (citing
ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 158 (1964)).
97 See, e.g., Green, supra, at 43; Viteritti Choosing Equality, supra, at 146-47; Viteritti Blaine’s Wake, 
supra, at 673; see also Bybee & Newton, supra, at 559 & n.46 (noting some counting inconsistencies among 
commentators); Heytens, supra, at 123 n.32 (stating that thirty state constitutions currently contain some form of 
Blaine Amendment, but that commentators often report numbers varying from twenty-four to thirty-three).  My own 
canvass confirms that, by 1890, 29 states had incorporated Blaine provisions into their constitutions.  As the 
following section will demonstrate, I find 36 State Blaine Amendments by 1911 and 38 after Alaska and Hawaii 
entered the union in 1959.  Because Louisiana deleted its Blaine Amendment in 1974, I find that the present number 
of State Blaine Amendments is 37.
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The general thrust of this period of lawmaking has been accurately summarized as follows:  
“Although the states adopted various … Blaine Amendments, it is at least clear that the states generally 
intended to forbid the use of public funds in sectarian schools; and in some cases, it appears that the 
amendments extended to other sectarian institutions as well.”98  The next section will examine the various 
linguistic formulas in which the State Blaine Amendments concretized those objectives.  While the State 
Blaines arose out of a specific historical context—they are the legal offspring of the Protestant-Catholic 
school funding crisis and the political opportunism of Grant and Blaine—today the State Blaines have a 
far more generalized operation in American public life.  They are a widespread mechanism for separating
public benefits from all religious institutions and religious individuals.
III.  State Blaines:  Language and Interpretation
The categorization of a particular state constitutional provision as a “Blaine Amendment” can be 
plausibly approached from various perspectives—e.g., when the provision was adopted, whether it is 
directly traceable to the aftermath of the failed attempt to amend the federal constitution, how state courts 
have interpreted it, etc.—and this probably explains why different treatments of the subject find different 
numbers of existing State Blaines.99  Given the parameters of my legal analysis, I propose a 
straightforward method of characterizing a constitutional provision as a State Blaine Amendment, 
focusing principally on language.  For my purposes, a State Blaine Amendment means a state 
constitutional provision that bars persons’ and organizations’ access to public benefits explicitly because
they are religious persons or organizations.
This is a broad definition and, consequently, the parameters of individual State Blaines will vary.  
For instance, some will bar equal participation in public aid only to religious schools; others will bar 
98
     Bybee & Newton, supra, at 560; see also DeForrest, supra, at 555 (arguing that the State Blaines 
“were motivated by a desire to preserve an unofficial Protestant establishment in public education, and to ensure that 
minority religions—Catholicism, in particular—would be unable to officially challenge that unofficial 
establishment”).
99 See, e.g., Heytens, supra, at 123 & n.32 (discussing counting discrepancies); see note __, supra.
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religious organizations or institutions; yet others will bar non-public institutions generally, while 
explicitly including religious institutions in that category.  State Blaines will also vary in the language 
used to describe the bar on equal participation:  some will prohibit application of funds and other benefits 
“in aid of” religious groups; others will prohibit aid that “supports or sustains” such groups; yet others 
will flatly prohibit any “direct or indirect” aid to such groups.  But, whatever range of disabilities or 
disqualifications exists in the various State Blaines, all of them are premised on something religious
about the disabled or disqualified person, status, organization, or affiliation.  The plain object of disabling 
religion is what unifies the State Blaines.100
State courts’ interpretation of the nuances of how a particular State Blaine applies will not be 
exhaustively explored, but two aspects of state court interpretation will be emphasized.  First, I will point 
out when a state court has explicitly recognized that a State Blaine creates a greater separation between 
church and state than the federal Establishment Clause.  Second, I will point out when a state court has 
done the reverse—that is, interpreted a plainly separationist State Blaine Amendment as doing nothing 
more than mimicking the parameters of the federal religion clauses.  In either case, focusing on these state 
court interpretations will highlight the federalism aspects of the State Blaine Amendments—i.e., whether 
they have been interpreted  simply to reinforce at the state level the separation the federal clauses already 
achieve, or whether they have been read to further a distinctive form of church-state separation that 
exceeds the separation between religion and public funds imposed by the federal religion clauses.
100
    My treatment of the State Blaines does not foreclose an analysis that categorizes them along a 
“continuum” according to how restrictively or expansively a particular provision bars public funding of religion.  
See, e.g., DeForrest, supra, at 576-601 (categorizing State Blaines generally as “less restrictive,” “moderate,” or 
“most restrictive”).  My argument does suggest, however, that in whatever context a State Blaine operates (for 
instance, whether it bars “direct” funding only or also “indirect” funding, or whether it applies only to education or 
to a broader range of persons and institutions), State Blaines generally impose disabilities on the basis of religion 
and, to that extent, are unconstitutional.  For instance, even though Mark DeForrest distinguishes among the State 
Blaines according to the severity of their funding restrictions, id., he concludes that “[w]ith some notable exceptions, 
state Blaine provisions specifically target religious institutions for disparate treatment from other private 
organizations and individuals.”  Id. at 607.
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A. Language
As discussed before, by 1876—just after the failure of the federal Blaine Amendment—fifteen 
states had adopted some kind of law that explicitly prohibited public funding of religious organizations.101
These anti-funding measures often found their way into state constitutions.  As early as 1848, the 
Wisconsin Constitution provided: “nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of 
religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.”102  In the 1850s, five states incorporated similar 
provisions into their constitutions.  The Michigan Constitution of 1850 provided that “[n]o money shall 
be appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious sect or society, theological or 
religious seminary, nor shall property belonging to the State be appropriated for any such purposes.”103  In 
1851 the Indiana Constitution added a similar prohibition.104  Taking an obverse approach, the Ohio 
Constitution of 1851 required that “no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right 
to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.”105  In 1855, Massachusetts provided in its 
constitution that funds raised for “public” or “common” schools “shall never be appropriated to any 
religious sect for the maintenance exclusively of its own schools.”106  Both Kansas107 and Oregon108
followed suit in 1859.
101 See note __, supra.
102 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1848).
103 MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 40 (1850); see MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2 (amended 1970).
104 IND. CONST. art I, § 6 (1851) (providing that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the 
benefit of any religious or theological institution”).
105 OHIO CONST. art. 6, § 2 (1851).
106 MASS. CONST. art. XVIII (1855).
107 KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 8 (1859) (providing that “[n]o religious sect or sects shall control any part of 
the common-school or University funds of the state”).  This provision was moved to art. 6, § 6 in the 1966 
amendment of the Kansas Constitution.
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The end of the 1860s and the first half of the 1870s saw similar provisions adopted by South 
Carolina, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Alabama and Nebraska.109  Illinois adopted an unusually 
detailed provision barring any payments “in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or 
sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, 
controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever” and also forbidding any grant of “land, 
money, or other personal property … to any church or for any sectarian purpose.”110  In the latter half of 
the 1870s—the period directly coinciding with the failure of the federal Blaine Amendment—Colorado, 
Texas, Georgia, New Hampshire, Minnesota, California and Louisiana also adopted anti-funding 
provisions.111  Georgia’s112 and Minnesota’s113 1877 provisions were notably explicit about the range and 
character of excluded institutions.
108 OR. CONST. art. 1, § 5 (1859) (providing that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the 
benefit of any religeous [sic], or theological institution” and forbidding that “any money be appropriated for the 
payment of any religeous [sic] services in either house of the Legislative Assembly”).
109 See S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 5 (1868) (providing that “[n]o religious sect or sects shall have exclusive 
right to or control of any part of the school-funds of the State”) (see also S.C. CONST. art. 11, § 4 (1973)); ILL. 
CONST. art. 8, § 3 (1870) (forbidding, inter alia, appropriation of public funds for “anything in aid of any church or 
sectarian purpose”) (renumbered art. 10, § 3 (1970)); PA. CONST. art. 3, § 18 (1874) (forbidding appropriations “for 
charitable, educational or benevolent purposes … to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation or 
association”); see id. art. 3, § 29 (1967); MO. CONST. art. 11, § 11 (1875) (presently art. 9, § 8) (forbidding any 
payment of public funds “in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian purpose” and to any school “controlled 
by any religious creed, church or sectarian denomination whatever”); ALA. CONST. art. 12, § 8 (1875) (forbidding 
educational funds being “appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian or denominational school”) (see 
also ALA. CONST. art. 14, § 263); NEB. CONST. art. 8, § 11 (1875) (forbidding “sectarian instruction … in any school 
or institution supported in whole or in part by [public school funds]” and state acceptance of any grant of property 
“to be used for sectarian purposes”); see id. art 7, § 11 (1976).  The Pennsylvania and Nebraska Constitutions were 
further amended in 1963 and 1976, respectively, to impose more specific restrictions against the use of public funds 
for religious purposes.  See ___, infra.
110 ILL. CONST. art. 8, § 3 (1870) (renumbered art. 10, § 3 (1970)).
111 See COLO. CONST. art. 9, § 7 (1876) (anti-funding provision identical to article 8, § 3 of the 1870 
Illinois Constitution, supra); id. art. 5, § 34 (1876) (prohibition on “charitable, industrial, educational or benevolent” 
appropriations to any “denominational or sectarian institution or association,” similar to article 3, § 18 of the 1874 
Pennsylvania Constitution, supra); TX. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (1876) (providing that “[n]o money shall be appropriated, 
or drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any sect, or religious society, theological or religious seminary”); id. 
art. 7, § 5(a) (barring school fund from “ever be[ing] appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian 
school”); GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, ¶ 14 (1877) (similar prohibition); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83 (1877) (same); MN. 
CONST. art. 13, § 2 (1877) (same); CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 30 (1879) (same) (see CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 5; art. 9, § 8 
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New Hampshire was an instructive and ironic case in point.  Since 1784, New Hampshire’s 
constitution had eloquently charged its legislature with promoting the educational flourishing of New 
Hampshire citizens:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, being essential to the 
preservation of a free government; and spreading the opportunities and advantages of 
education through the various parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote 
this end; it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this 
government, to cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and 
public schools, to encourage private and public institutions, rewards, and immunities for 
the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and natural 
history of the country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and
general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and economy, honesty and 
punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, and generous sentiments, among 
the people[.]114
Somewhat marring the harmony and inclusiveness of these sentiments, New Hampshire added this 
exception in 1877:  “Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by taxation shall ever be granted or 
applied for the use of the schools or institutions of any religious sect or denomination.”115
In the 1880s and 1890s another thirteen states added their numbers to this growing trend of 
religiously sensitive anti-funding provisions.116  As discussed above, during this period Congress began 
(amended 1966)); see also LA. CONST. art. 51 (1879) (providing that “[n]o money shall ever be taken from the 
public treasury, directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, 
preacher, minister or teacher thereof”); id. art. 228 (1879) (providing that no school funds “shall be appropriated to 
or used for the support of any sectarian schools”); and cf. LA. CONST. art. 140 (1868) (prohibiting appropriation to 
“any private school or any private institution of learning whatever” but lacking any reference to “sectarian” schools).  
Louisiana’s anti-funding provisions were deleted from its constitution in the 1974 revision.  See LA. CONST. art. 1, § 
8 (1974) (paralleling federal religion clauses).
112 GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, ¶ 14 (1877) (stating that “[n]o money shall ever be taken from the public 
treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult, or denomination of religionists, or of any sectarian 
institution”); see GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, ¶ 7.
113 MN. CONST. art. 13, § 2 (1877) (“In no case shall any public money or property be appropriated or 
used for the support of schools wherein the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets or any particular Christian or other 
religious sect are promulgated or taught.”) (amended and restructured in 1974).
114 N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83 (1784).
115 Id. pt. 2, art. 83 (added 1877).
116
     For instance, in 1880 Nevada approved the addition of article 11, § 10 to its constitution, providing 
that “[n]o funds of any kind or character whatever, State, County or Municipal, shall be used for sectarian purpose.”
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requiring newly admitted states to provide in their constitutions for a system of public schools “free from 
sectarian control.”117  Consequently, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming and Washington 
all placed some form of anti-funding provision in their constitutions in 1889.118  Idaho and Mississippi 
added similar provisions in 1890; Kentucky, in 1891.119  New York added its anti-funding provision in 
1894 after a long and bitter fight, previously discussed, over parochial school funding.120  Rounding out 
the nineteenth century, Utah and Delaware added anti-funding provisions in 1896 and 1897, 
respectively.121
NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 10 (added 1880); see generally Bybee & Newton, supra, at 565-67.  In 1885, Florida 
provided in its Declaration of Rights that no public revenue “shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or 
indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.”  FLA. DECL. OF 
RTS. § 6 (1885); see FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
117 See note __, supra; see also 25 Stat. 676, 677 (1889).
118 See MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 8 (1889) (forbidding any “direct or indirect” appropriation from public 
funds “for any sectarian purpose” or “to aid” any learning institution “controlled in whole or in part by any church, 
sect, or denomination”) (see also MONT. CONST. art. 10, § 6); N.D. CONST. art. 8, § 152 (1889) (forbidding public 
school funds from being “appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school”) (see also N.D. CONST.
art. 8, § 5); S.D. CONST. art. 8, § 16 (1889); id. art. 6, § 3 (1889) (respectively prohibiting the “appropriation of 
lands, money or other property or credits to aid any sectarian school,” and providing that no public funds “shall be 
given or appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or religious society or institution”); WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 8 
(1889) (no portion of public school fund may be used to “support or assist” any institution of learning “controlled by 
any church or sectarian organization or religious denomination whatsoever”); id. art. 3, § 36 (1889) (forbidding 
“charitable, industrial, educational or benevolent” appropriations to any “denominational or sectarian institution or 
association”); WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (1889) (providing that “[n]o public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious 
establishment”).
119 See IDAHO CONST. art. 9, § 5 (1890) (broad anti-funding provision similar to article 8, § 3 of the 1870 
Illinois Constitution, supra); MISS. CONST. art. 8, § 208 (1890) (providing that “[n]o religious or other sect” should 
ever control any part of the public school funds, and that no funds should be “appropriated toward the support of any 
sectarian school”); KY. CONST. § 189 (1891) (providing that “[n]o portion” of any educational fund “shall be 
appropriated to, or used by, or in aid of, any church, sectarian or denominational school”).
120 See note __, supra; N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 4 (1894) (prohibiting public funds from being used 
“indirectly or directly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of 
learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any 
denominational tenet or doctrine is taught”); see also N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
121 See UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 4 (1896) (providing that “[n]o public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment”); DEL. CONST. art. 10, § 3 (1897) (prohibiting any part of educational funds from being 
“appropriated to, or used by, or in aid of any sectarian, church or denominational school”).
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This era of proliferating anti-funding amendments seemed to wind down in the first decade of the 
twentieth century.  Virginia first included an explicit anti-funding provision in article 4, § 67 of its 
constitution in 1902.122  Oklahoma (1907),123 Arizona (1910),124 and New Mexico (1911)125 each included 
anti- funding provisions in their new constitutions.  With these four constitutions, a long period of 
lawmaking—stretching back over sixty years to the Wisconsin Constitution of 1848—seemed to pause 
for breath.  When it did, the American state constitutional landscape could boast of some thirty-six states 
that explicitly barred a wide range of religious schools and institutions from access to an impressive array 
of public benefits.  The constitutional landscape was not significantly altered until the admission of 
Hawaii and Alaska into the union in 1959, with each new state bringing anti-funding constitutional 
provisions.126  That brought the total of religion-based anti-funding amendments at that time to thirty-
eight.
The remaining developments in relevant state constitutional language are piecemeal but reflect a 
preoccupation with singling out and excluding religiously affiliated organizations.  For instance, both in 
122 See VA. CONST. art. 4, § 67 (1902) (prohibiting General Assembly from making “any appropriation” 
of public funds “to any church, or sectarian society, association, or institution of any kind whatever, which is 
entirely or partly, directly or indirectly, controlled by any church or sectarian society”).  Interestingly, that same 
section also authorized the General Assembly to “in its discretion, make appropriations to non-sectarian institutions 
for the reform of youthful criminals.”  Id.  Article 9, § 141 of the 1902 Virginia Constitution generally forbade 
appropriation of public funds to “any school or institution of learning not owned or exclusively controlled by the 
State or some political subdivision thereof,” but it specifically empowered counties, cities, towns and districts to 
“make appropriations to non-sectarian schools of manual, industrial, or technical training.”  Id. art. 9, § 141 (1902).
123 OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 5 (1907) (providing that “[n]o public money or property shall ever be 
appropriated, applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, 
denomination, or system of religion, or the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other 
religious teacher or dignitary, or any sectarian institution as such”).
124 ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 12; art. 9, § 10 (1910) (forbidding public funds from being “appropriated for or 
applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment,” and 
prohibiting taxes or appropriations “in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school”).
125 N.M. CONST. art. 12, § 3 (1911) (barring the use of any educational funds “for the support of any 
sectarian, denominational or private school, college or university”).
126 AK. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (1959) (providing that “[n]o money shall be paid from public funds for the
direct benefit of any religious or other private educational institution” ); HAW. CONST. art. 10, § 1 (1959) (forbidding 
public funds from being “appropriated for the support or benefit of any sectarian or private institution” ).
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1956 and in 1971, Virginia amended its anti-funding provisions to create more pointed religion-based 
exclusions from public benefits.  In 1956, Virginia amended article 8, § 10 of its constitution to allow the 
expenditure of public education funds for “Virginia students in public and nonsectarian private schools 
and institutions of learning.”127  In 1971, Virginia added article 8, § 11, allowing its General Assembly to 
provides loans or grants to “students attending nonprofit institutions of higher education in the 
Commonwealth whose primary purpose is to provide collegiate or graduate education and not to provide 
religious training or theological education.”128  Pennsylvania had made a similar adjustment to its 
constitution in 1963 when it allowed for the provision of scholarship grants or loans for higher education 
“except that no [such] scholarships, grants or loans … shall be given to persons enrolled in a theological 
seminary or school of theology.”129  In 1970, Michigan amended its constitution with the apparent 
purpose of specifically barring any kind of school voucher program.130  Finally, in 1976, Nebraska made 
perhaps the most pointed adjustment in any state constitution by providing that its legislature could allow 
government contracts with non-public institutions to provide “educational or other services” to 
handicapped persons under twenty-one years old, but only “if such services are nonsectarian in nature.”131
In this section, I have taken care to acquaint the reader with the specific linguistic formulas by 
which the various State Blaines erect religion-sensitive barriers to the allocation of public benefits.  I have 
done this to allow the State Blaines, in a sense, to speak for themselves.  State Blaines have an undeniably 
127 VA. CONST. art. 8, § 10 (amended 1956) (emphasis added).  The former provision had been interpreted 
to limit the expenditure of public educational funds to public schools only, thus excluding private schools altogether.
128 VA. CONST. art. 8, § 11 (added 1971) (emphasis added).
129 PA. CONST. art. 3, § 29 (added 1963).
130 See MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2 (amended 1970) (providing that “[n]o payment, credit, tax benefit, 
exemption or deductions, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or property shall be provided, 
directly or indirectly, to support the attendance of any student or the employment of any person at any [private, 
denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary] school”); see Kemerer, supra, at 4-6 
(observing that this amendment was specifically designed to bar vouchers).
131 See NEB. CONST. art. 7, § 11 (added 1976).
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multi-faceted character, which makes it tricky to treat them generally.  But I will nonetheless offer four 
interrelated observations about the nature of the State Blaines’ common objectives, as reflected in their 
language. 
First, the State Blaines apply their prohibitions to a wide spectrum of public benefits.  
Restrictions are sometimes limited to particular sources of public funds—e.g., to a “public school fund” 
or to “educational funds”—but more commonly they apply broadly to, for instance, “public funds” or 
“state property,” to “money raised by taxation” or “money drawn from the treasury,” or simply to 
“money,” categorically forbidding “appropriations” or “payments” from these generic public sources.  
Second, the State Blaines restrict the application of public benefits to religious institutions in terms that 
not only circumscribe the destination of the benefits but, separately, their purpose and effect.  So, for 
instance, public funds may not be applied “in aid of,” “for the benefit of,” or to “support or sustain” any 
religious organization, and, additionally, these forbidden applications may not be achieved “directly or 
indirectly.”  Another way of effecting this kind of restriction is to forbid the appropriation of funds for 
religious “purposes,” or to prohibit religious groups from having any “control” over public funds.  Third, 
some State Blaines limit their prohibitions to religious “schools,” while many strike more broadly at 
religious “institutions,” “associations,” “establishments,” and “societies.”  Others dictate the tenor of 
instruction offered at institutions “supported” by public funds, prohibiting “sectarian instruction” at such 
places.
But the most significant and overarching quality that links State Blaines is that all explicitly tailor 
their restrictions to religion.  They target institutions that are “religious,” “sectarian,” “theological,” 
“ecclesiastical,” “denominational,” or affiliated with a “church.”  They prohibit appropriations to places 
where the “doctrines,” “creeds,” or “tenets” of religion are practiced or taught, or where religious 
“worship,” “exercise,” or “instruction” occurs.  They delimit the “purposes” for which public benefits 
may be applied, removing “religious” purposes from the universe of other purposes.  They single out 
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individuals who, because of their religious affiliation, cannot be included in the distribution of public 
benefits—people such as “priests,” “preachers,” “ministers” and “teachers” of religious doctrine.132
It will be remembered, of course, that the State Blaine Amendments arose largely in response to 
widespread Protestant fears of Catholic influence on society, politics and education.  Yet, it is perhaps 
stating the obvious to observe that the words “Roman Catholic” appear nowhere in any of the provisions.  
The State Blaines survive today in thirty-seven state constitutions as broad, explicit, and generic
prohibitions on public funding of all religion.  Their historical antecedents can help us contextualize the 
amendments but they should not control their application or our assessment of their constitutionality.  The 
social and religious contexts in which the State Blaines operate today are far different from those of their 
origins and, consequently, the faithful application of the language of the State Blaines no longer divides, 
for purposes of public funding, the public Protestant schools from the Catholic private schools.  Instead, it 
divides the thoroughly secularized public schools and other public institutions from a growing array of 
private religious schools and other private religious entities.  It divides persons with religious affiliations 
or religious purposes from persons with non-religious affiliation and purposes.  This operation is fully 
consonant with the changing dynamic of religious conflicts in modern American society.  As Ira Lupu 
and Robert Tuttle have observed, “[t]he religious wars in the United States in the early 21st century are 
not Protestant vs. Catholic, or Christian vs. Jew, or even the more plausible Islam vs. all others.  They are 
instead wars of the deeply religious against the forces of a relentlessly secular commercial culture.”133
One hopes that such modern conflicts are fairly described as something more benign than “wars,” but, 
regardless, there is little doubt what side the State Blaines are fighting for:  the State Blaines are, today, a 
132 See, e.g., DeForrest, supra, at 602 (observing that “[t]he overall effect of these Blaine-style provisions, 
by their express wording or through later judicial interpretations, was usually to preclude both the direct or indirect 
transfer of state funds to religious or sectarian schools and institutions”).
133 See Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 954-55.
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widespread legal obstacle separating the secular from the religious in the allocation of public benefits.  It 
will be that operation that I will measure against the requirements of the First Amendment.
B. Interpretation
There is no doubt room for nuanced interpretation of the various linguistic formulas that appear in 
State Blaines.  For instance, a court might decide that a provision banning funds “in aid of” a religious 
school has a broader prohibitory scope than a provision simply banning direct funding.134  This section 
will take a broader approach to interpretation.  I will discuss state court decisions that explicitly recognize 
that a State Blaine Amendment has created a greater separation between public benefits and religious 
organizations than the federal religion clauses require.  Conversely, I will note other state court decisions 
that do the opposite—i.e., despite a State Blaine’s restrictive language, decide that the provision imposes 
no greater obstacles than the federal Constitution to religious groups’ access to public funds.  My purpose 
is to demonstrate that state courts have often—but not always—interpreted the State Blaine Amendments 
both as going beyond the federal Establishment Clause and also as creating an explicitly religion-sensitive 
barrier to the allocation of public funds and other benefits.
A prime example of the first kind of interpretation—one recognizing greater state separation—
was provided by the Idaho Supreme Court in 1971.  In Epeldi v. Engelking, that court considered a 
provision that provided a neutral transportation reimbursement to public and non-public schoolchildren 
alike, including children attending religious schools.135  The reimbursement would have passed muster 
under the federal Establishment Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court years before in Everson and 
again in Allen.136  But the Idaho Supreme Court observed that, “unlike the provisions of the Federal 
134 See, e.g., Lenstrom v. Thone, 311 N.W.2d 884 (Neb. 1981); see also Kemerer, supra, at 16 (discussing 
impact of specific language on courts’ application in terms of Nebraska’s State Blaine Amendment). 
135
   Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d 860, 861-62 & n.1 (Idaho 1971) (discussing IDAHO CODE § 33-1501 
(1970)).
136 See Epeldi, 488 P.2d at 865.  Everson, the seminal establishment decision, concluded that a neutral 
transportation reimbursement did not violate the Establishment Clause merely because it incidentally helped some 
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Constitution, the Idaho Constitution contains provisions specifically focusing on private schools 
controlled by sectarian, religious authorities.”137  Referring to Idaho’s Blaine Amendment—article 9, § 5 
of the Idaho Constitution—the court confessed that “one cannot help but first be impressed by the 
restrictive language contained therein.”138  After reviewing the “phraseology and diction of this 
provision,” the court “conclu[ded] that the framers of our constitution intended to more positively 
enunciate the separation between church and state than did the framers of the United States 
Constitution.”139  The court then struck down the transportation reimbursement provision under the Idaho 
Blaine Amendment.140  It remarked, logically enough, that its disposition under the state constitution 
“eliminate[d] as a test for determination of the constitutionality of the statute” the federal Establishment 
Clause standards used by the Supreme Court in Everson and Allen.141
children attend religious schools by paying for their bus transportation.  See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 
(1947).  In Allen, the Supreme Court applied Everson to conclude that the neutral provision of free secular textbooks 
to public and nonpublic schools—including religious schools—also did not constitute a forbidden “establishment” 
of religion.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).  In going beyond Everson, Epeldi was not an 
aberration, but was merely one example of a mode of interpretation that had prevailed in state courts for many years 
since Everson.  Thomas Berg notes that “[t]his stricter anti-aid position prevailed in many other forums; between 
1949 and 1963, seven of eight state supreme courts to consider bus reimbursement for Catholic students ruled it 
invalid under state constitutional provisions.”  Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 128 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Antone, 
384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1962); Matthews v. Quinton, 
362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961); McVey v. Hawkins, 258 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. 1953); Zellers v. Huff, 236 P.2d 949 (N.M. 
1951); Visser v. Nooksack Valley Sch. Dist., 207 P.2d 198 (Wash. 1949); Silver Lake Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Parker, 
29 N.W.2d 214 (Iowa 1947) (all striking down bus aid); Snyder v. Newtown, 161 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1961) 
(upholding aid)); see also ANSON PHELPS STOKES AND LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
431 (1964).
137 Epeldi, 488 P.2d at 865.
138 Id.  Idaho’s State Blaine Amendment is discussed in note __, supra.  It broadly prohibits appropriation 
of public funds, inter alia, “to help support or sustain any school … controlled by any church, sectarian or religious 
denomination whatsoever.”  IDAHO CONST. art. 9, § 5 (1890).
139 Epeldi, 488 P.2d at 865.
140 Id. at 866.
141 Id.  This expansive reading of the Idaho Constitution was reiterated in 1996 by the Idaho Supreme 
Court, when, citing Epeldi, it remarked that “[t]he Idaho Constitution has been held to provide greater restrictions on 
the state's involvement in parochial activities than the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”  See Doolittle 
v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 919 P.2d 334, 342 (Idaho 1996).  Interestingly, in that case the court additionally 
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The Washington Supreme Court followed a similar rationale in Witters III, already alluded to in 
Part I, when in 1989 it barred a blind student’s use of generally available public funds for religious 
training—a use which the U.S. Supreme Court had already, in the same case, allowed under the federal 
Establishment Clause.142  The Washington Supreme Court relied on what it called the “sweeping and 
comprehensive” language of the Washington Blaine Amendment—article 1, § 11 of the Washington 
Constitution—“which prohibits not only the appropriation of public money for religious instruction, but 
also the application of public funds to religious instruction.”143  The court reasoned that in this restrictive 
language “lies a major difference between our state constitution and the establishment clause of the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution,” thereby making application of federal constitutional 
standards “inappropriate.”144  Significantly, the court referred to prior decisions construing the phrase 
“religious instruction” in article 1, § 11, and concluded that the kind of instruction constitutionally barred 
from funding was “devotional in nature and designed to induce faith and belief in the student,” as opposed 
to the “open, free, critical, and scholarly examination of the literature, experiences, and knowledge of 
mankind” that would occur, for instance, in a “Bible as Literature” course.145
Further examples of this kind of expansive (i.e., resulting in greater separation than federal 
constitutional standards) interpretation are easy to find.  For instance, in 1963 the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court concluded that the Blaine Amendment in article 2, § 5 of its constitution created a more rigorous 
held that the Idaho Constitution’s anti-funding provision was preempted by the reimbursement provisions of the 
IDEA, a federal disability law.  Id.
142 See note __, supra; Witters v. State, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989).
143 Witters, 771 P.2d at 1122 (citations omitted).  The Washington Blaine Amendment, dating from 1889, 
is discussed in note __, supra.  For a general discussion of the origins of the Washington Blaine, see DeForrest, 
supra, at 574-76.
144 Id.
145 Id. (quoting Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Regents, 436 P.2d 189, 193 (1967)); see 
generally State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811-13 (Wash. 1986) (extensive discussion of general analysis for 
determining whether Washington Constitution provides broader civil liberties than the federal Constitution).  For a 
detailed discussion of Washington’s “uniquely developed body of Blaine Amendment jurisprudence,” see
DeForrest, supra, at 590-601.
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funding restriction than the federal Constitution and therefore prohibited the kind of busing 
reimbursement allowed by Everson.146  The court reasoned that Everson’s construction of the 
Establishment Clause “does not change the effect of state constitutional provisions.”147  The court was 
frank and unapologetic about the practical inequity of its decision.  It flatly stated that if a parent exercises 
his right to “provide for the religious instruction and training of his own children” and consequently 
places them in “educational facilities that combine secular and religious instruction,” then, as a matter of 
law, “he is faced with the necessity of assuming the financial burden which that choice entails.”148
Moreover, when state courts interpret their own constitutions as more restrictive than the federal 
Establishment Clause, often they also purport to “reject” the reasoning underlying the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause decisions.  For instance, the California and South Dakota Supreme Courts have 
both explicitly rejected the “child benefit” theory relied on by the U.S. Supreme Court in Everson and 
other cases.149 Joseph Viteritti observes that “[a]t one time or another courts in nearly half the states have 
issued pronouncements indicating that they do not consider the Court’s [school aid] decisions to be 
binding in interpreting their own constitutions,” and that “several have specifically rejected the ‘child 
benefit theory.’”150  Finally, states sometimes reach beyond weaker or even non-existent anti-funding 
provisions to create rigid barriers against religious funding.  For instance, in 1979 the Alaska Supreme 
146 See Bd. of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911, 912-13 (Okla. 1963).  Oklahoma’s Blaine Amendment, 
discussed in note __, supra, provides that no public money “shall ever be appropriated … directly or indirectly, for 
the use, benefit, or support of any … sectarian institution.”  OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 5 (1907).
147 Antone, 384 P.2d at 913.
148 Id.; accord Meyer v. Okla. City, 496 P.2d 789, 790-92 (Okla. 1972).
149 See, e.g., Elbe v. Yankton Indep. Sch. Dist., 372 N.W.2d 113, 117 (S.D. 1985) (noting that it had 
“clearly rejected the child benefit doctrine” in an earlier case and deeming it irrelevant in applying South Dakota 
Blaine Amendment); Cal. Teachers’ Ass’n v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953, 960-64 (Cal. 1981) (criticizing and refusing to 
follow child benefit doctrine in applying stricter provisions of California Blaine Amendment).
150
     Viteritti Choosing Equality, supra, at 149 & nn. 195-98 (citing Linda S. Wendtland, Note, Beyond the 
Establishment Clause:  Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. 
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Court interpreted its fairly narrow Blaine Amendment—prohibiting only the payment of public funds “for 
the direct benefit” of any religious school—to achieve a strict funding prohibition.151  Vermont has no 
explicit anti-funding provision in its constitution, but in 1999 the Vermont Supreme Court decided that 
the provision in chapter 1, article 3 (protecting persons from being “compelled to … support any place of 
worship”) erected a stronger barrier against a neutral voucher program than the Establishment Clause.152
On the other hand, several states have interpreted the plainly restrictive language in their Blaine 
Amendments as creating no greater separation than the federal Establishment Clause.  A significant recent 
decision is that of the Arizona Supreme Court in Kotterman v. Killian, in which the court refused to 
interpret Arizona’s anti-funding provision in a rigidly absolutist manner, while at the same time 
criticizing the discriminatory motives behind the federal Blaine Amendment.153  Other states have chosen 
either simply to ignore the separationist language in their own constitutions or to interpret it in a manner 
coextensive with the federal religion clauses.154  For instance, in approving the loaning of free textbooks 
to religious schools, the Mississippi Supreme Court leniently interpreted the language in its constitution 
prohibiting any public funds from being “appropriated toward the support of any sectarian school,” and 
added that “[t]here is no requirement that the church should be a liability to those of its citizenship who 
L. REV. 625 (1985); CHESTER JAMES ANTIEU ET AL., RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965); G. Alan 
Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73 (1989)).
151 See Sheldon Jackson Coll. v. State, 599 P.2d 127, 129-32 (Ak. 1979) (interpreting AK. CONST. art. 7, 
§ 1 (1959) (emphasis added)).
152 See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 562-63 (Vt. 1999); see VT. CONST.
Ch. 1, art. 3 (1777).
153 See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 623-24 (Ariz. 1999); see also DeForrest, supra, at 583 
(discussing Kotterman).
154 See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. State, 648 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1982) 
(interpreting art. 9 § 7 and art. 5, § 34 of the Colorado Constitution); People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 305 N.E.2d 
129 (Ill. 1973) (interpreting art. 10, § 3 of the Illinois Constitution); Durham v. McLeod, 192 S.E.2d 202 (S.C. 1972) 
(interpreting former art. 11, § 9 of the South Carolina Constitution); Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 
P.2d 916 (Utah. 1993) (interpreting art. 1, § 4 of Utah Constitution); Chance v. Miss. State Textbook Rating & 
Purch. Bd., 200 So. 706 (Miss. 1941); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998) (interpreting art. 1, § 18 of 
Wisconsin Constitution); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999) (interpreting art. 6, § 2 of Ohio
Constitution).
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are at the same time citizens of the state, and entitled to privileges and benefits as such.”155  Similarly, the 
Ohio Supreme Court has suggested that its state constitution provides greater free exercise rights than the 
federal Free Exercise Clause, while indicating that its religious anti-funding provision—although phrased 
in absolutist terms—is merely coextensive with the federal Establishment Clause.156
This section simply highlights expansive state court decisions which are significant for two 
reasons.  First, state courts have interpreted State Blaines in a manner that explicitly goes beyond the 
church-state separation mandated by the federal Establishment Clause, specifically in the area of public 
aid to religious schools.  This has been occurring for as long as the Supreme Court has been interpreting 
the boundaries of the Establishment Clause; indeed, such state court decisions tend to cluster around 
instances in which the Supreme Court has allowed some form of public benefit (as with free 
transportation in Everson and free textbooks in Allen) to be shared equally between public and religious 
schools.157  Second, state courts have frankly recognized that, under their application of the State Blaine 
Amendments, religiously motivated behavior pays a special price.  Those burdens on religion are not 
incidental but rather are targeted disabilities, the predictable and intended result of a policy of self-
consciously distancing the public sphere from religious persons and institutions.
More lenient interpretations of State Blaines are possible, of course, but it is fair to say that such 
decisions must work hard to hurdle the plainly separationist implications of the State Blaines’ language. 
But the more expansive decisions are not aberrations.  Rather, they faithfully cleave to what the State 
155 See Chance, 200 So. at 710 (interpreting art. 8, § 208 of Mississippi Constitution).
156 See Humphrey v. Lane, 739 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ohio 2000) (stating that “rights of conscience” 
provision in art. 1, § 7 of Ohio Constitution provides broader free exercise rights than federal Constitution); 
Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 211-12 (interpreting Ohio Blaine Amendment in art. 6, § 2 in a non-separationist 
manner and as generally coextensive with federal Establishment Clause). 
157 See, e.g., Viteritti Choosing Equality, supra, at 149 (observing that “[f]ederal rulings to the contrary, 
many state courts have, from time to time, invalidated public assistance to private or parochial school students in the 
form of transportation or textbooks”) (footnotes omitted).
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Blaines say and to the separationist objectives that their language plainly aims to achieve.  It will be 
remaining task of this article to say whether those objectives violate the First Amendment.
IV.  The Jurisprudential Roots of Non-Persecution
The foregoing cross-section of the State Blaines reveals that a preference for separating public 
benefits from religious persons and organizations persists in over two-thirds of our state constitutions.  
Broadly speaking, the State Blaines are the residue of the second great historical controversy to raise 
profound questions about the shape of American religious liberties—the rise of public schools and the 
withdrawal of public funds from private religious schools.158  Those amendments “arguably represent[ed] 
a political judgment on the constitutional questions raised by such funding.”159  But we should be 
skeptical about accepting the State Blaines’ judgments as the last constitutional word on those questions.  
As we have seen, the anti-funding advocates of that era failed to amend the federal Constitution, naturally 
raising the question whether the State Blaines themselves conflict with federal norms of religious liberty.  
More importantly, as Douglas Laycock observes, “the nineteenth century movement was based in part on 
premises that were utterly inconsistent with the First Amendment,” given that “opposition to funding 
religious schools drew heavily on anti-Catholicism.”160  Anti-Catholic motives alone may not, in the final 
158 See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L. J. 43, 48-53 
(1997).  The first great historical controversy, as Laycock explains, was the 1780s dispute over church financing that 
gave rise to Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance.  Id. at 48-49; see also McConnell Crossroads, supra, at 183 
(stating that “[o]ne of the most important eighteenth-century abuses against which the no-establishment principle 
was directed was mandatory support for churches and ministers.  This system was support for religion qua religion; 
it singled out religion as such for financial benefit.”).
159
     Laycock Unity, supra, at 50 (emphasis added).
160 Id.  Laycock contrasts the nineteenth-century resolution of the school funding problem (i.e., the 
proliferation of State Blaines) with the eighteenth-century resolution of the church funding problem.  He argues that 
Madison’s solution to the latter problem was a principled one that virtually everyone today still accepts and that 
itself is firmly embedded in federal religion clause jurisprudence:  government cannot directly fund religious 
teaching and it certainly cannot exclusively fund teachers of only one kind of religion.  See id. at 49 (explaining that 
the General Assessment was “a tax solely for the support of clergy in the performance of their religious functions,” 
that only Christian teachers were subsidized, and that “[t]he essence of the general assessment was massive 
discrimination in favor of religious viewpoints”).  In sharp contrast, the school funding crisis “did not produce a 
principled resolution to a difficult problem” but “produced instead a nativist Protestant victory over Catholic 
immigrants” that was “only a pretense of neutrality.”  Id. at 52.
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analysis, be enough to invalidate the State Blaines under the First Amendment, but their presence should 
at least raise some red flags.  And, raising further suspicions, the plain terms of most State Blaines go 
well beyond the narrower questions raised by the school funding controversy.
The movement spawning the State Blaines only lapped at the shores of the federal Constitution, 
but failed to alter it.  Thus, the federal constitutional standards governing public aid to religion have 
charted their own jurisprudential course.  The stark kind of strict separationism between all public 
benefits and religion required by most State Blaines has never been regnant in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  Even the first major non-establishment decision, Everson, allowed indirect state aid to 
religious schools, notwithstanding Justice Black’s “strict separationist” dicta.161  Some of the Court’s non-
establishment decisions may skirt the borders of Blaine-like separationism—Charles Fried recently 
referred to the Court’s mostly-defunct decision in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist as “a kind of Court-imposed Blaine Amendment”162—but the Court has generally proceeded in 
a non-absolutist (if sometimes counterintuitive) manner in sketching the boundaries between permissible 
and impermissible government aid to religious persons and entities.  Furthermore, the direction the Court 
has been taking over the last two decades highlights the gulf between federal standards of non-
establishment and the rigid barriers thrown up by the State Blaines over a century ago.
161 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947) (stating that “[n]either a state nor the federal 
government can … aid one religion, [or] aid all religions … [and] [n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities or institutions”).  At the same time, as I discuss below, Everson contains an 
equally strong condemnation of discrimination against religion.  See id. (stating that “[o]n the other hand … [a state] 
cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.  Consequently, it cannot exclude individual 
Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or members of any 
other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation”).  Douglas 
Laycock observes that “the essence of both the no-aid and the nondiscrimination theories is succinctly laid out in 
[these] two paragraphs.”  Laycock Unity, supra, at 53-54. 
162 See Fried Five to Four, supra, at 196.  In Nyquist, the Court invalidated a New York program that 
gave grants to nonpublic schools and tax credits to parents whose children attended those schools, which included 
religious schools.  See 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973).  The scope of Nyquist seems to have been sharply limited by 
Zelman.  See infra note __.
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For instance, it is becoming increasingly evident that the government acts within the bounds of 
the federal Establishment Clause when it provides secular benefits to a broad range of public and private 
recipients, including religiously affiliated private recipients, based on criteria that are “neutral”—in the 
sense that the benefits are not distributed on the basis of any religious quality, or lack thereof, in the 
recipient.163  Relatedly, when those secular benefits, neutrally distributed, end up in the hands of religious 
organizations because of the private choices of individuals—and not because of any deliberate 
government design to nudge the benefits toward religious ends—government has not impermissibly 
“subsidized” religion.164  Generally, the Court has emphasized that the Establishment Clause does not 
require a wholesale exclusion of religious entities from participation in government programs and 
government funding.  In other words, the argument is steadily evaporating that selective discrimination 
against religion finds its justification in the Establishment Clause itself.  To be sure, the clause “singles 
out” religion for a kind of disability, as Michael McConnell explains:  “[t]he disestablishment principle 
prevents the government from using its power to promote, advocate, or endorse any particular religious 
position.”165  But this principle stands diametrically opposed to a posture of hostility toward religion that 
is required, or even justified, by the Establishment Clause.  Again, McConnell:  “[T]he suggestion that 
163 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2473 (2002) (program of generally available school 
vouchers, neutral with respect to religion, does not violate the Establishment Clause); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 
793, 809-10 (2000) (plurality op. of Thomas, J.) (program of secular governmental aid, neutrally offered to a wide 
range of private groups without reference to religion, does not violate Establishment Clause).
164 See, e.g., Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465-66 (distinguishing between provision of government aid 
“directly” to religious schools and “programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious 
schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals”); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 
(observing that the Court has, “as a way of assuring neutrality,” considered whether government aid is channeled to 
religious schools only because of private choice); see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 
(1993) (because government-provided sign-language interpreter was present in religious school “only as a result of 
the private decision of individual parents,” the aid did not violate Establishment Clause); Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89 
(blind student’s private decision to use neutral, generally available scholarship funds for ministry training did not 
violate Establishment Clause).
165 See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 43 (2000);
see also Laycock Unity, supra, at 70-71 (explaining that sometimes even a substantively neutral view of the religion 
clauses “requires that religion be treated in ways that are arguably worse than the treatment available to similar 
secular activities,” such as prohibiting the government from “celebrat[ing] religion or lead[ing] religious exercises”).
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religious organizations must categorically be barred from participation in all government-funded 
programs must be rejected.  Although favored by the so-called ‘strict separationists,’ this has never been 
the rule in establishment clause cases and has been rejected by the Supreme Court in every case in which 
it has been seriously advanced.”166  Indeed, McConnell argues that, in both the abortion and religion 
contexts, “denying federal funding for activities that would otherwise be funded would amount to a 
substantial penalty for exercising one’s constitutional rights.”167
Doubtless, there is clarifying work left to do at the federal level, but for present purposes one may 
observe, uncontroversially, that federal constitutional barriers to public funding of religious institutions 
have demonstrably softened, that “the [Supreme] Court has become more solicitous of innovative 
partnerships between governments and religious institutions,”168 and that both states and Congress will 
likely respond—and have already responded—by enacting laws allowing religious groups to enjoy 
generally available public benefits.169  Enter the State Blaine Amendments.
166 See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem:  Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 989, 1027 (1991) (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 608-09 (1988); Hunt v. McNair, 413 
U.S. 734, 742-43 (1973); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 
299-300 (1899)).
167 See McConnell Selective Funding, supra, at 1028 (emphasis added); see also Berg Anti-Catholicism, 
supra, at 163 (“Since about 1980, we have been in a third period of modern church-state relations.  The last two 
decades have seen the decline of strong separationism as the dominant church-state ideal—a slow, partial, but 
continuing decline—ane the corresponding rise of the principle that religion can be an equal participant with other 
ideas and activities in public life, including in government benefit programs.”).  I will say more below about 
“selective” funding of “non-religious” persons and entities, about whether that is a plausible way of defending some 
operations of State Blaines, and about the relationship of that issue to selective funding of childbirth over abortion.  
See infra __.
168
     Bybee & Newton, supra, at 574.
169
     Bybee and Newton discuss several federal and state initiatives that take advantage of a more flexible 
approach to government involvement with religious organizations.  See Bybee & Newton, supra, at 552-53.  For 
instance, they discuss the 1996 Charitable Choice Act, a federal law allowing states that participate in certain 
federally funded programs “to contract with religious organizations, or to allow religious organizations to accept 
certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement [under these programs].”  Id. at 552 (citing Charitable Choice 
Act of 1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-193, tit. 1, § 104, 110 STAT. 2161 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1996)).  
They also point to President Bush’s announced policy of “encouraging faith-based solutions in partnership with the 
federal government” and the extensive media coverage of that initiative.  Bybee & Newton, supra, at 552-53 & n.10.  
Finally, they mention the increasing number of states that have begun experiments with school vouchers.  Id. at 552-
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If I may indulge in metaphor for a moment, the role of the State Blaines will become clearer.  The 
federal constitutional standards for permissible aid to religion were, for many years, like murky water in a 
lake—water that has gradually been clearing until we can see better what principles govern which kinds 
of aid the federal Constitution allows and disallows.  But simultaneously, we are now beginning to 
discern another layer of murk, representing the State Blaines.  As we have seen, the State Blaines are far 
more stringent than the federal Constitution about the barriers raised against public funding of religious 
schools and other religious organizations.  The real question now is whether the State Blaines are the 
bottom of the lake.
If they are the bottom of the lake—if, so to speak, there is nothing “beneath” them to temper or 
annul what they plainly do—then the resulting legal landscape among the states is fairly predictable.  
Depending on how each state constitution is framed and interpreted, we will have in this country a 
kaleidoscope of separationism:  one state will hermetically seal off all public benefits from religious 
schools; another might do the same for all religious organizations generally; another might focus on 
individuals who plan to put the benefits to faith-oriented uses; and still another might decide to erect no 
separationist barriers at all.  My canvass of the State Blaines suggests that the balance will be tilted 
significantly in the direction of shutting off religion from public funds.  The ability of religious persons 
and institutions to enjoy public benefits on an equal basis will be—quite apart from how permissively the 
federal Establishment Clause is interpreted—refracted through the anti-funding provisions of fifty state 
constitutions.
But this will only be true if there exists no principle in the federal Constitution that can restrain 
the process.  In this Part, I will demonstrate that there is.  That principle consists of three conceptually 
related strands found in Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech jurisprudence.  But they combine 
in one overarching rule—what the Supreme Court has referred to as the “fundamental nonpersecution 
53 & n.11; see also Lupu Distinctive Place, supra, 45-47 (commenting on increasing role of religious organizations 
in Charitable Choice).
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principle of the First Amendment.”170  Simply stated, the non-persecution rule means, among other things,
that neither state nor federal governments may, consistently with the First Amendment, restrict access to 
generally available public benefits based on persons’ or organizations’ religious status, purpose, 
affiliation, or identity.
A. Free Exercise and Non-Persecution
Prohibiting religious discrimination lies at the heart of the free exercise clause, but it is important 
to carefully define “discrimination” by reference to the Supreme Court’s long history of balancing the 
conflicting claims of religion and government.  Paradoxically, the principle condemning religious 
discrimination—or “fundamental nonpersecution principle,” as the Court has most recently called it—is 
best understood against the backdrop of another important free exercise principle, one that restricts
religious freedom.  That background rule is the “non-exemption” rule, which was best articulated in the 
1990 Smith decision but which goes back over 125 years to the Court’s earliest religion clause cases.   
Non-exemption means that the Free Exercise Clause does not require courts to grant religion-based 
exemptions from the burdens of genuinely neutral laws.  The mere statement of the rule suggests that it 
interacts significantly with the narrower rule that laws may not target religious behavior or affiliation for 
special disabilities.
The non-exemption rule (which has been the subject of sharp scholarly debate)171 illuminates the 
parameters and continuing force of the non-persecution rule, particularly as it applies to the State Blaine 
Amendments.  As Michael McConnell has explained, whether the free exercise clause requires religious 
170 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532; see infra __.
171 Compare, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Should the Religion Clauses of the Constitution Be Amended?, 32 
Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 9 (1998); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1109 (1990), with Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of 
the First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251 (2000); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The 
Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998); Philip A. 
Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 
(1992); Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled:  Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 245 (1991).
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exemptions (as he argues), or whether Smith correctly decided that such exemptions lie only within the 
province of the legislature, it is clear that the free exercise clause unambiguously forbids laws that 
directly target religious conduct for penalties or disabilities:
Under both conceptions, it is unconstitutional to inflict penalties on religious practice as 
such.  For example, zoning ordinances disallowing churches while allowing meeting halls 
and other uses with comparable effects are unconstitutional, as are “anti-cult” legislation, 
laws barring clergy from public office, and charitable solicitation regulations crafted to 
disadvantage a particular religious sect.172
The non-exemption rule has jurisprudential roots in the nineteenth century conflict between the 
Mormon Church and the territorial laws of the United States prohibiting polygamy.  In its first significant 
religion clause decision, Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Mormons’ religious 
tenets—which at the time commanded polygamy as a religious duty for male members—did not exempt 
them, under the Free Exercise Clause, from obedience to a generally applicable criminal prohibition 
against polygamy.173  Twelve years later in Davis v. Beason, the Court explained (again with reference to 
Mormon polygamy) that the Free Exercise Clause permitted no interference with “man’s relations to his 
Maker and the obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in which an expression shall be 
made by him of his belief on those subjects, … provided always the laws of society, designed to secure its 
peace and prosperity, and the morals of its people, are not interfered with.”174  Free exercise, then, “must 
172
     McConnell Origins, supra, at 1418 (citing Hollingsworth v. State, 37 Tenn. 518 (1858); Catholic 
Bishop v. Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E.2d 583 (1939); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Larson v. Valente, 
456 U.S. 228 (1982); see also Lash, supra, at 1113 (agreeing with McConnell that “[e]ven if the original free 
exercise clause was intended to express norms of individual freedom, the scope of the clause appears to be limited to 
a prohibition of laws that abridge religion qua religion”).
173 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  The Court drew a basic distinction between 
“mere opinion,” which the Free Exercise Clause clearly protected, and “actions … in violation of social duties or 
subversive of good order,” which Congress could proscribe.  See id. at 164.  
174
     Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
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be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions regarded by general 
consent as properly the subjects of punitive legislation.”175 176
Since 1940, when it recognized that the Free Exercise Clause applied to the states,177 the Court 
has had more opportunities to develop the non-exemption rule.  In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 
the Court gave a more nuanced description of the rule’s scope, even as it denied that Jehovah’s Witnesses 
merited a religious exemption from compulsory flag-salute laws:  “The religious liberty which the 
Constitution protects has never excluded legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal 
loyalties of particular sects.”178  Again, in Braunfeld v. Brown, the Court rejected an Orthodox Jew’s 
175 Id. at 342-43.  Provocatively, the Court glossed this statement by including examples both of sects 
with tenets requiring “the necessity of human sacrifices, on special occasions,” as well as of “sects which denied as a 
part of their religious tenets that there should be any marriage tie, and advocated promiscuous intercourse of the 
sexes, as prompted by the passions of its members.”  Id. at 343.
176
     Another  “pre-incorporation” instance of the non-exemption principle was Hamilton v. Regents of the 
University of California, which concluded that the University did not violate Methodist conscientious objectors’ 
“liberty,” under the Fourteenth Amendment, when it refused to exempt them from mandatory military science 
instruction.  See 293 U.S. 245, 263-65 (1934).  Concurring, Justice Cardozo assumed that the Free Exercise Clause 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Relying on Davis, supra, Cardozo concluded that the 
objectors’ religious scruples did not entitle them to an automatic exemption from the required military instruction.  
See id. at 265-66 (Cardozo, J., concurring). Cardozo broadly observed that “[t]he right of private judgment has never 
yet been so exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government,” and concluded in vintage 
oracular style that  “[o]ne who is martyr to a principle … does not prove by his martyrdom that he has kept the law.”  
Id. at 268 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
177 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
178
   Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940) (emphasis added).  The Court also 
explained that “[c]onscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved 
the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”  Id.
(emphasis added).  Only three years later, Gobitis was overruled by West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, but in a way that left intact Gobitis’ reasoning about the tempered scope of the non-exemption rule.  See
319 U.S. 624, 639-42 (1943).  The Barnette majority opinion relied on the principle that laws may not compel 
speech under the First Amendment.  See id.; and cf. id. at 643-44 (Black, J., concurring) (relying, by contrast, on a 
free exercise rationale); id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring) (same).  Much later in Smith, the Supreme Court 
explicitly relied on Gobitis for its discussion of the non-exemption rule.  See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 879 (1990) (quoting Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594-95); see infra __.  Jay Bybee’s explanation of the dynamic 
between Gobitis and Barnette accords with my reading of Gobitis.  Justice Jackson, the author of Barnette, 
“broadened the [Gobitis] inquiry to take the focus off of the religious aspects of the conflict between the Witnesses 
and the Board of Education.  The issue was compelled speech, not infringement of religious beliefs.”  Bybee Power 
Theory, supra, at 279.  Indeed, as Bybee explains it, Justice Jackson’s general approach to the First Amendment 
accords with the later non-exemption / non-persecution rationale illuminated by Smith and Lukumi:  “In large 
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claim that a generally applicable Sunday-closing law violated his Free Exercise rights by imposing an 
“indirect” burden on his religious beliefs, which honored Saturday and not Sunday as a day of rest.179
But, in doing so, Braunfeld observed that, unlike a truly “general” law, “[i]f the purpose or effect of a law 
is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, the 
law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.”180
Most strikingly, in the seminal Everson decision the Court stated in dicta that, as a consequence of free 
exercise, a state “cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, 
Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or 
lack or it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”181
Thus, the Court’s gradual refinement of the non-exemption rule seemed to reveal a corollary 
condemning laws that were not “general” but were instead targeted at particular faiths or at religion 
generally.  So, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court could affirm the state’s power to regulate, “by 
general and non-discriminatory legislation,” the time, place and manner of door-to-door solicitation, 
while, at the same time, striking down the discriminatory application of that rule to Jehovah’s Witnesses 
measure, the First Amendment applied principally when governments attempted to regulate religion qua religion or 
speech qua speech, but not religion or speech qua something else.”  Id. at 290 (citations omitted).
179 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
180 Id.
181
    Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).  Everson, of course, was an Establishment Clause 
decision and thus did not actually resolve any dispute about the scope of the Free Exercise Clause.  The Court had 
made an equally striking statement condemning religious discrimination—one, moreover, in the context of school 
funding—almost forty years before in Quick Bear v. Leupp.  That case principally involved the construction of a 
treaty with the Sioux tribe regarding whether the treaty terms permitted contracts with and payments to religious 
schools for tribe members’ education.  But, in dicta, the Court rejected the notion that the Constitution would forbid 
such payments.  The Court adopted the statement of the court of appeals that “it seems inconceivable that Congress 
shall have intended to prohibit [the Sioux] from receiving religious education at their own cost if they desire it; such 
an intent would be one to prohibit the free exercise of religion amongst the Indians, and such would be the effect of 
the construction for which the complainants contend.”  See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908).  It 
should be noted, however, that the Court specifically characterized the treaty funds as the Sioux’ “own money” and 
“the only moneys that [they] can law claim to as matter of right; the only sums on which they are entitled to rely as 
theirs for education.”  Id. at 82.  It should also be noted that the Supreme Court has recently referred to Quick Bear
as only “indirectly” addressing the free exercise issue.  See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 n.4 (2000) 
(plurality op.).
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on free speech and free exercise grounds.182  The licensing scheme struck down in Cantwell effectively 
empowered local officials to clamp down on religious solicitation that the officials deemed did not 
“conform[] to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity.”183
Similarly, in Torcaso v. Watkins, the Court took a non-discrimination approach to Maryland’s 
requirement that state officeholders make a “declaration of belief in the existence of God” or forfeit their 
right to office.184  In the Court’s view, the oath requirement placed “[t]he power and authority of the State 
of Maryland … on the side of one particular sort of believers [sic]—those who are willing to say they 
believe in the ‘existence of God.’”185  The Court struck down the requirement under free exercise, 
explaining that “neither the State nor the Federal Government … can constitutionally pass laws or impose 
requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on 
a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.”186
182 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-10 (1940); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y 
of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (striking down solicitation licensing requirement as applied 
to Jehovah’s Witnesses under First Amendment).  
183
     Solicitation was allowed only after case-by-case review, under which the secretary of public welfare 
determined whether the promoted cause was “a religious one or … a bona fide object of charity or philanthropy and 
conforms to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity.”  Cantwell,  310 U.S. at 302.  The Court concluded that 
this licensing scheme amounted to “the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause 
… lay[ing] a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.”  Id. at 307.   Cantwell
may be more about religious speech than about religious conduct.  See, e.g., Bybee Power Theory, supra, at 266-67.  
I agree with Bybee that Cantwell “concerned religious liberty only because the Connecticut statute specifically 
regulated religious canvassing.”  Id.  But, again, I think that very point is what makes Cantwell relevant to the issue 
of religious non-persecution.  Douglas Laycock, for instance, has observed that the “religious free speech cases from 
the Jehovah’s Witness era” are an important aspect of the foundation of the Court’s religious “nondiscrimination 
theory.”  See Laycock Unity, supra, at 63 & n.124 (citations omitted).
184 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961) (quoting MD. CONST. art. 37).
185 Id. at 490.
186 Id. at 495 (footnotes omitted).  The Court quoted James Iredell, later a Supreme Court Justice, during 
the North Carolina Convention ratification debates.  Discussing the prohibition of religious tests for federal officers 
in proposed Article VI, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3, and responding to the fear that the people may consequently 
“chose representatives who have no religion at all, and that pagans and Mahometans may be admitted into offices,” 
Iredell asked:  “But how is it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking away that principle of religious 
freedom which we ourselves so warmly contend for?”  Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.10 (quoting 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES 
IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 194).
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 Non-discrimination based on religious affiliation or status was the controlling factor in McDaniel 
v. Paty, unanimously striking down Tennessee’s practice of excluding ministers from public office.187
The Tennessee Constitution embodied the last hold-out of that discredited practice, which dated back to 
the early republic.188  The dispute in McDaniel arose when Tennessee tied eligibility to be a delegate at its 
1977 constitutional convention to eligibility to be a state representative, by implication excluding 
ministers from the constitutional convention.189
The Supreme Court unanimously invalidated Tennessee’s clergy-disqualification provision.  
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion, for a four-Justice plurality, struck down the provision under the Free 
Exercise Clause alone.  Burger found that right to free exercise encompassed the right “to be a minister,” 
and he reasoned that the clergy-exclusion wrongly forced a minister to chose between that free exercise 
187 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 622-25 (1978).  Article 9, § 1 of the Tennessee Constitution 
provided:  “Whereas ministers of the gospel are, by their profession, dedicated to God and the care of Souls, and 
ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their functions; therefore, no minister of the gospel, or priest of any 
denomination whatever, shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the legislature.”  Id. at 621 & n.1.  The 
provision dated from article 8, § 1 of the 1796 Tennessee Constitution.  Id.  In 1978, Tennessee remained the only 
state in the union that excluded ministers from some public offices.  Id. at 625.  Maryland’s clergy-disqualification 
provision had been struck down by a federal district court in 1974.  Id.
188 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 622-25 (1978).  The Court noted Madison’s condemnation of the 
practice, underscoring the equality notions inherent in his view of religious liberty:
Does not the exclusion of Ministers of the Gospel as such violate a fundamental principle of 
liberty by punishing a religious profession with the privation of a civil right?  does it [not] violate 
another article of the plan itself which exempts religion from the cognizance of Civil power?  does 
it not violate justice by at once taking away a right and prohibiting a compensation for it?  does it 
not in fine violate impartiality by shutting the door [against] the Ministers of one Religion and 
leaving it open for those of every other?
See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 624 (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 288 (G. Hunt ed. 1904)) (emphasis added).  
The Court remarked that Madison’s view “accurately reflects the spirit and purpose of the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment.”  Id.  In a recent essay on Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, Vincent Blasi underscores 
Madison’s linkage of equality with religious liberty: “There can be no dispute that considerations of equal treatment 
lay at the core of Madison’s conception of religious liberty, both his aversion to any form of religious establishment 
and his emphasis on the notion of ‘free exercise.’”  Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty:  Seven 
Questions From Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 802 (2002); see also DeForrest, 
supra, at 614-15 (discussing Madison’s Memorial in relation to State Blaines).
189 Id. at 621-22.  The justifications for the minister’s disqualification put forward by the Tennessee 
Supreme Court were not novel—they were the same reasons that proponents of such measures had long relied on.  
See Hamburger, supra, at 79-83.
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right and his right to hold state office recognized by the Tennessee Constitution.190  Additionally, while 
Burger did not find that the exclusion targeted beliefs as such—in which case the law would have been 
absolutely prohibited191—he did conclude that it targeted “status as a ‘minister’ or ‘priest,’” a status 
defined by religiously affiliated and motivated “conduct and activity.”192  Burger then explained that the 
disqualification, targeted as it was at a religiously defined “status,” could only escape invalidation if it 
were justified by “interests of the highest order.”193  Significantly, Burger rejected Tennessee’s asserted 
interest in “preventing the establishment of a state religion,” a goal Tennessee claimed was “consistent 
with the Establishment Clause.”194  While Tennessee’s fears about the influence of clergy on politics were 
once “held in the 18th century by many, including enlightened statesmen of that day,” Burger reasoned 
that those fears had been overwhelmingly found baseless and provided no justification for continuing to 
burden ministers’ free exercise rights today.195
190 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626.  Burger relied on the “balancing” approach of Sherbert in this part of his 
opinion.  See note __, supra, and notes __, infra (discussing Sherbert).  Sherbert has been limited by Smith, but 
Smith independently emphasized McDaniel’s continuing force.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
191 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626-27.  Burger was referring principally to Torcaso v. Watkins, see note 
__, supra, in which Maryland conditioned access to public office on the willingness to swear to the existence of 
God. 
192 Id. at 626-27.  The Court relied in part on the language of the Tennessee Constitution, which 
“inferentially defines the ministerial profession in terms of its ‘duties,’ which include the ‘care of Souls,’” and also 
on its construction by the Tennessee Supreme Court, which reasoned that the exclusion reaches, e.g., “those filling a 
‘leadership role in religion.’”  Id. at 627 n.6.
193 See id. at 627-28.  Burger relied principally on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), a case that 
invalidated on free exercise grounds Wisconsin’s attempt to force the parents of Amish children to attend public 
schools after the age of 14.  Like Sherbert, Yoder has also been limited by Smith.  See notes __, infra.  But, again, 
Smith itself confirms that McDaniel still has significant impact for analyzing laws that target religiously affiliated 
statuses or behavior.  See supra note__.
194 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628.
195 Id. at 629.    The Court’s earlier quotation of Madison, as well as its observation that even in the 
founding era “many clergymen vigorously opposed any established church,” both suggest that the discriminatory 
exclusion of ministers from public office was never justified under the Free Exercise Clause.  Id. at 629 & n.9 
(emphasis added).
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Concurring, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, would have gone beyond the plurality 
opinion and found the clergy disqualification absolutely prohibited under Torcaso as a “religious 
classification … governing the eligibility for office.”196  Brennan’s opinion was strongly influenced by his 
perception that the ministerial exclusion was essentially a religious discrimination, “impos[ing] a unique 
disability upon those who exhibit a defined level of intensity of involvement in protected religious 
activity.”197 198
McDaniel remains a vital precedent that forbids government from “impos[ing] special disabilities 
on the basis of religious views or religious status.”199  The decision is strong evidence of the non-
persecution principle in that it holds up for particular disfavor laws that impose disabilities on status—and 
196 Id. at 631-35 (Brennan, J., concurring).  Brennan would have also invalidated the exclusion under the 
Establishment Clause, id. at 636-42.
197 Id. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring).  That this was Brennan’s perception of the law is reinforced by 
his citation to the language in Everson condemning laws that disabled various denominations “because of their faith, 
or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”  Id. at 633 n.7 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 
16).  See also McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 635 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that, because the clergy 
disqualification “[b]y its terms … operates against McDaniel because of his status as a ‘minister’ or ‘priest,’ it runs 
afoul of the Free Exercise Clause simply as establishing a religious classification as a basis for qualification for a 
political office”) (citation to majority op. omitted).
198
     In a separate concurrence, Justice Stewart agreed with Brennan that the clergy exclusion implicated 
the absolute prohibition against laws targeting beliefs, a principle supported by “the judgment that … government 
has no business prying into people’s minds or dispensing benefits according to people’s religious beliefs.” Id. at 
642-43 & n.* (Stewart, J., concurring).  In another separate concurrence, Justice White would have invalidated the 
exclusion under the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 643-46 (White, J., concurring).
199
     See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; accord DeForrest, supra, at 615-616 (relying on McDaniel, in part, to 
condemn State Blaines as generally unconstitutional).  It is an error to read McDaniel narrowly to forbid only 
religious disqualification from “participation in the political process” or as presenting a unique conflict between 
state and federal rights.  See, e.g., Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 965 n.218 (characterizing clergy disqualification 
in McDaniel as “coercively exclud[ing] clergy from one aspect of the right of self-government”); Davey, 299 F.3d at 
762-63 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (arguing McDaniel merely involved the “juxtapos[ition] [of] two fundamental 
rights,” one of which was the right “to directly engage in the political process”).  The precedential value of the 
decision is better described by the Supreme Court itself—in Smith, the Court described McDaniel as forbidding 
government to “impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status.”  See 494 U.S. at 877; 
see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (reiterating Smith’s interpretation of McDaniel); id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(same). The fact that Tennessee had imposed a religious disability on “the right to self-government” likely made the 
case that much easier to decide, but the controlling factor was the religious disability itself, as Smith and Lukumi 
make clear.  It is implausible to suggest that McDaniel would have come out differently if Tennessee had instead, 
for instance, generally forbidden clergy from participating in an otherwise accessible government charity program, 
simply because of their identity as clergy.
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more precisely on the behavior that is part and parcel with the status—specifically because of its 
connection to religion.  Significantly, McDaniel also treats with skepticism any justification for targeting 
religious affiliation based on historical attitudes about religion that have either been discarded, that are 
incompatible with properly understood principles of religious freedom, or that are themselves of doubtful 
historical lineage.  Finally, notice what little separated the plurality and concurring Justices—four 
subjected the law to strict scrutiny as a “religious conduct discrimination,” while Brennan, Marshall and 
Stewart would have summarily invalidated the law as a “religious belief discrimination.”
The foregoing jurisprudential foundations for the non-exemption and non-persecution rules set 
the stage for the clearest interaction of those rules in two decisions from the 1990s.  Those were Smith—
reaffirming and clarifying the non-exemption rule—and Lukumi—reaffirming and clarifying the non-
persecution rule.  Each decision reinforced the strength of the non-persecution rule and placed it in the 
context of the Court’s overall free exercise jurisprudence.
1. Smith and Peyote
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court confronted whether Oregon could “include 
religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug,” 
and could, consequently, deny unemployment benefits to persons who had been fired for using the drug 
sacramentally during a Native American Church ceremony.200  In deciding that Oregon could do so 
without violating the Free Exercise Clause, the Court focused on the general nature of the criminal peyote 
prohibition, repeatedly characterizing it as a “neutral” or “generally applicable law.”201  “Generally 
200
     Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).  Oregon classified peyote, “a hallucinogen 
derived from the plant Lopophora williamsii Lemaire,” as a Schedule I controlled substance, the possession of 
which was punishable as a criminal felony.  See id. (citations omitted).
201 See id. at 874 (“general criminal prohibition” on peyote use), 878 (“generally applicable law”), 879 
(“valid and neutral law of general applicability”), 880 (“a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law”), 881 (a 
“neutral, generally applicable law”), 884 (“a generally applicable criminal law” and “an across-the-board criminal 
prohibition”), 885 (“generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct”).  The Court was careful to 
distinguish the general criminal prohibition at issue in Smith from the individualized denials of unemployment 
compensation the Court had invalidated in Sherbert, Thomas and Hobbie.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876 & 882-84; see 
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applicable” laws were explicitly contrasted with laws that “were specifically directed against” or that 
“discriminated against” religious behavior.202  The Court recognized that the “exercise of religion” 
protected by the First Amendment often extends to physical acts—listing as examples devotional or 
otherwise religion-motivated actions such as “assembling with others for a worship service, participating 
in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of 
transportation.”203  Further demonstrating what a “generally applicable law” does not do, the Court 
hypothesized the following scenario:
It would be true, we think (although no case of ours has involved the point), that a State 
would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it sought to ban such acts or 
abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the 
religious belief that they display.  It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to 
ban the casting of “statues that are to be used for worship purposes,” or to prohibit 
bowing down before a golden calf.204
Finally, the Court also relied on the text of the Free Exercise Clause to develop its “targeted 
discrimination” distinction.  The Court explained that it was a “permissible reading of the text”—i.e., 
“Congress shall make no law … prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]”—“to say that if prohibiting the 
exercise of religion … is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally 
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”205
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).  Smith left these decisions intact, while limiting their 
applicability outside the context of “individualized” denials of religious exemptions. 
202 See id. at 877 (observing that “[t]he government may not … impose special disabilities on the basis of 
religious views or religious status) (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), and Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 
U.S. 67 (1953)); see also id. (explaining that government would be prohibiting free exercise if it “sought to ban 
[religious] acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious 
belief that they display”); id. at 878 (characterizing respondents’ argument that their religious motivation “places 
them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice”); id. at 886 n.3 
(explaining that the Court “strictly scrutinize[s] governmental classifications based on religion” (citing McDaniel, 
supra; Torcaso, supra).
203 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
204 Id. at 877-78 (emphasis added).
205 Id. at 878; accord Amar BILL OF RIGHTS, at 42-43 (as to the “unreconstructed” free exercise clause); 
but see id. at 254-56 (discussing “reconstructed” clause).
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Smith thus solidifies a sharp distinction between “generally applicable” or “across-the-board” 
laws that are not targeted at religious behavior but may incidentally burden it, and laws that are in fact 
“religion sensitive”—i.e., whose very operation penalizes behavior because of its connection to religious 
belief or practice. Smith thereby suggests that the way laws structure their burdens is constitutionally 
determinative;  if a law structures its burdens deliberately to fall on religious conduct alone, then it is not 
generally applicable.  Three years later in its Lukumi decision, the Court reinforced that distinction and 
demonstrated that laws of this variety—imposing “religion-sensitive” burdens—presumptively violate 
free exercise rights.
2. Lukumi and Animal Sacrifice
While the Court was evaluating exemptions for religious peyote use in Smith, the Lukumi case 
was still working its way through the federal courts.  Supporting the non-exemption rule, the Smith Court 
cited the district court’s 1989 opinion in Lukumi.  The Court did so merely to give an example of one of 
the many kinds of general civic obligations—in Lukumi, animal cruelty laws—that ought not to be forced 
by the Free Exercise Clause to exempt religious conduct that has been only incidentally burdened.206  But 
in 1993, when the Court examined the animal cruelty laws at issue in Lukumi, it discovered that, on closer 
inspection, those laws were in fact a coordinated web of prohibitions and exceptions deliberately designed 
for one purpose—to criminalize the ritual sacrifices performed by adherents of the Santeria religion.207
Thus, Lukumi  allowed the Court to refine the distinction between generally applicable laws on the one 
hand, and, on the other, those rarer instances of laws whose “object or purpose … is the suppression of 
religion or religious conduct.”208
206 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. 
Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
207 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
208 Id. at 533.
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The exercise of Santeria—a fusion of Roman Catholicism with traditional African religious 
practices—involves ritual animal sacrifice.  As the Santeria Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye was 
preparing to begin worship in the southern Florida community of Hialeah, the Hialeah city council held 
an emergency session, during which it passed a number of resolutions and ordinances concerning animal 
cruelty and ritual sacrifice.209 None of the ordinances passed to further the resolutions mentioned the 
Santeria by name,210 but, as the Court would remark in the course of its opinion invalidating them, 
“almost the only conduct subject to [the Ordinances] is the religious exercise of the Santeria church 
members.”211
At the outset of its opinion, the Supreme Court set forth the overarching standards from Smith:
[O]ur cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general 
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law 
had the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.  Neutrality and 
general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to 
satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.  A law 
failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.212
The Court observed that, “at a minimum” the Free Exercise Clause protects against a law that 
“discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is 
undertaken for religious reasons,” and that instances of such “religious persecution” lie at the historical 
209 See generally id. at 524-28.  Various resolutions expressed, for example, “concern” that “certain 
religions may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety,” and 
determined to “oppose the ritual sacrifices of animals.” Id. at 526-27 (quoting Resolutions 87-66 & 87-90).
210 Id. at 527-28 (quoting Ordinances 87-52, 87-71, & 87-72).  For instance, the ordinances (1) prohibited 
animal “sacrifice,” defined as “to unnecessarily kill … an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the 
primary purpose of food consumption”; (2) restricted that prohibition to any individual or group that “kills, 
slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual”; (3) exempted certain “licensed establishments” from the 
slaughtering prohibition for animals “specifically raised for food purposes” and set zoning areas for slaughterhouse
use; and (4) further exempted from regulation the slaughter or processing for sale of “small numbers of hogs and/or 
cattle per week” in accordance with other state law.  Id.
211 Id. at 535.
212 Id. at 531-32 (citing Smith) (emphasis added).
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roots of the clause.213 A law is not neutral “if the object of [the] law is to infringe upon or restrict 
practices because of their religious motivation.”214  A law blatantly violates neutrality when it 
“discriminate[s] on its face,” by, for instance, “refer[ring] to a religious practice without a secular 
meaning discernable from the language or context.”215  But a law may advance its discriminatory object 
more subtly—engaging in “masked” or “covert suppression of particular religious beliefs”—when its 
operation “targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment.”216  To illuminate what it meant by covert
discrimination, the Court quoted a well-known directive from its Establishment Clause jurisprudence to 
the effect that “[t]he Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to 
eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.”217
The Court unanimously concluded that the Hialeah Ordinances violated the Free Exercise Clause 
because, essentially, the ordinances prohibited a form of conduct (animal killing) only when it was 
engaged in to observe the religious practices of the Santeria.  The ordinances were carefully structured to 
exempt every other form of animal killing that could conceivably fall within their prohibitions—for 
instance, large-scale slaughterhouses, small-scale farm slaughter, kosher butchers, and hunting.218  The 
Court characterized this as a religious “gerrymander” whose effect was “that few if any killings of 
213 Id. at 532 (citations omitted).
214 Id. at 533.  Using largely the same expression, the Court also remarked that neutrality is violated 
when “the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious conduct.”  Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 534 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 704 (1986) (op. of Burger, C.J.)).
217 Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax. Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see infra __.  
As to “general applicability,” the Court explained that this inquiry focused on equality-of-treatment concerns and 
was guided by “[t]he principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner 
impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief.”  Id. at 542-43.  The Court admitted that the “general 
applicability” and “neutrality” inquiries are “interrelated” and, concurring, Justice Scalia “frankly acknowledge[d] 
that the terms are not only ‘interrelated,’ … but substantially overlap.”  Id. at 531; id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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animals are prohibited other than Santeria sacrifice, which is proscribed because it occurs during a ritual 
or ceremony and its primary purpose is to [fulfill Santeria religious requirements], not food 
consumption.”219  The ordinances, therefore, were not “neutral” because they “had as their object the 
suppression of religion.”220  Therefore the Court applied strict scrutiny to the ordinances, citing McDaniel
and Smith, while candidly acknowledging that “[a] law that targets religious conduct for distinctive 
treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation 
will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”221  Unsurprisingly, given the Hialeah Ordinances’ plain 
object and operation, Lukumi was not one of those rare cases.222
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, sheds additional light on 
Lukumi’s analysis, particularly since Scalia wrote Smith.  Scalia clarified that the “terms ‘neutrality’ and 
‘general applicability’ are not to be found within the First Amendment itself,” but instead have been used 
by the Court “to describe those characteristics which cause a law that prohibits an activity a particular 
individual wishes to engage in for religious reasons nonetheless not to constitute a ‘law … prohibiting the 
free exercise” of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment.”223  In Scalia’s view, a laws are not 
218 Id. at 535-37.  The Court observed that, under Florida case law, even “the use of live rabbits to train 
greyhounds” would not violate the Florida animal cruelty laws, which the Hialeah Ordinances had incorporated.  Id.
at 537 (citing Kiper v. State, 310 So.2d 42 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 328 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1975)).
219 Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
220 Id. at 542.  For largely the same reason, the ordinances were also not “generally applicable”—while 
they pursued legitimate governmental interests, at least broadly speaking, in seeking to prevent animal cruelty and to 
protect public health, they did so “only against conduct motivated by religious belief.” Id. at 542-46.  The Court 
reasoned that the ordinances were blatantly “underinclusive” in furthering the asserted legislative goals—failing to 
encompass many non-religious kinds of animal cruelty and public health hazards.  Id. at 543-45.  For no legitimate 
reason, the ordinances forced religiously motivated conduct alone to “bear the burden” of their prohibitions and they 
therefore had “every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshiper] but 
not upon itself.”  Id. at 544, 545 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment)).
221 Id. at 546 (citing McDaniel, supra, 435 U.S. at 628; Smith, supra, 494 U.S. at 888).
222 Id. at 546-47.
223 Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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“neutral” in that sense when “by their terms [they] impose disabilities on the basis of religion (e.g., a law 
excluding members of a certain sect from public benefits).”224  By contrast, laws lack “general 
applicability” when, “though neutral in their terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement 
[they] target the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory treatment.”225  Scalia allowed that his 
line between these two qualities of discriminatory laws was “somewhat different” from the one drawn in 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, but he judged the distinction was inconsequential since the categories 
“substantially overlap.”226
3. Summary:  Non-Persecution and Free Exercise
The consistent rejection in the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence of laws that target religious 
conduct for special disabilities—laws that impose “religion-sensitive” penalties—undergirds the non-
persecution principle.  The Court has long recognized that the laws of a pluralist society will inevitably 
intrude on certain behavioral demands that religions make of their adherents.  In early cases like Reynolds
224 Id.  Illustrating that proposition, Scalia cited McDaniel and also Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in 
Bowen v. Roy, in which Burger stated that “denial of [governmental] benefits by a uniformly applicable statute 
neutral on its face is of a wholly different, less intrusive nature than affirmative compulsion or prohibition, by threat 
of penal sanctions, for conduct that has religious implications.”  Id.; see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 704 (1986) 
(op. of Burger, C.J.).
225 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  Jay Bybee provides an accurate 
synthesis of Scalia’s opinions in Lukumi and Smith.  As Bybee explains, the law upheld by Scalia’s majority opinion 
in Smith “prohibited the use of peyote generally, … [and] necessarily prohibited the religious use of peyote.”  The 
impact on religiously motivated conduct was incidental, not deliberate.  The prohibition was not religion-sensitive.  
By contrast, in Lukumi, Scalia concurred in invalidating “a city ordinance barring the ritual slaughter of animals,” a
law in which “ritual use was an element of the crime.”  Bybee Power Theory, supra, at 312-13.  The Lukumi law’s 
prohibition was tied to religious motivation; its burden on the Santeria practitioners was unique and deliberate.  The 
law was religion-sensitive.  See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited 
Public Forum:  Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 653, 698 (1996) (observing that Smith’s “less well known” holding, which was confirmed in Lukumi, 
“reiterated that laws ‘imposing special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status’ are 
presumptively unconstitutional, and subject to strict scrutiny”).
226 Id. at 557, 558 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Any difference seems slight and immaterial.  Scalia and the 
majority agree on the qualities of a law that render it discriminatory for purposes of free exercise analysis, but they 
merely group those qualities differently under the rubrics of “neutrality” and “general applicability.”  It appears that 
Scalia would treat “neutrality” more narrowly than the majority—focusing more on the actual terms of the law—but 
would treat “general applicability” more broadly—including the “design [and] construction” of the law.  See id. at 
557-58 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and Davis, Mormons’ religious obligation to engage in polygamous marriages had to give way before 
society’s different conception of marital limits.  Over a century later in Smith, Native Americans’ 
celebration of a sacrament of their religion bowed before society’s need to regulate harmful substances.  
But there is a deeper principle at work governing the burdens society may legitimately place on religious 
conduct, one evident in the parameters of the non-exemption rule itself.  For that rule coherently operates 
only in the context of laws that further legitimate governmental goals through “neutral and generally 
applicable” means and that, by definition, place burdens on religiously motivated conduct only 
“incidentally.”  In other words, the Court has always premised the soundness of the balance struck in the 
non-exemption rule on the notion that the laws in question circumscribe conduct for legitimate reasons 
independent of its religious affiliation or motivation.  Once laws begin to impose burdens based on 
whether a status, organization, or behavior is connected to religion, then the entire basis for the non-
exemption rule crumbles.
Gerard Bradley has persuasively explained the intersection between these two complementary 
lessons.  Commenting on the relationship between Smith and Lukumi, Bradley argues that “[t]hose cases 
stand for the proposition that where an action is legitimately generally prohibited, the Constitution does 
not require different treatment for believers who engage in the activity for religious reasons, or for the 
religious significance they see in or attach to it.”227  But the necessary corollary to this rule, Bradley is 
careful to add, flows from what I have described as the backbone principle of non-persecution:  “Where 
public authority generally permits an activity—say, slaughtering animals—it may not discriminate against 
persons who would engage in the activity for religious reasons or for the religious significance they see in 
or attach to it.”228  Thus, we can broadly say that the Free Exercise Clause does not withhold from 
government the power to prohibit all polygamy, but does withhold power to prohibit Mormon polygamy 
only or polygamy engaged in “for religious purposes.”  Government may forbid peyote use across-the-
227 See Bradley Stereotype, supra, at 15.
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board for the religious and non-religious alike, but it may not prohibit the “ritual” or “sacramental” use of 
peyote while exempting all other uses.  Eligibility for public office may be regulated based on any 
number of general criteria (age, citizenship, and criminal record come to mind), but eligibility may not be 
premised on the nature of a person’s connection to religion or to a person’s role in a church.  Government 
may enact generally applicable public health rules for animal slaughter and disposal, but it may not tailor 
those rules to target religious animal slaughter only, while leaving the butcher, the farmer and the hunter 
inexplicably unregulated.
What counts here is whether religion is the triggering mechanism for the burden imposed.  The 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate burdens on religious practice shows that the constitutional 
defect arises when the categorizations such “religious,” “religious affiliation,” or “religious purposes” are 
used as the organizing principle for imposing legal disabilities.  “Incidental” burdens—those which, in a 
sense, accidentally occur only because general laws may conceivably burden someone’s religious practice 
in a religiously plural society—are constitutionally permissible.  But laws that reserve their burdens for 
religious conduct only—“religious gerrymanders,” in Justice Harlan’s phrase229—are impermissible 
because, in allocating the burdens and benefits of society’s laws, they force religiously motivated conduct 
alone to bear the burdens and forego the benefits.  The free exercise clause condemns such laws because, 
as Michael McConnell explains, “[t]he free exercise principle ‘singles out’ religion for special protection 
against government hostility or interference.”230
Notice how the subtle ripening of the non-persecution principle, as seen in the long progression 
from Reynolds in 1878 to Lukumi in 1993, reinforces the idea that, at bottom, pre cisely what non-
persecution prohibits is invidious religious categorization.  Reynolds seemed to stingily protect only 
228 Id. (citations omitted).
229 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring).
230
     McConnell Singling Out, supra, at 43.
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Mormons’ religious opinions and leave their actions entirely open to legal prohibition, provided they were 
“in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”231  In 1890, Davis perhaps promised slightly 
more protection—shielding not only “man’s relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they 
impose,” but also “the manner in which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those 
subjects.”232  Like Reynolds, Davis also recognized the trumping power of criminal law, but added that 
such laws must be “passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the subjects 
of punitive legislation.”233  Fast forward to Gobitis in 1940 and we find the Court suggesting that 
“religious liberty” is offended by laws “directed against the doctrinal loyalties of particular sects” or laws 
“aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”234   A short seven years later gives us the 
Court’s striking dicta in Everson that free exercise prohibits states from “exclud[ing] individual Catholics, 
Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of 
any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare 
legislation.”235 Braunfeld, in 1961, condemns laws imposing even “indirect” burdens on religious 
practice if their “purpose or effect” was “to impede the observance of one or all religions” or “to 
discriminate invidiously between religions.”236 In 1978, McDaniel invalidates laws targeting religious 
“status”—in the sense of conduct or activity affiliated with religion—for special disabilities.237  And, in 
231 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
232 Davis, 133 U.S. at 342-43 (emphasis added).
233 Id.
234 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added).
235 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16; see also Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607 (stating that, unlike a “general” law, “[i]f 
the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously 
between religions, the law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only 
indirect”).
236 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607.
237 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626-28.
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the 1990s, Smith and Lukumi solidify the prohibition against laws that impose disabilities on a category 
defined in religious terms.
This can plausibly be viewed as a progression of free exercise principles from simply forbidding 
laws targeting religious beliefs, to forbidding encroachments on religious observance and practice, to 
forbidding exclusions based on religiously motivated conduct, status, and affiliation.  Overall, the 
movement has been toward forbidding invidious religious categorization altogether.  The elaboration of 
“general” versus “targeted” laws in Smith and Lukumi cannot be properly understood apart from this 
matrix of free exercise decisions stretching back over a century.  And Lukumi explicitly invokes that long 
history when it glosses “religious persecution” as laws that “discriminate[] against some or all religious 
beliefs or regulate[] or prohibit[] conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”238  Thus, the 
Court does not use persecution carelessly or outside the context of its own jurisprudence, and it has not 
suggested that the term is confined to the grossest instances of official religious discrimination.  
Understanding the term’s proper place in free exercise jurisprudence shows that persecution is legally 
accomplished by the more sophisticated method of an invidious classification based on religion alone.239
In the next section, I will examine how principles from Court’s non-establishment and free 
speech jurisprudence reinforce and round out the scope of this non-persecution rule.  But it will be useful 
238 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532.  Lukumi specifically says that “[i]t was ‘historical instances of religious 
persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.’” Id. (quoting Bowen 
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (op. of Burger, C.J.)).  
239
     Just as it is wrong to read McDaniel narrowly, see supra note __, it is wrong to restrict Lukumi its 
facts.  See, e.g., Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 963 n.211 (distinguishing Lukumi because it involved “coercive, 
animal protection legislation upon a particular religious sect, rather than the limitation of a government benefit to 
secular organizations”); Davey, 299 F.3d at 762 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (declining to find “any guidance in 
Lukumi beyond the criminal ordinance at issue there”).  Not only does this ignore the Court’s language in Lukumi—
which broadly teaches that, “[a]t a minimum, the protections of the free exercise clause pertain if the law at issue 
discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for 
religious reasons”—it more fundamentally ignores Lukumi’s place in the larger development of the Court’s 
religious non-discrimination jurisprudence—again, which the Court made clear in its opinion.  See 508 U.S. at 532-
33.  The laws at issue in Lukumi doubtlessly presented egregious violations of free exercise, because they were 
designed to stamp out a central religious practice of a minority religious group.  But neither the opinion itself, nor 
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to pause at this point and assess the State Blaines in light of the basic tenets of non-persecution drawn 
from the Court’s free exercise cases.  Those tenets call the obvious textual applications of the State Blaine 
Amendments into serious question.240  All State Blaines explicitly single out religious purposes, religious 
institutions, and religious affiliation for exclusion from otherwise generally available public benefits.  The 
object which is plain on the face of all the State Blaines is to place religion at a civil disadvantage with 
respect to all conduct, institutions, and persons that are “non-religious.”  In doing so, the State Blaines 
explicitly exclude themselves from the category of “neutral and generally applicable laws”—the only 
kind of laws which, under the Free Exercise Clause, may place burdens on religious conduct.  Like the 
clergy exclusion in McDaniel, the State Blaines force persons whose behavior or status affiliates them 
with religion to choose between adhering to that affiliation and receiving public benefits that eligible 
“non-religious” persons are entitled to.  Like the animal sacrifice laws in Lukumi, the State Blaines tailor 
their burdens and exclusions to conduct that is undertaken for religious reasons—only the State Blaines 
add to that the additional defect of discriminating against religion openly.241
the Court’s non-discrimination jurisprudence generally, gives any reason to think that Lukumi represents a minimum
level of “religious persecution” which must be reached before the Free Exercise Clause is triggered.
240
   In a recent article, Mark DeForrest reaches a similar conclusion about the State Blaines.  See
DeForrest, supra, at 607.  More generally, DeForrest also argues that the State Blaines violate a “principle of 
nondiscrimination” inherent in liberal democracy itself and in principles of distributive justice.  See generally id. at 
607-13 (relying principally on Paul Weithman, Religious Reasons and the Duties of Membership, 36 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 511 (2001); Ashley Woodiwiss, Ecclesial Profiling, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 557 (2001); JOHN 
COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION
(1960)).
241 My application of the non-persecution rule to the State Blaines does not rely on the subjective 
motivations legislators may have had, individually or collectively, in promulgating them.  It is not clear whether 
such “legislative purposes”—those hopes or fears which may lurk in lawmakers’ breasts but find no objective 
expression in the language, structure, or operation of the laws they pass—should figure in analyzing the validity of 
laws under the establishment or free exercise clauses.  Some of what the Court has said in non-establishment cases 
suggests that legislators’ subjective motivations could be relevant.  See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38, 56-61 
(1985) (considering legislators’ subjective motivations for “moment of silence” law in determining “’whether 
government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion’”) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)); see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 73-78 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (generally 
discussing use of legislative history, including some limited use of legislators’ statements, in assessing secular 
purpose of law); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) (stating that “we continue to ask whether the 
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion”).  As to free exercise cases, the evidence is 
shakier.  In Lukumi, only two Justices relied on statements of individual council members’ subjective motivations 
for the animal cruelty ordinances.  See 508 U.S. at 540-42 (op. of Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, J.).  That reliance 
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B. “Neutrality” and Non-Persecution
It is often stated that the religion clauses demand that laws be “neutral” toward religion.242  The 
concept continues to play a major conceptual role in the Supreme Court’s non-establishment 
jurisprudence.243  But “neutrality” is an incomplete and open-ended term;  as Douglas Laycock observes, 
“[t]hose who think that neutrality is meaningless have a point.  We can agree on the principle of neutrality 
without having agreed on anything at all.”244  Yet Laycock rightly does not dismiss neutrality as an 
intelligible concept—indeed, he argues that one of the “case law roots of the nondiscrimination theory” 
lies in “the Court’s frequent statements over two decades that the Constitution requires government to be 
was strongly rejected in Justice Scalia’s concurrence.  See id. at 558-59 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, 
C.J.).  In any event, the parameters of the non-persecution rule I have analyzed in this article suggest that an 
objective notion of legislative purpose is the relevant one for free exercise purposes.  Non-persecution asks how a 
law operates objectively with respect to religious persons, organizations, and purposes.  It would not seem to regard 
as a necessary or a sufficient condition for a law’s invalidity that the lawmakers who passed it subjectively wished to 
persecute religion—provided those subjective wishes found no objective expression in the language, structure, or 
operation of the law.  A view that such subjective wishes are alone enough to invalidate a law seems inconsistent 
with the distinction clarified in Smith and Lukumi between “religion neutral” and “religion targeted” laws.
This issue impacts an analysis of the State Blaines.  If invalidation of a particular State Blaine required a 
specific showing that the legislators passing it subjectively intended to persecute Catholics, the task would be 
difficult indeed.  See Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 967-70 (describing difficulties in mounting a purely “animus-
based” attack on State Blaines).  Further, it would raise the hard question of whether lawmakers’ subjective purposes 
in the late nineteenth century should even matter today.  But my analysis of the State Blaines regards such subjective 
motivation as irrelevant.  The State Blaines, on their face, objectively structure categories of public beneficiaries to 
exclude the religious.  Understanding the State Blaines’ historical provenance, of course, helps explain why such 
laws exist.  But if we had no knowledge about why the State Blaines came into being, they would still operate 
unconstitutionally against religion.  On this point, I disagree with Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle that a subjective 
“animus-based” attack is the only way to invalidate the State Blaines.  See id.
242 See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (remarking that the First Amendment “requires the state to be 
neutral in its relations with groups of believers and non-believers”); see also Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, 
and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 993 (1990) (observing that “[a] wide 
range of courts and commentators commonly say that government must be neutral toward religion” and assuming 
that “neutrality is an important part of the meaning of the religion clauses”) (citations omitted).
243 See infra __.
244 See Laycock Substantive Neutrality, supra, at 994.
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neutral toward religion.”245  Neutrality, in short, has something to tell us about the non-persecution 
principle and, in turn, how that principle applies to the State Blaines.246
Among scholars of American religious liberties, there are two prominent competing views of 
what a principle of “neutrality” toward religion requires.  My purpose is not to choose one over the 
other.247  Instead, my modest point that either view of “neutrality” supports the non-persecution principle 
gleaned from the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence.  I will briefly demonstrate that the Court has often 
suggested as much—i.e. that religious discrimination is inconsistent with any plausible notion of 
government neutrality toward religion—when elaborating the requirements of neutrality in its non-
establishment cases.
One account of neutrality posits that the religion clauses are co-belligerents in the cause of 
promoting religious freedom:  free exercise forbids discrimination against particular religions and against 
religion generally, while non-establishment “prevents the government from using its power to promote, 
advocate, or endorse any particular religious position.”248  Douglas Laycock has coined the influential 
term “substantive neutrality” to capture this notion—i.e., that “the religion clauses require government to 
minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or 
nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.”249  The religion clauses, so often accused of being in 
“tension,” should instead be read holistically “in the light of an overarching purpose to protect freedom of 
245 See Laycock Unity, supra, at 63 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
246 See, e.g., DeForrest, supra, at 608 n.468 (linking State Blaines’ discriminatory operation to Court’s 
use of neutrality in its religion jurisprudence).
247
   A substantive conception of neutrality does seem, however, more congruent with the religion-
promoting text and purposes of the religion clauses.
248
     McConnell Singling Out, supra, at 43.
249 See Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supra, at 1001; see also Laycock Unity, supra, at 45 (reiterating 
argument for substantive neutrality that “an underlying purpose of religious liberty is to minimize government 
influence on religious choices”); Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 122 n.5 (agreeing with Laycock’s view of 
“substantive neutrality”); Lupu Distinctive Place, supra, at 66 n.96 (contrasting Laycock’s “substantive neutrality” 
with a more formalist view of neutrality).
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religion.”250  Seen that way, “most of the tension between them disappears.  They are complementary 
provisions, both in the service of the same fundamental right.  They bar Congress from abridging 
religious freedom in one specific way (by legislation ‘respecting an establishment of religion’), and in 
general (‘or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’).”251  In a similar vein, Michael McConnell explains that 
“[t]he Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses serve a complementary function:  to reduce the power of 
government over religion, whether to help, hurt, or control, to the greatest extent consistent with the 
achievement of legitimate secular objectives.”252
A competing notion of religious neutrality is “formal neutrality.”  This view holds that 
“government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction,” because the unified thrust of the 
free exercise and establishment clauses “prohibit[s] classification in terms of religion either to confer a 
benefit or to impose a burden.”253  Formal neutrality draws a strikingly different inference from the 
complementarity of free exercise and non-establishment.  Although it reads the clauses as “stating a single 
precept,”254 that precept directs government not merely to avoid interfering with religion, but rather to 
250 See Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 541 
(1991).
251 Id.
252
     McConnell Singling Out, supra, at 11.  In an earlier article, McConnell proposed a similar view of 
what he called a “pluralistic” approach to interpreting the Establishment Clause.  According to him, “a pluralistic 
approach would not ask whether the purpose or effect of the challenged action is to ‘advance religion,’ but whether 
it is to foster religious uniformity or otherwise distort the process of reaching and practicing religious convictions.  
A governmental policy that gives free rein to individual decisions (secular and religious) does not offend the 
Establishment Clause, even if the effect is to increase the number of religious choices.  The concern of the 
Establishment Clause is with governmental actions that constrain individual decisionmaking with respect to religion, 
by favoring one religion over others, or by favoring religion over nonreligion.”  McConnell Crossroads, supra, at 
175.
253 See Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961); see 
also Mark Tushnet, ‘Of Church and State and the Supreme Court”: Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373; 
Laycock Substantive Neutrality, supra, at 999-1000 & nn.22-23; Lupu Distinctive Place, supra, at 66 & n.96.
254
     Kurland, supra, at 96.
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adopt a mechanistic evenhandedness toward religion, “without regard to whether such evenhandedness 
helps or hinders religion.”255
These two views of neutrality make a difference on some important issues.  For instance, does the 
Establishment Clause allow legislatures to make specific exemptions from laws for religiously-motivated 
behavior or religious organizations?  A “substantively neutral” view would hold that, generally speaking, 
government may (or perhaps must) do so, and this, indeed, is how the issue has been resolved historically 
in American legislatures and courts.256  A “formally neutral” view would reject any special religious 
exemptions by courts or legislatures.  Smith indicates that the Supreme Court was guided by concerns 
with formal neutrality when deciding whether religious behavior should receive judicial exemptions from 
generally applicable laws.257  At the same time, Smith did not wholly embrace formal neutrality, since the 
255
     Lupu Distinctive Place, supra, at 66 & n.96; cf. Glendon & Yanes, supra, at 541 (arguing that the 
First Amendment should be read holistically as a straightforward declaration that “forbids Congress to interfere with 
a group of important freedoms,” first among which is simply “religious freedom”).   Purely formal neutrality has 
been widely criticized.  For instance, Laycock claims that “formal neutrality has been almost universally rejected,” 
that “[n]o major commentator has endorsed it for a generation” (he excepts Tushnet, supra), and that “[h]ardly 
anyone else has been willing to apply it universally, because it produces surprising results that are inconsistent with 
strong intuitions.”  Laycock Substantive Neutrality, supra, at 1000.  McConnell rejects what he calls “religion-
blindness” as an across-the-board standard for interpreting the religion clauses, and he points out that Kurland’s 
formulation itself illogically uses “religion” as a legal categorization.  See McConnell Singling Out, supra, at 11.  I 
would add that it is difficult to derive a rule of formal neutrality from the text and purposes of the religion clauses 
themselves.  If the religion clauses, as Akhil Amar has persuasively demonstrated (see Amar BILL OF RIGHTS, at 33-
34, 41), simply withdrew two objects of legislative power from Congress (i.e., the power to “forbid the free exercise 
of religion” and to “meddle with state establishments of religion”), then why should we read them as impliedly 
making the additional and vastly broader withdrawal of any power to legislate on religious matters altogether?  
Indeed, based on text and purposes alone, it would seem more plausible to reason, by negative implication, that the 
religion clauses empower Congress to promote the flourishing of religion generally.
256 See, e.g., McConnell Singling Out, supra, at 5-6 (arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that religious accommodations are constitutionally permissible, even if not constitutionally required”) (citations 
omitted); id. at 14 (stating that “not one historian or constitutional scholar has [in recent years] claimed that the 
founding generation deemed religious accommodations illegitimate.  Accommodations of religion during the years 
leading up to the framing of the First Amendment were common (the most frequent examples were exemption from 
military conscription or jury duty, exemption from oath requirements, and exemption from tithes).”); see also, e.g., 
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (stating that “we do not deny 
that the Constitution allows the State to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens” and that “[o]ur 
cases leave no doubt that in commanding neutrality the Religion Clauses do not require the government to be 
oblivious to impositions that legitimate exercises of state power may place on religious belief and practice”).
257 See supra __.
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opinion itself approves of legislative exemptions.258  Many proponents of “substantive neutrality” have, 
nonetheless, criticized Smith.259
For present purposes, I need not resolve the tensions between formal and substantive neutrality.  
Why?  On either account of neutrality, laws that explicitly target religion for special disabilities are “non-
neutral.”  Such laws violate substantive neutrality because they promote, not religious freedom, but 
hostility toward religion; their object and effect is to demote and penalize religious belief, behavior, or 
association.260  Such laws violate formal neutrality for more formal reasons;  they use religion as a 
category for imposing legal burdens.261   Either conception of neutrality, then, would forbid religious 
discrimination and therefore accords with the general non-persecution principles under the Court’s free 
exercise jurisprudence.  A brief look at the Court’s treatment of “neutrality” (whether that treatment 
reflects a more formal or more substantive view of neutrality) in its non-establishment cases will 
demonstrate that idea.
Neutrality as “religious non-hostility” can be seen as one fixed star in the otherwise untidy 
constellation of the Court’s non-establishment cases.  The Establishment Clause is neutral toward religion 
in that it does not “compel the exclusion of religious groups from government benefit programs that are 
258 See, e.g., McConnell Crossroads, supra, at 166-67 (“The formal neutrality position would make 
unconstitutional all legislation that explicitly exempts religious institutions or individuals from generally applicable 
burdens or obligations.  Yet the theory of Smith is that exemptions are a form of beneficent legislation, left to the 
discretion of the political branches.  … Smith thus rejects the formal neutrality position under the Establishment 
Clause.”) (citations omitted).
259 See, e.g., Laycock Substantive Neutrality, supra, at 1000 (strongly criticizing Smith); Lupu Distinctive 
Place, supra, at 71-72 & nn.113-15 (discussing criticism and defense of Smith); see also supra __.
260 See, e.g., McConnell Crossroads, supra, at 184-87 (arguing that selective exclusion of religious 
institutions from generally available public benefits would violate neutrality insofar as it “use[s] the government’s 
coercive power to disadvantage religion”) (citing Michael W. McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions:  
Unrecognized Implications for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1989)).
261 See Kurland, supra, at 96 (religious clauses “prohibit classification in terms of religion either to 
confer a benefit or to impose a burden) (emphasis added); see also Lupu Distinctive Place, supra, at 66 & n.96 
(stating that the “Neutralist believes that religious entities and causes are to be treated exactly like their secular 
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generally available to a broad class of participants.”262  But the Court has often suggested that neutrality 
goes beyond merely “not compelling” religious exclusion; neutrality affirmatively condemns 
governmental hostility toward religion itself.263  As Justice O’Connor has observed, “The Religion 
Clauses prohibit the government from favoring religion, but they provide no warrant for discriminating 
against religion.”264  For instance, neutrality means that government may not deliberately skew how it 
distributes aid either in favor of or against religious recipients.265  In other words, no particular universe 
of aid recipients may be defined in a way that religious groups get more aid because they are religious 
groups; conversely, because potential recipients are religious groups, they may not designedly get less.
This religion-friendly side of neutrality is most clearly distilled in the doctrine that laws violate 
the federal Establishment Clause if they deliberately “inhibit” religion.266  The notion runs back to the 
seminal Establishment Clause decision, Everson itself, which declared that “State power is no more to be 
counterparts—no worse and no better,” and is one “who equates neutrality with nondiscrimination between religious 
institutions and their secular counterparts”) (emphasis added).
262
   Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988) (observing that the Court has 
never held, under the Establishment Clause, “that religious institutions are disabled … from participating in publicly 
sponsored social welfare programs”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (refusing to find under 
Establishment Clause any “constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to 
religion”).
263 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 (“More than once we have rejected the position that the 
Establishment Clause even justifies, much less requires, a refusal to extend free speech rights to religious speakers 
who participate in broad-reaching government programs neutral in design.”); id. at 846 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(stating that “insistence on government neutrality toward religion explains why we have held that schools may not 
discriminate against religious groups by denying them equal access to facilities that the schools make available to 
all”); Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (declaring that “State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it 
is to favor them”) (emphasis added) (citations and quotations omitted).
264 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 714 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
265 See, e.g., Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2467-68 (finding Ohio voucher program “neutral in all respects toward 
religion” in that the aid is “allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor
religion”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997) (government aid does not advance religion by creating 
religious incentives “when the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor
religion and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis”) (emphasis 
added).
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used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.”267 Everson also closely links this aspect of 
non-establishment jurisprudence to the Free Exercise Clause.268  None of this is to say, however, that the 
most comfortable argument against religiously-hostile laws lies in the Establishment Clause proper.  The 
Court has rarely, if ever, applied the “inhibition” prong, and there is some doubt as to the coherence of the 
argument that government disapproval of religion somehow “establishes” religion.269  Furthermore, four 
members of the current Court have recently suggested that “to require exclusion of religious schools from 
[a genuinely neutral aid program] would raise serious questions under the Free Exercise Clause.”270  My 
narrower purpose is to point out that, like free exercise jurisprudence, non-establishment jurisprudence 
contains a background assumption that laws violate basic canons of legitimacy when they purposefully 
266 See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (law is an “establishment” of religion if its “primary effect … 
advances or inhibits religion”); see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-23 (confirming that “we continue to ask whether 
the government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion”)
267 See Everson., 330 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).  Further linking neutrality to non-hostility, Everson
also stated that the First Amendment “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious 
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.”  Id.
268 See id. at 16 (explaining that Free Exercise Clause “commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its 
citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.  Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, 
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, 
because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”) (emphasis added).
269
     As to the State Blaines, the argument would be that they themselves “establish” religion, because their 
purpose and effect is to “inhibit” religion by disqualifying it from generally available public benefits. See Lemon, 
403 U.S. at 612 (a law’s “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion”); see 
also McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 636-42 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that Tennessee clergy exclusion also violated 
Establishment Clause since the clause, “properly understood, is a shield against any attempt by government to 
inhibit religion as it has done here”); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 856-57 
& n.2 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that legal categorization that explicitly discriminates against 
religion is unconstitutional because it wrongly takes “cognizance” of religion) (citing Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance).  Cutting against this line of argument, Michael McConnell has argued that the “apparent symmetry” 
of the Lemon “inhibition” prong is “spurious,” pointing out that “in actual practice, actions ‘inhibiting’ religion are 
dealt with under the Free Exercise Clause” and that the only case in which the Supreme Court has applied 
“inhibition” as a matter of establishment law is Larson v. Valente (a case involving denominational discrimination).  
See McConnell Crossroads, supra, at 118 n.9 & 152.  In a similar vein, Douglas Laycock has argued that “the Court 
never took the ‘inhibiting’ prong of Lemon seriously in the context of school finance.”  Laycock Unity, supra, at 56. 
270 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835 n.19 (plurality op.) (citing Lukumi, Everson, and Rosenberger) 
(emphasis added).
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single out religion for disfavored treatment.  This background assumption is evident in much of the 
Court’s elaboration of the neutrality requirement, as the following examples underscore.
Even when forbidding Bible reading in public schools in Abington Township v. Schempp—a 
decision regarded by some as an apogee of Court-imposed separationism271—the Court emphasized that 
the Establishment Clause did not sanction purposeful religious discrimination.  Constitutional limits of 
legislative power were transgressed, the Court said, if the “purpose and the primary effect of the 
enactment” is “either the advancement or inhibition of religion.”272  Justice Goldberg’s concurrence better 
articulated this idea, explaining that “[t]he fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that 
government neither engage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or 
between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence to no religious belief.”273
That “benevolent” view of neutrality was prominent in Walz v. Tax Commission, a decision which 
validated the venerable practice of granting tax exemptions to churches.274 Walz stated categorically that 
“[t]he general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is 
this:  that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference 
271 See Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 151-52.
272
     Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (emphasis added).  The 
Abington majority underscored the religious neutrality and non-hostility guaranteed by both religion clauses, noting 
that “the two clauses may overlap.”  As a general matter, the Court remarked that “the ideal of our people as to 
religious freedom … [is] one of ‘absolute equality before the law, of all religious opinions and sects’” and that 
“‘[t]he government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none.’”  Id. at 214-15 
(quoting Minor v. Bd. of Educ. of Cincinnati, 23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (Sup. Ct. Cincin. 1872) (op. of Alphonso Taft, 
J.)) (emphasis added).  The Court described the religion clauses’ overarching approach as “wholesome ‘neutrality.’”  
Abington, 374 U.S. at 222.  The Court added that “[w]e agree of course that the State may not establish a ‘religion of 
secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who 
believe in no religion over those who do believe.’”  Id. at 225 (quoting Zorach, supra, 343 U.S. at 314).
273 See Abington, 374 U.S. at 305-06 (Goldberg, J., concurring).  Justice Goldberg’s elaboration of 
neutrality seems to have more of a “substantive” flavor than the majority’s articulation, insofar as Goldberg 
emphasized that non-establishment disabled the government from “engaging in or compelling religious practices,” 
from showing “favoritism” to particular sects or to religion generally, and from “deterring” religious belief.  Id.  The 
majority, by contrast, reasoned that laws may not have the “effects” of either advancing or inhibiting religion.  Id. at 
222.  As Douglas Laycock points out, the first two prongs of the Lemon test (in particular, the “neither advances nor 
inhibits” language) “are taken almost verbatim from the Court’s elaboration of ‘benevolent neutrality’ in 
[Abington].”  Laycock Unity, supra, at 56.
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with religion.”275  In a thoughtful concurrence, Justice Harlan articulated two “related and mutually 
reinforcing concepts” underlying the Court’s application of the religion clauses—“neutrality” and 
“voluntarism.”276  By “voluntarism,” Harlan meant the principle that “legislation neither encourages nor 
discourages participation in religious life.”277  Harlan saw in “neutrality” an “equal protection mode of 
analysis,” requiring the Court to “survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to 
eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.”278  These concepts were, as Harlan explained, “short-form 
for saying that the Government must neither legislate to accord benefits that favor religion over 
nonreligion, nor sponsor a particular sect, not try to encourage participation in or abnegation of
religion.”279
One thus sees that neutrality, which is central to the Court’s non-establishment jurisprudence, is 
itself bottomed on the twin commands that government neither favor nor disfavor religion.  But what does 
neutrality add to the non-persecution principle I have already discussed?  Principally, neutrality should 
foreclose the notion that the free exercise and establishment clauses are somehow “in tension” with each 
274 See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
275 Id. at 669.  In the same passage, the Court also disclaimed undue rigidity in adhering to “[t]he course 
of constitutional neutrality,” warning that “rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is 
to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.”  Id. (emphasis added).
276 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 694-700 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534.
277 Id. at 696.  Harlan cited examples such as school-sponsored prayer or Bible reading or “released-
time” programs that were structured to encourage participation in religious instruction.  Id.  As Harlan described it, 
“voluntarism” still factors significantly into the Court’s approach to “neutrality,” as seen in the Court’s recent 
discussions of when “religious indoctrination” can be ascribed to the government.  See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 
809 (plurality op.) (discussing governmental indoctrination).
278 Walz, 397 U.S. at 696.  As already discussed, in Lukumi the Court drew on Harlan’s idea of “religious 
gerrymanders” to describe a significant impermissible aspect of the Hialeah ordinances—i.e., that they pursued 
otherwise legitimate governmental objectives only against religious conduct.  See supra __.
279 Walz, 397 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).  Supporting this statement, Harlan quoted the passage from
Justice Goldberg’s Abington concurrence discussed earlier in this section, and also cited the Court’s free exercise 
discussion in Torcaso, discussed above in part __, which condemned government discrimination in favor of some or 
all religions.  Id. at 695 (quoting Abington, 374 U.S. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495).
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other on the substantive issue of government religious hostility.  The proper interaction of the clauses 
regarding religious benefits may still be murky, but their interaction on religious hostility is clear—both 
categorically condemn it.  Secondly, neutrality reinforces the proposition that it is invidious governmental 
religious categories themselves that impinge on religious freedom.  It is the government categorization 
that must be scrutinized—i.e., how the government has chosen to structure the exclusions and inclusions 
in its scheme of distributing benefits.  When it is apparent that government has engaged in “religious 
gerrymandering” by creating a category of beneficiaries designed to exclude “religious persons” or 
“religious entities,” then government has likely fallen short of the neutrality that the Establishment Clause 
specifically, and the religious clauses more generally, demand.
Does this mean that government is constitutionally forbidden from ever conferring a special 
benefit on religious persons?  Or does this mean that government may allow certain narrow exemptions 
from general laws for religious reasons?  These hard questions throw us back on the original debate 
discussed previously over formal versus substantive neutrality.  And regardless of the resolution of that 
debate, one concept unites both sides:  government may not confer special disabilities on religious 
persons or entities through its structuring of beneficiary categories.  That much should be clear from the 
overlap between the two competing theories of neutrality, and also from the Supreme Court’s consistent 
condemnation of categories explicitly disfavoring religion.  There is, in short, some real substance behind 
the Court’s label of neutrality as “benevolent.”  Whatever “benevolence” may mean regarding 
government’s favoring of religion, “benevolence” plainly excludes governmental categories that embody 
malevolence toward religion.
C. Free Speech and Non-Persecution
Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has consistently validated the “fundamental First 
Amendment proposition that government may not discriminate against individuals’ or groups’ speech on 
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account of its religious nature or the speaker’s religious identity.”280  Two aspects this religious speech 
jurisprudence reinforce the non-persecution principle that government may not target religion for special 
disabilities in distributing public benefits.281  First, the Court’s treatment of laws targeting religious 
viewpoints for exclusion from limited public fora echoes the Court’s approach to non-persecution in the 
free exercise context and to neutrality in the non-establishment context.  Second, the Court has 
consistently rejected as justifications for religious viewpoint discrimination both exaggerated fears of 
violating the federal Establishment Clause and also states’ interests in crafting greater church-state 
separation.  Each of these points reinforces my general argument that an overarching non-persecution 
principle forbids most of the obvious applications of the State Blaine Amendments.
Since the early 1980s, the Court has repeatedly addressed variations on the following general 
theme: a governmental body creates a limited public forum for the discussion or dissemination of a 
broadly defined range of topics, but it explicitly excludes participants if they bring speech or ideas of an 
overtly religious character.  Thus, in Widmar v. Vincent, the University of Missouri opened its facilities to 
any student discussion group, but disallowed facility access to any student group that would engage in 
280
     Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum:  
Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 
655 (1996).
281 In this article, I will not address at length the argument that certain applications of State Blaines 
independently violate the Free Speech Clause.  There are undoubtedly applications of State Blaines that would 
squarely abridge free speech—e.g., if State Blaines are used to justify excluding religious viewpoints from public or 
limited public fora.  But the more difficult question, which I do not explore here, is whether the concept of a speech 
forum is sufficiently expansive to cover the wider array of situations where religious persons and institutions seek 
equal access to public benefits.  See, e.g., Rebecca G. Rees, “If We Recant, Would We Qualify?:  Exclusion of 
Religious Providers from State Social Service Voucher Programs, 56 WASH. L. REV. 1291, 1313-28 (1999) (arguing 
that excluding religious providers from neutral voucher programs would abridge free speech); see also Lupu 
Zelman’s Future, supra, at 962 n.204 (advocating a narrower viewpoint-discrimination ground for result in Davey v. 
Locke, infra); DeForrest, supra, at 618-25 (applying free speech principles to State Blaines).  Again, however, this 
article focuses on free exercise principles as a primary source for attacking the vast majority of the State Blaines’ 
conceivable applications, and so I will discuss the Court’s religious speech cases insofar as they support my general 
non-persecution argument.
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religious worship or discussion.282  Similarly, in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School 
District, a local school board made public school property available for after-school use for “social, civic 
and recreational meetings” and other “community welfare purposes,” while excluding “meetings for 
religious purposes.”  The school board applied that policy to forbid a group from showing a film that 
discussed child-rearing from an explicitly Christian perspective.283  More recently, in Good News Club v. 
Milford Central School, an elementary school opened its facilities for the same range of uses as in Lamb’s 
Chapel but refused to allow a Christian organization access for after-school meetings that involved 
religious instruction and activities.284  Finally, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of 
Virginia, the University established a Student Activity Fund that provided indirect financial assistance to 
a wide array of student publications.  A student newspaper with an explicitly Christian viewpoint 
qualified to participate in the Fund but was denied access because of the religious content of the 
newspaper.285  In each of these cases, the governmental body claimed that it could legitimately deny equal 
participation in otherwise generally available benefits—here, participation in a limited public forum—
because of the avowedly “religious” content or affiliation of certain groups.  But, in every case, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the religious exclusion as viewpoint discrimination under the Free Speech 
Clause and, moreover, refused to justify the discrimination under any theory of non-establishment.286
282 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).  The student group in Widmar was called 
“Cornerstone,” an evangelical Christian organization whose meetings “included prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, 
and discussion of religious views and experiences.”  Id. at 265 & n.2.
283 See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386-89 (1993).
284 See Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102-04 (2001).
285 See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 820-27 (1995).  Board of 
Education v. Mergens is another case that addresses these issues, although Mergens does so in the context of the 
Equal Access Act and not the First Amendment.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
286 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 
394-97; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276-77.  For free speech purposes, the Court has said “[i]t is axiomatic that the 
government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”  Rosenberger, 515 
U.S. at 828 (citing Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).  Discrimination against speech 
because of the message conveyed is presumptively unconstitutional and, furthermore, “[w]hen the government 
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The Court’s consistent invalidation of the religious speech exclusions in these cases resonates 
with the general non-persecution principle.  In each case, the governmental unit had created a “limited 
public forum,” opening its facilities to a broad but defined range of speakers or topics.287  For instance, in 
Lamb’s Chapel and Good News Club, the school boards had opened their facilities under a New York 
education law that allowed after-school meetings for “social, civic and recreational meetings and 
entertainments, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community,” provided that such meetings 
were “non-exclusive” and “open to the general public.”288  Similarly, in Rosenberger the Student Activity 
Fund guidelines authorized fund access to “student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or 
academic communications media groups.”289  But, in those cases the relevant access provisions mandated 
targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment 
is all the more blatant.”  Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).  The 
Court therefore characterizes viewpoint discrimination as “an egregious form of content discrimination.”  
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
287
     For example, in Widmar the Court explained that, “[t]hrough its policy of accommodating their 
meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups.  Having done so, the 
University has assumed the obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional 
norms.”  Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 (footnote omitted); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (“Once it has opened a 
limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.”).  The speech forum thereby 
created should be distinguished from a “public forum” which by its nature or design is “open for indiscriminate 
public use for communicative purposes.”  Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392.  
288 See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386 (explaining that New York Education Law § 414 “authorizes 
local school boards to adopt reasonable regulations for the [after-school] use of school property for 10 specified 
purposes”); Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102-03 (same); see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2000).  In 
Widmar, the Court explained that “the stated policy” of the University of Missouri was “to encourage the activities 
of student organizations,” that it “officially recognize[d] over 100 student groups,” and that it “routinely provide[d] 
University facilities for the meetings of registered organizations.”  Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.  The Christian group at 
issue in Widmar had “regularly sought and received permission to conduct its meetings in University facilities” until 
the University adopted its policy of religious exclusion.  Id.
289 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823-25 (describing University guidelines relating to Student Activity 
Fund access).  Notice that the forum created in Rosenberger involved more than equal access to facilities—it 
involved equal access to funding.  See Paulsen, supra, at 654 (“Equal access, according to the Court in Rosenberger, 
means no discrimination in eligibility for a right, benefit, or privilege—including funding—on the basis of religious 
viewpoint.”).  Paulsen calls Rosenberger’s recognition of a free-speech right to equal access to a “funding” forum “a 
major doctrinal breakthrough in First Amendment law.”  Id. at 710.  He also points out that the same issue (equal 
access of religious persons to neutral sources of public funding) was presented on remand in Witters.  Id. at 711 
n.140.  Paulsen’s analysis of Rosenberger, thus, underscores the obvious connections between religious free speech 
and free exercise jurisprudence.
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explicit exclusions for groups with religious purposes or content.290  Consequently, in each case a student 
organization was admittedly eligible for participation in the limited forum because it fell within the 
forum’s defined scope, but the group was nonetheless excluded from participation specifically because of 
its religious affiliation or religious purposes.
The Court has consistently condemned these exclusions as impermissibly discriminating on the 
basis of religious viewpoint.  While government may permissibly limit the speakers in a limited public 
forum according to “subject matter and speaker identity,” such exclusions must be “reasonable in light of 
the purpose served by the forum and [must be] viewpoint neutral.”291  In each case, participation was 
denied for no reason “other than the fact that the [speech] would have been from a religious 
perspective,”292 and the exclusion therefore plainly amounted to forbidden viewpoint discrimination.  As 
explained in Rosenberger, “[b]y the very terms of the [Student Activity Fund] prohibition, the University 
does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic 
efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.”293  The Court categorically rejected the use of concepts like 
290
     In Lamb’s Chapel and Good News Club, the school boards had promulgated rules stating that “school 
premises shall not be used by any group for religious purposes” or that otherwise forbade use “by any individual or 
organization for religious purposes.”  See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 103.  
Similarly, in Widmar, the University adopted a regulation that prohibited use of University building or grounds “for 
purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”  Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 & n.3.  The exclusion in 
Rosenberger, as befitted a University setting, was more philosophically nuanced—among certain student activities 
excluded from the Student Activity Fund were “religious activities,” defined as any activity that “primarily promotes 
or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”  See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825.
291 Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-93 (quoting Cornelius NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
292 Lamb’s Chapel, 508 at 393-94; see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111-12 (reaffirming consistent 
view that “speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the 
ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint”).
293 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (emphasis added).
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“religion,” “religious purpose” and “Christian viewpoint” as legitimate organizing principles for the 
exclusion of groups and speech from participation in the limited public fora.294
The parallels between the reasoning in these cases and its approach to religious neutrality and 
non-discrimination in its religion clause jurisprudence are unmistakable.  The Court itself has referred to 
its treatment in these cases of public fora to illustrate the proper scope of religious neutrality in the 
Establishment Clause area.295  Justice O’Connor made that connection explicit when, in her Rosenberger
concurrence, she observed that the Court’s “insistence on government neutrality toward religion explains 
why we have held that schools may not discriminate against religious groups by denying them equal 
access to facilities that the schools make available to all,” citing Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar as 
examples.296  The Rosenberger majority was operating on the same premise, as evidenced by its 
concluding statement that “[t]he neutrality commanded of the State by the separate clauses of the First 
Amendment was compromised by the University’s course of action.”297  Further clarifying the 
connection, the Court went on to explain that “[t]he viewpoint discrimination inherent in the University’s 
294 See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 110-12.  In Good News Club, the Court made its most pointed 
rejection of the argument that the “religious nature” of speech somehow makes it fair game for exclusion.  The 
school had claimed that the explicit Christian content of the Good News Club’s teaching activities distinguished 
them from “pure” moral teaching and character development.  In the school’s view, the Club’s “Christian 
viewpoint” was “quintessentially religious” and therefore added an “additional layer” to otherwise neutral moral 
teaching.  The Court rejected the school’s argument, stating that “we can see no logical difference in kind between 
the invocation of Christianity by the Club and the invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other 
associations to provide a foundation for their lessons.”  Id. at 111.
295
     For instance, in Mueller v. Allen, the Court approved under the Establishment Clause a general 
education tax deduction—one that included deductions for religious education expenses—for the primary reason 
that the allowable expenses were incurred by all parents, regardless of whether their children attended public, private 
non-religious, or private religious schools.  The Court explicitly relied on the “state’s provision of a forum neutrally 
open to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers” in Widmar to support its conclusion that the tax 
deduction at issue was also “neutral” for non-establishment purposes.  See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 
(1983) (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274).  Given Mueller’s reliance on Widmar, it is easier to see the logic of 
Rosenberger, which “extended” the notion of a speech forum to a forum defined by a neutral funding mechanism.  
See, e.g., Paulsen, supra, at 711 n.139 (stating that “[a]rguably, Rosenberger is a step beyond Mueller and Zobrest in 
that it upholds direct state funding of specifically religious activities”).
296 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
297 Id. at 845.  
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regulation … was a denial of the right of free speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility 
to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires.”298 In sum, the 
overarching principle in these cases is that religious speech—just like religious conduct and status—may 
not be excluded from participation in the public arena simply because it is religious.  “Religious” cannot 
be the organizing principle or the basis for classification that results in some speech or ideas being denied
entry into an otherwise accessible public forum.299
Significantly, these cases also reject “unreasonable fears of establishment” as a justification for 
excluding religious speech from limited public fora.  The governmental units attempted to justify its 
religious discrimination by raising its “interest in not violating the Establishment Clause” or its 
“compelling interest in maintaining strict separation of church and state.”  And in every case, the Court 
rejected that argument by concluding that allowing the religious groups to participate in the public fora 
was not even a colorable violation of the Establishment Clause.300
Moreover, in Widmar, the University of Missouri also grounded its discriminatory policy on the 
Missouri Blaine Amendment, which the University asserted “ha[d] gone further than the Federal 
Constitution in proscribing indirect state support for religion.”301  The Court approached this claim 
298 Id. at 845-46 (emphasis added).
299 See Paulsen, supra, at 662 (“There is no ‘religion exception’ to the Free Speech Clause or the Free 
Press Clause; religious speakers and groups are entitled to the same equal access to public fora, public facilities, and 
public funds as other private speakers and groups receive.”).
300 Good News, 533 U.S. at 112-119; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-76; see also Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 
394-97; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837-45.
301 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275.  The University relied in part on the general anti-religious-funding 
provision in article 9, § 8 of the Missouri Constitution, the only possibly relevant part of which provides that no 
“grant or donation of personal property or real estate [shall] ever be made by [any governmental unit] for any 
religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever.”  See supra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing 
Missouri Blaine Amendment).  The University also relied on article 1, § 6 (addressing the “seminary fund”) and 
article 1, § 7 (addressing “county and township school funds”), neither of which seem applicable to the access issue 
nor to fall within the general parameters of State Blaine Amendments as I have described them.  Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court deferred to statements of the Missouri Supreme Court that the “Missouri Constitution requires 
stricter separation of church and state than does the Federal Constitution.”  Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275 n.16 (citing
Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 720 (Mo. 1976) (en banc)).
.83
cautiously, first observing that the Missouri courts had not determined whether “a general policy of 
accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing to gather together to engage in religious 
and nonreligious speech, would offend the State Constitution.”302  Declining to resolve that issue, the 
Court also passed over whether the Supremacy Clause would override a more restrictive state policy 
toward religious accommodation.303  But, in tension with those preliminary comments, the Court 
concluded that
the state interest asserted here—in achieving greater separation of church and state than is 
already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution—is limited 
by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free Speech Clause as well.  In this 
constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State’s interest as sufficiently 
“compelling” to justify content-based discrimination against respondents’ religious 
speech.304
Thus, although the Court seemed to go out of its way to avoid addressing any conflict between the 
Missouri Constitution and the federal Constitution, its conclusion plainly favored federal religious and 
free speech rights.
In sum, the Court’s consistent protection of religious speech against targeted exclusion from 
limited public fora—including a public forum in Rosenberger defined by a neutral funding mechanism—
reinforces the non-persecution principle.  First, the religious speech cases underscore the basic idea that 
religion—whether religiously motivated conduct, religiously affiliated persons or groups, or speech from 
a religious viewpoint—cannot be singled out for exclusion from participation in public benefits or public 
fora to which it would otherwise be permitted.  Second, and relatedly, the religious speech cases reinforce 
the point that it is the invidious religious classifications themselves that are constitutionally suspect and 
per se disfavored.  Third, they make the important additional point that religious discrimination cannot be 
justified by erroneous conclusions about the scope of Establishment nor by pretensions at creating a 
302 Id. at 275.
303 Id. at 276.
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stricter separation at the state level.  Michael Stokes Paulsen has concisely summed up the lessons taught 
and the principles reinforced by this line of cases:  “The Establishment Clause does not authorize, and the 
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses do not permit, government discrimination against religious 
speakers or religious speech on the basis of religious content, viewpoint, or speaker identity—ever.”305
V.  The State Blaines and Non-Persecution
What remains is to apply the non-persecution principle described in Part IV to the State Blaines.  
This appears to be a daunting, because, as Part III showed, the State Blaines cover a lot of ground.  But, 
for constitutional purposes, that complexity can be misleading; what unites all State Blaines is the explicit 
object of separating public benefits from religious persons, institutions, and purposes.  I will thus limit 
myself to assessing that operation of the State Blaines—i.e. whether they may block religious persons’ 
and groups’ access to generally available public benefits on the basis of their religious affiliation, status, 
or purpose.  First, I will look at whether State Blaines may operate to prevent the flow of public aid to 
persons who wish to use the aid to further their religious education or training.  That inquiry will take us 
back to the example that opened this article—Larry Witters’ plan to use public financial assistance to train 
for the ministry—as well as the situation presented in Davey v. Locke, a recent Ninth Circuit decision 
involving selective state funding of non-religious degrees that will be heard by the Supreme Court in early 
2004.  In this first section, I will also take up general defenses to the operation of State Blaines grounded 
in federalism and in the Supreme Court’s non-establishment jurisprudence itself.  In the next section, I 
will address whether a state’s control over how and why it spends money can provide an additional 
justification for the State Blaines’ religion-sensitive exclusion from equal participation in public benefits.
A. Educational Funding, Federalism, and Incorporation
I began this article with Larry Witters’ dilemma and now return to it.  Recall that Witters 
qualified for state educational aid because he was blind, and he wanted to use that aid for ministry 
304 Id.
.85
training at a Christian college.  The Supreme Court told Witters he could do so under the federal 
Establishment Clause, because the funds were distributed without reference to religion and because they 
ended up at a religious school solely as a result of Witters’ private choice to use them there.306  But on 
remand the Washington Supreme Court blocked Witters’ use of the funds under the Washington Blaine 
Amendment—forbidding public funds from being “appropriated or applied to any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction.”307  Witters arguably fell within the plain terms of the prohibition, but the court 
added the case-law gloss that “religious instruction” meant only instruction that was “devotional in nature 
and designed to induce faith and belief in the student,” as opposed to instruction marked by the “open, 
free, critical, and scholarly examination of the literature, experiences, and knowledge of mankind.”308
How does this application of a State Blaine fare under the non-persecution principle?
Let us first notice that the result in Witters would obtain under the plain terms of any number of 
other State Blaines.  Utah’s Blaine Amendment, for instance, enacts an identical ban on funding religious 
instruction.309  Pennsylvania’s and Virginia’s Blaines specifically disallow grants or scholarships to 
students in a “theological seminary or school of theology”310 or students in a school “whose primary 
purpose is … to provide religious training or theological education.”311  Nor does it take much 
hermeneutical imagination to conclude that Witters’ situation implicates the use of public money to “aid,” 
“benefit,” “assist,” or “support” a “society,” “seminary,” “institution,” “association,” “instruction” or 
even a “purpose” that is “religious,” “sectarian,” “theological,” “denominational,” or “controlled by” a 
305
     Paulsen, supra, at 653.
306 See Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Serv’s for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); see also supra ___.
307 Witters, 771 P.2d at 1122 (emphasis added); see also supra __ (discussing WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11).
308 Id. (citation omitted).
309 See supra note __.
310 See supra note __
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church or religious institution.  Indeed, the more difficult task is to identify any State Blaine whose terms 
would clearly allow Witters’ contemplated use of the funds.312  The point is not that a court could 
leniently interpret any State Blaine to favor Witters—as noted above, interpretations have gone both 
ways—but rather that state constitutions are littered with provisions whose language invites Washington’s 
separationist result.
That result does not fare well under the non-persecution principle.  First, as applied to exclude 
Witters’ use of the funds, a State Blaine does not operate as a “generally applicable” law that incidentally 
burdens religiously-motivated conduct.  Instead, it would be a law that targets its disabilities at purpose, 
conduct, and affiliation because of their religious character.  The funds in question were generally 
available funds—they were made available to Witters on a religion-neutral basis (he qualified for them 
because he was blind)—and nothing beyond the religion-sensitive prohibition in the State Blaine would 
prohibit his use of the funds for ministry training.313  That religion-penalizing application of a State Blaine 
would therefore merit strict scrutiny under Smith and Lukumi.  Notice, moreover, how the State Blaine’s 
exclusionary operation fits precisely into the prohibition articulated, over forty years before those 
decisions, in Everson—it “exclude[s] individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, 
Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith … 
from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”314  Notice further that the State Blaines target 
everyone on Everson’s list except the “Non-believer,” thereby privileging the areligious and the 
irreligious over the religious.
311 See supra note __.
312
     Some candidates might be those State Blaines whose prohibitions appear limited to specific “funds” 
(such as “educational” or “public school” funds), since Witters’ aid apparently came from a vocational rehabilitation 
fund.  See, e.g., supra note __ (Kansas, Ohio, Nebraska Constitutions).
313
     This would be different, of course, if the federal Establishment Clause independently prohibited 
Witters’ use of the funds.  In that case, construction of the State Blaine would not logically be implicated.
314 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added); see supra ___.
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Second, the State Blaine’s application is patently non-neutral.  Washington State has made a pool 
of state aid generally available to handicapped students, but the State Blaine operates to categorize the 
recipients of that aid according to whether they will use the aid for “religious” or “non-religious” 
instruction.315  This is nothing other than a religious gerrymander.316  A government benefit program has 
been structured to exclude religion because it is religious—a contemplated religious use is the sole 
disqualifying trigger.  Aid is therefore distributed to disfavor religious persons and purposes.317
Finally, the religious speech cases reinforce the analysis.  In those cases, religious groups were 
eligible to participate in limited public fora, but they were excluded only because of their religious 
affiliation and viewpoint.  The limited public fora in those cases are directly analogous to the neutrally-
available educational funds in Witters.318  Witters was eligible to receive the funds and the federal 
315
    Again, notice that the federal Establishment Clause does not prohibit the religious use of the aid 
contemplated by Witters.  Thus, the pool of aid is genuinely “generally available” to Witters.  Washington State is 
thus penalizing Witters’ religious choice because it is religious, and not because its hands are tied by the 
Establishment Clause.  See also infra ___.
316 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534; Walz, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also supra notes __.
317 See supra___.
318 See Paulsen, supra, at 711-12 & nn.139-40 (explaining Rosenberger’s precedential implications for 
neutral governmental funding programs and observing that the same principles were involved in Witters on remand).  
Indeed, as I have explained, the Court itself has drawn the analogy between the limited speech fora in the religious 
speech cases, and the notion of a “neutral” distribution of public funds based on non-religious criteria.  See, e.g., 
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983) (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274); supra notes __.  Both the majority 
opinion and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence seemed to flinch from embracing the logical application of 
Rosenberger’s holding to neutral disbursements from “general tax revenue.” See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840-41 
(attempting to distinguish the student fees disbursements from an “expenditure from a general tax fund”); id. at  851-
52 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (claiming that student fund “simply belongs to the students” and is not “tax revenue”).  
The distinction is unpersuasive.  It is difficult to understand how the student fee program—which exacts fees from 
all students and makes them neutrally available for student groups’ private uses—is constitutionally different from 
the same kind of program involving “general tax revenues.  See, e.g., Paulsen, supra, at 712 (criticizing as 
unpersuasive the majority’s and Justice O’Connor’s qualifications of holding in Rosenberger as applied to a 
“general tax fund”); Laycock Unity, supra, at 66-67 & n.144 (arguing that the Rosenberger “majority hedged the 
opinion with unpersuasive distinctions and reservations” about general tax revenues and directness of funding); see 
also Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 (comparing limited speech forum in Widmar to generally available tax deduction for 
educational expenses).  Since Rosenberger, the Court has relied on the limited forum cases for “instruction” in 
assessing the constitutionality of a government subsidy program derived from general tax funds.  See Legal Servs. 
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543-44 (2001) (observing that “limited forum” cases like Lamb’s Chapel and 
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Establishment Clause presented no plausible impediment to his using them for religious purposes.  But 
the State Blaine operated to disqualify him solely because his purposes were religious.  It is no rejoinder 
that Witters involved funding and not speech.  The simplest answer is that Rosenberger, too, involved a 
religious group’s access to generally available funding.  But the better answer is that Rosenberger
logically applied to a discriminatory funding scheme the principles of religious non-persecution found in 
the earlier religious speech cases, in free exercise cases like Smith, Lukumi, and McDaniel, and in the 
neutrality principle consistently elaborated in the Court’s non-establishment jurisprudence, going back to 
Everson itself.319  Religious status, purpose, or affiliation may not be independently used to exclude 
persons from participation in public benefits.
Notice a further complicating factor in Witters’ situation.  The Washington Supreme Court 
suggested that its Blaine Amendment targeted only “devotional” religious purposes.  That is, if Witters 
had wanted to use the funds to become a purely secular expert in comparative religion, the State Blaine 
would not have barred his use of the funds.320  This distinction weakens the constitutional footing of the 
State Blaine even further.  First, it arguably raises the stakes of religious discrimination from religiously-
motivated conduct to religious belief itself—Witters is being excluded from using the funds not simply 
because of a generally “religious” purpose, but because he takes religion seriously enough to become a 
minister.321  Second, it opens the State Blaine to an independent “viewpoint discrimination” challenge 
under the Free Speech Clause—the State Blaine is not merely excluding “religion,” but is excluding 
Rosenberger “do provide some instruction” for cases in which “government establishes a subsidy for specified 
ends”).
319 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra, at 658 (arguing that “Rosenberger’s equal access to funding follows 
naturally from Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb’s Chapel, each of which involved a claim of some type on public 
resources by a religious group”).
320 See Witters, 771 P.2d at 1122 (citations omitted). 
321 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626-27; id. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489-90.
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certain religious viewpoints.322  Finally, it unmasks the religious bigotry lurking beneath the State Blaine:  
Washington will tolerate handing over its educational funds to those who engage in “open, free, critical, 
and scholarly examination of the literature, experiences, and knowledge of mankind,” but not to the 
irrational zealots who undertake religious instruction that is “devotional in nature and designed to induce 
faith and belief in the student.”323
Witters essentially resurfaced as a statutory matter in the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Davey 
v. Locke.324 Davey is significant not only because it invalidates a fairly widespread statutory 
discrimination against religious education,325 but also because the Supreme Court will hear the case in 
early 2004.  Davey addresses Washington State’s “Promise Scholarship,” an aid program begun in 1999 
to help fund the first two years of college for high-achieving students from low- to middle-income 
families.326  But the program specifically excludes from participation students who are “pursuing a degree 
322 See Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 962 n.204 (offering viewpoint discrimination as a narrower
alternative ground for result in Davey).
323 Witters, 771 P.2d at 1122.  This “motivational” parsing of a State Blaine merely deepens its 
unconstitutional application as to Witters.  But a “categorical” reading would amount to unconstitutional religious 
discrimination as well.  That is, if the Washington Supreme Court had simply declared that all religious studies were 
ineligible for funding—whether or not they were “devotional”—it would still have singled out “religious” as a 
category excluded from public benefits.  Nothing in the Court’s development of the non-persecution principle would 
limit persecution to “discrimination against devotional religious motivation only.”  But the Court has suggested that 
religious discrimination targeted at particular qualities of belief is especially disfavored.  See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 
876-77 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402; Torcaso, 367 U.S. 488).
324 See Davey v. Locke, 299 F. 3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075, 71 U.S.L.W. 3589 
(U.S. May 19, 2003) (No. 02-1315).
325
   Washington’s certiorari petition lists thirteen other states with similar statutory funding restrictions on 
financial aid to theology or divinity students.  Pet. for Cert. at 21 & n.4 (citing laws from Alabama, Florida, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, and 
Wisconsin).
326
     The scholarship paid $1,125 during the 1999-2000 year and $1,542 for 2000-01 and could be spent on 
any educational expense, including room and board.  Davey, 299 F. 3d at 750-51.  The general eligibility criteria 
require that students (1) be in the top 10% of their 1999 high school graduating class; (2) have a family income no 
greater than 135% of the state median income; and (3) attend an accredited public or private university in 
Washington.  Id. at 751.
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in theology.”327 Defending its program before the Ninth Circuit, Washington justified the theology
exclusion by reference to the Washington State Blaine—the same provision that had frustrated Larry 
Witters’ ability to study for the ministry over two decades ago.328  The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by 
Judge Rymer, declared the theology exclusion in the Promise Scholarship criteria unconstitutional under 
the Free Exercise Clause, relying on the religious non-discrimination principle derived mainly from 
Lukumi, McDaniel, and Rosenberger, and denying that the Washington Blaine could justify the religious 
discrimination.329
It is hard to see any constitutional difference between the statutory exclusion for “theology” 
degrees in Davey, and the application of Washington Blaine to bar Witters from using state funds for 
“religious instruction.”  Both operate as laws that target religion—here, education that is affiliated with 
religion or has a religious purpose—for exclusion from otherwise generally available public aid.  Neither 
impose merely “incidental” burdens on religious conduct.  Neither is neutral toward religion in any 
plausible sense, because both structure categories of public aid to remove beneficiaries who are motivated 
by religion or who simply direct their studies toward religious ends.330  Both laws, then, violate the 
327
     Washington defines an “eligible student” as “a person who … is not pursuing a degree in theology.”  
Id.  The eligibility criteria are codified in WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(a)-(f).  The court also noted that 
WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.814 provides that “[n]o aid shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in 
theology.”  The court did not say whether “theology” is defined by Washington state law.
328 Id. at 758; see supra notes ___ and accompanying text.  The plaintiff, Joshua Davey, was in virtually 
the same situation as Witters.  Already selected as a Promise Scholar, Davey enrolled in an accredited private 
Christian school, intending to enter the ministry, and declared a double major in Pastoral Ministries and Business.  
The Pastoral Ministries major was “designed to prepare students for a career as a Christian minister.”  Northwest’s 
theology offerings were grounded on the assertion that “the Bible represents truth and is foundational,” whereas 
theology curricula at Washington public universities were generally “taught from an historical and scholarly point of 
view.”  Washington determined that Davey’s major in Pastoral Ministries constituted a “theology” degree and 
therefore disqualified him for scholarship eligibility.  Davey chose to forego the scholarship and continued to pursue 
his major.  Davey, 299 F. 3d at 751.
329 Davey, 299 F. 3d at 752-58.  Judge McKeown dissented, relying primarily on the “federalism” and 
“funding” objections that I will address in this and the next section.  Id. at 760-68 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
330
     It was unclear from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion whether the statutory exclusion in Davey has the 
additional vice, as Witters did, of excluding only “devotional” theology courses.  See, e.g., Davey, 299 F.3d at 755-
56, 760; Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 962 n.203.
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religious non-persecution principle and, under strict scrutiny, must be justified by a compelling state 
interest.
In a recent article, Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle offer some thoughtful objections to the foregoing 
analysis.331  They criticize what they call the “Free Exercise Clause approach” to attacking the State 
Blaines— roughly equivalent to the non-persecution principle—i.e., “that the state may not generically 
treat religious entities worse than secular ones.”332  Principally, they say the argument proves too much, 
because “American Constitutional law, federal and state, has for many years done exactly what this 
argument condemns.”333  By this, they mean primarily that the federal Establishment Clause has often 
been interpreted to require government to “single out” religious entities for “special” treatment in many 
areas.  For instance, government cannot directly subsidize religious indoctrination, nor can it intervene in 
church disputes involving matters of faith.334  Thus, by attacking any rule drawing a “line between 
religious and nonreligious organizations,” the free exercise / non-persecution argument against State 
331 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future:  Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next 
Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 957-72 (2003).  Their objections are not directed 
specifically toward the application of State Blaines in Witters and Davey, but instead are more general.  That said, 
the authors do suggest that Davey would have been better resolved as a case of viewpoint discrimination.  See id. at 
962 n.204.
332 Id. at 963.  My approach, although normatively similar to the approach Lupu and Tuttle criticize, 
draws on jurisprudence not only from the Free Exercise Clause but also from the Establishment and Free Speech 
Clauses.  That said, I think the Free Exercise Clause is the most apt constitutional locus for the State Blaines’ 
unconstitutional operation.  See supra __.
333 Id. at 964.
334 Id. (citing, inter alia, Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (government cannot “subsidize religion” by using aid 
that “results in governmental indoctrination”); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228-29 (government may not “directly 
subsidize” religion);  Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979); Serbian East Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 
426 U.S. 696, 708-12 (1976) (government may not intervene in property or personnel disputes that are internal to 
religious communities and organizations and involve religious matters).
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Blaines undermines, they say, “each and every religion-specific doctrine under the federal religion 
clauses.”335
Lupu and Tuttle’s second rejoinder, sounding in federalism, complains that the non-persecution 
argument is “hostile to notions of respect for state law, and in particular to the tradition of independent 
state constitutional law.”336  They contend that, even if a narrower form of the non-persecution argument 
would salvage the religion-sensitive doctrines in federal constitutional law, it would still “deny states any 
room whatsoever for their own church-state policy.”337  In other words, states would be wrongly confined 
under a ceiling of federal non-establishment principles—they would have “absolutely no room to have a 
nonestablishment policy broader than whatever five Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court find to be the 
content of federal law at any given moment.”338  The authors’ resolution of the federalism issue, by 
contrast, would leave “each state … free to make its own constitutional policy of church-state relations, 
and to extend it beyond the federal policy, so long as the state approach serves reasonable purposes of the 
sort associated with the regime of Separationism.”339
335
     Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 964.  The authors also point to the doctrine excepting clergy-
congregation relationships from federal anti-discrimination law, id. at 964 n.216, as well as various religious 
freedom restoration acts enacted by the federal government and many states in response to Smith.  Id. at 964 n.217 
(citations omitted).
336 Id. at 965.
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Id. at 966.  The authors are cautious, however, about saying what such “reasonable purposes” might 
be.  They admit that the purposes supporting a “regime of Separationism” are in need of “restatement” and 
“reinvigoration,” especially since current defenders of separationism—the Zelman dissenters, for instance—“have 
tended to rely on justifications now viewed by many as outmoded.”  Id.  The authors conclude by stating that 
“[w]hether states can defend a Separationist policy broader than the federal constitution requires will thus depend on 
the efforts of judges and academics to provide precisely this sort of rehabilitation of the Separationist ethos.”  Id.
The authors point to two of their articles as laying some possible groundwork.  Id. at n.222 (citing Lupu Distinctive 
Place, supra, note __; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government 
Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 537 (2002)).  Along those lines, the dissenter in Davey, 
Judge McKeown, herself articulated some “reasonable purposes” for Washington’s Blaine Amendment.  
Washington, she said, could justify its State Blaine in order to “define its vision of religious freedom as one 
completely free of governmental interference,” to “reflect its strong desire … to insulate itself from the appearance 
of endorsing religion,” and to evince “the state’s strong prophylactic interest in steering clear of endorsing or 
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Lupu and Tuttle’s objections go to the heart of the religious-liberty and federalism issues
presented by the State Blaines, but ultimately they neither undermine the non-persecution principle nor 
save the State Blaines from constitutional invalidity.  First and foremost, they largely reduce the non-
persecution principle to the untenable formalist notion that laws may not “single out” religion for any 
purpose whatsoever.  But the non-persecution principle condemns a different, narrower kind of legal 
categorization—it forbids singling out religion for disfavored treatment and, in the context of the State 
Blaines, disfavored treatment of the kind that excludes persons and organizations from participation in 
public benefits only because they are somehow religious.  Second, it is reductionist to claim that the 
Supreme Court has generally “singled out” religion in its religion clause jurisprudence in order to 
“disfavor” religion.  Furthermore, that claim is premised on the implausible notion that, whether as a 
textual, historical, or jurisprudential matter, the Constitution itself singles out religion for “disfavor.”  
Third, the authors’ federalism-based argument undervalues the effect of incorporation of the religion 
clauses against the states.  It is more plausible to conclude that incorporation limits rather than expands
states’ power to achieve greater non-establishment.
At its broadest, Lupu and Tuttle’s criticism of my approach is that “American constitutional law, 
federal and state, has for many years done exactly what” the non-persecution principle “condemns.”340
But what, exactly, does non-persecution condemn?  As I have been at pains to demonstrate, it condemns 
(among other things) the targeted exclusion of persons and organizations from public benefits (1) for 
supporting religion through direct funding of religious pursuits.”  Davey, 299 F.3d at 761, 762, 766 (McKeown, J., 
dissenting).
Lupu’s and Tuttle’s suggestions are intriguing, but they leave unanswered a fundamental question.  Even if
judges or academics succeed in “reinvigorating” the purposes of the “Separationist ethos”—an ethos the authors 
admit is currently founded on a tissue of anachronism and anti-religious hostility—why should their “rehabilitated” 
purposes suffice as legitimate, not to mention compelling, justifications for states’ targeted exclusion of religious 
persons and groups from public benefits?  Regardless of what rejuvenated brew of “Separationism” might be 
concocted, the legal operation of that “ethos” will still be measured against the free exercise rights of religiously 
motivated state citizens who, needless to say, will continue to object to their religion-based second-class citizenship.  
In short, it is implausible that new reasons for religious discrimination will prove any more legitimate or compelling 
than the old reasons.
340 Id. at 964 (emphasis added).
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which they are otherwise eligible, (2) because of their religious affiliation or purpose.  Is it fair to say that 
“American constitutional law” has “done exactly this” for many years, or indeed ever?
It is scarcely possible to specify what the Supreme Court has “done” over the last century as it has 
worked out the constitutionally permissible relationships between religion and government.  Its 
universally criticized jurisprudence has charted an evolutionary development of doctrines seeking to 
balance different theories about what the religion clauses require—and not something reducible to one 
purpose such as “disfavoring religion by excluding it from generally available public benefits.”341  In 
other words, what “American constitutional law” has been doing since at least Reynolds in 1878 is, 
broadly speaking, trying to figure out why the Constitution “singled out” religion as it did, and how the 
purposes behind that “singling out” should translate into practical relationships between the polity and 
religion.  A long-standing generalized object of “disfavoring” religion is, to put it mildly, hard to 
reconcile with the Court’s many statements (dating at least from Everson) that the Establishment Clause 
does not require government hostility toward religion342 and that government acts permissibly and even in 
concert with “the best of our traditions” when it seeks to accommodate religious practices and beliefs.343
It is impossible to reconcile with the ardently pro-religious and pro-Christian statements from earlier 
courts, Justices, and lawmakers.344
341 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and the Constitution, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1397, 
1403 (2003) (observing that “[t]he constitutional jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses navigates among competing 
tacit accounts of the role of religious organizations in a democratic society”).
342 See supra notes __ (discussing the non-hostility thread in Everson, Bowen, Rosenberger, Grumet, 
Agostini, Mitchell, and Zobrest).
343 See, e.g., Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 (when the legislature acts to accommodate religious belief or 
practice, it “follows the best of our traditions”); see also Grumet, 512 U.S. at 705; id. at 714 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); id. at 723 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 743-45 (Scalia, J., concurring) (all acknowledging the 
consistent American legal tradition of accommodating religious belief and practice).
344 See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465-72 (1892) (explaining that “no 
purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious 
people”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890) (remarking that “[b]igamy and polygamy are crimes by the 
laws of all civilized and Christian countries”); Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. 127, 198-99 (1844) (stating it is 
unnecessary “to consider what would be the legal effect of a devise in Pennsylvania for the establishment of a school 
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Lupu and Tuttle also characterize too broadly what a plausible rule of non-persecution condemns.  
Non-persecution simply does not amount to a formalist (á la Philip Kurland) argument that law cannot 
ever use “religion” as a basis for legal categorization.345  The non-persecution rule is narrower than that.  
It says law may not single out religion with the object of disfavoring or punishing it.  It is clearly violated 
when, as State Blaines do, laws exclude religious persons and organizations from public benefits because
they are religious.
  The State Blaines represent a political judgment of nineteenth-century vintage, enshrined in 
almost forty state constitutions, about the relationship between religion and public benefits.  My argument 
is that their collective judgment is at odds with the long-standing and consistent tradition of religious non-
discrimination as seen in free exercise jurisprudence, in the “neutrality” concept, and in the more recent 
religious speech cases.346  Is it possible that certain of the Court’s non-establishment decisions 
(particularly in the school aid context), or indeed certain Justices’ individual views, have reflected a 
“separationist” or “religion-hostile” cast reminiscent of the State Blaines?  Roughly speaking, yes.  Many 
commentators refer to the “strict” separationism reflected in certain decisions or periods that was possibly 
or college, for the propagation of Judaism, or Deism, or other form of infidelity [because] such a case is not to be 
presumed to exist in a Christian country; and therefore it must be made out by clear and indisputable proof”); People 
v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y.Sup. 1811) (Kent, J.) (stating that “[t]he people of this state, in common with the 
people of this country, profess the general doctrines of Christianity, as the rules of their faith and practice” and that 
“[t]hough the constitution has discarded religious establishments, it does not forbid judicial cognisance of those 
offences against religion and morality that have no reference to any such establishment”); see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1871, at 728 (Boston: Hilliard, Gray 1833) (“The 
real object of the [Establishment Clause] was, not to countenance, much less to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, 
or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects.”) (discussed in Amar BILL 
OF RIGHTS at 252n); and see Amar Bill of Rights at 247 (discussing the First Congress’s “extending the Confederate 
Congress’s Northwest Ordinance of 1787, a regime that one leading scholar has described as ‘suffused with aid, 
encouragement, and support for religion”) (quoting GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN 
AMERICA 98 (1987)).
345 See supra __ (discussing Kurland and formal neutrality).
346 See, e.g., Lupu Anachronistic, supra, at 386 (stating that “[t]he Protestant paranoia fueled by waves of 
Catholic immigration to the United States, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, cannot form the basis of a stable 
constitutional principle, and the stability of the principle has been undermined by the amelioration of the concerns”) 
(citing Hamburger, supra).
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the fruit of anti-religious currents.347  The seeds of such separationism may have been sown in absolutist 
language in Everson,348 or it may have grown from more deep-seated misunderstandings about the history 
and purposes of the religion clauses.349  Certain Justices have been accused, plausibly, of harboring 
“separationist” ideas,350 of clinging to outdated notions of religious “divisiveness,”351 or of simply being 
anti- religious.352
347 See, e.g., Berg Anti-Catholicism, supra, at 122-23, 151-52, 162 (commenting on flux of “strict 
separationism” in religion jurisprudence and that “a distrust of Catholic power and Catholic education was still a 
factor in the stricter ‘no- aid’ separationism of the 1960s and 1970s,” although less so than in the 1940s and 50s; 
Laycock Unity, supra, at 53-54 (discussing tension between the “no-aid” and “non-discrimination” strands in the 
Court’s religion jurisprudence, beginning with Everson); Lupu Anachronistic, supra, at 388 (asking “[i]f the line of 
decisions from Everson to Lemon was driven substantially by the then-demographics of public and private 
education, coupled with anti-Catholic animus, what remains to justify principles forbidding direct aid to sectarian 
elementary and secondary schools?”); McConnell Crossroads, supra, at 120 (commenting on tendency of Warren 
and Burger Courts “to press relentlessly in the direction of a more secular society” and “to view religion as an 
unreasoned, aggressive, exclusionary, and divisive force that must be confined to the private sphere”); id. at 127 
(arguing that the Warren and Burger Court’s “legal doctrines … reinforced their lack of sympathy for religion”)
348 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (stating that “[n]either a state nor the Federal government can … aid 
one religion, [or] aid all religions …. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice 
religion”).
349 See, e.g., Hamburger, supra, at 454-63 (discussing misapprehension of Everson parties and Justices 
about nature of Establishment Clause); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (generally criticizing Court’s non-establishment jurisprudence and observing that “[i]t is impossible to 
build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history”).
350 See, e.g., Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 949-52 (criticizing Justice Souter’s no-aid separationism); 
Fried Five-to-Four, supra, at 188 (criticizing Souter’s Zelman dissent because it treated “twenty years of 
jurisprudence” from Mueller to Zobrest “as a mistake,” and because Souter’s no-aid separationism was actually 
reflected in the Court’s jurisprudence for a “relatively brief” period from 1971-83).
351 See, e.g., Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 952-55 (criticizing Justice Breyer’s concerns with religious 
divisiveness).  Lupu and Tuttle argue that Breyer’s Zelman dissent “shows a deep insensitivity to the history, limits, 
and failings of the concerns for ‘political divisiveness,” and relies on “a history of Protestant-Catholic tension in the 
United States that, if anything, should embarrass a Court that spawned the regime of no-aid Separationism out of 
deeply anti-Catholic premises.”  Id. at 954.
352 See, e.g., id. at 952 n.162 (noting Justice Stevens’ “long and unbroken record of opposing the cause of 
religion no matter what the issues presented”); Grumet, 512 U.S. at 749 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that Justice 
Stevens’ concurrence was “less a legal analysis than a manifesto of secularism” that “announced a positive hostility 
to religion”); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contending 
that Stevens’ majority opinion “bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life”); see also Berg Anti-
Catholicism, supra, at 129 (commenting on anti-Catholic rhetoric in Justices Black, Douglas, and Rutledge’s 
opinions); Laycock Unity, supra, at 57 (discussing historical scholarship documenting that the “intellectual anti-
Catholic movement [of the mid-1900s] attracted the favorable attention of Justices Black, Frankfurter, Rutledge, and 
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But there is a difference between noticing these elements in the lengthy and complex history of 
the Court’s religion clause jurisprudence, and raising them to the level of a normative premise of that 
jurisprudence.  An argument that “American constitutional law” has targeted religion for particular 
disfavor asks us to make just that, deeply implausible interpretive move.  Even assuming that any “anti-
religious” stripe of separationism ever held sway in the Court’s jurisprudence, it has largely vanished—
particularly concerning equal access to neutrally available public benefits, where a far more neutralist 
regime is firmly in place.353  Second, as noted above, such a premise would have been flatly at odds with 
what the Court has consistently said about government hostility toward religion.354  Third, it is more 
plausible to argue that any occasional “anti-religious” currents in the Court’s non-establishment cases 
were wrong to begin with because they were out of step with a proper interpretation of how the religion 
clauses were supposed to interact.  Certainly, when the Court has consciously altered course in its non-
establishment cases, it has explicitly discarded premises that were at odds with the deeper principles of 
the religion clauses.355
The major examples Lupu and Tuttle rely on to support their “singling out for disfavor” argument 
fail to do so.  It seems strange to describe the doctrine forbidding government intervention in faith-based 
religious disputes as primarily disfavoring religion.  Perhaps, as the authors point out, that doctrine 
Burton”) (citation omitted); Lupu Anachronistic, supra, at 385 (commenting that Justice Jackson’s Everson dissent 
and Chief Justice Burger’s Lemon opinion were “open and conspicuous tracts about the pervasive religious 
indoctrination thought to accompany the system of Catholic education”); McConnell Crossroads, supra, at 121-22 
(commenting on Black’s anti-Catholic bias in his Allen dissent).
353 See, e.g., Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 918 (commenting that, on the eve of Zelman, “only the 
most ostrich-like separationist could have denied the flux in the law of the Establishment Clause,” explaining that 
“[i]n the context of access of private parties to public fora for purposes of religious expression, and direct 
government transfer of material resources to religious institutions, norms of non-Establishment have been tending 
sharply toward the paradigm of Neutrality and away from the metaphorical wall of church-state separation”) 
(citations omitted).
354 See supra ___.
355 See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-35 (overruling Aguilar); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (plurality op.) 
(overruling Meek and Wolman); id. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with plurality); Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 
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“deprive[s] religious factions of the opportunity for authoritative dispute resolution by the state,”356 but it 
seems more plausible that the doctrine simply recognizes the delicate position religion occupies in our 
secular polity and seeks to protect religion from the corrosive effects of direct governmental meddling in 
its theological affairs—an area, moreover, in which government has no special competence.  The “no-
subsidy” rule seems a better candidate for a doctrine that affirmatively disfavors religion—by putting a 
church on lesser footing than a secular recipient of some forms of government largesse—but it is a weak 
foundation on which to build the broad premise that American constitutional law specially disfavors 
religion.  The parameters and the historical provenance of the “no-subsidy” rule continue to be 
disputed,357 but assume for a moment that the Establishment Clause affirmatively requires some form of a 
rule that prohibits direct, unrestricted cash payments to religious groups for religious purposes.  Why 
should we assume from that rule alone that the Constitution sanctions a general “disfavoring” of religion?  
It is more plausible to regard such a “no-subsidy” rule as, at most, one limited disadvantaging of religion 
that is worked out in the Constitution itself—a specific resolution, so to speak, of the “tension” between 
free exercise and non-establishment.  And why shouldn’t that stand as a constitutional balance that the 
states ought not be able to aggravate, at the risk of trampling on free exercise values, especially when the 
federal religion clauses apply with full force to the states themselves through incorporation?  At bottom, 
the argument that federal non-establishment doctrine itself “disfavors” religion begs the more 
fundamental question at the heart of the State Blaines’ constitutional validity—can the states legitimately 
2472 (sharply limiting Nyquist); see also Paulsen, supra, at 711 n.138 (Nyquist has not been formally overruled but 
it “must be regarded as moribund in light of” subsequent decisions).
356
     Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 964.
357 See, e.g., Lupu Anachronistic, supra, at 376 (questioning “the force of the constitutional case against 
direct state aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools” and claiming that “the arguments against direct aid 
rest on precedents and policies whose contemporary relevance has dwindled dramatically”); id. at 377-80 (criticizing 
jurisprudential foundation for “direct/indirect” distinction); id. at 388-93 (questioning reliance on General 
Assessment controversy and Madison’s Memorial as basis for “direct funding” prohibition).
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go beyond federal disestablishment and heap greater “disfavor” upon religion as a matter of state 
constitutional policy?358
A more fundamental refutation of the notion that “American constitutional law” has often singled 
out religion for disfavored treatment lies in the text and purposes of the Constitution itself.  The 
Constitution plainly “singles out” religion:  for instance, it forbids “religious Tests” for federal office and 
“accommodates the religious desires of those who were opposed to oaths by allowing any officeholder—
of any religion, or none—to either take an oath of office or an affirmation.”359  Religious scruples here are 
singled out for special solicitude, not disfavor.  What of the paradigmatic “singling out” of religion—the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses?  The former—forbidding Congress from “making any law” 
that “prohibits” the “free exercise of religion”—hardly sounds like it imposes a disadvantage on religion.  
Indeed, as already noted, it was originally conceived as forbidding laws punishing religion qua religion.360
The latter, as Akhil Amar has persuasively demonstrated, was originally designed to (1) forbid Congress 
from creating “The Church of the United States,” and (2) prevent Congress from disestablishing existing 
state religious establishments.361  The claim to find in these materials a general charter for disabling 
religious persons or religious organizations vis-á-vis their secular counterparts is unconvincing.  If 
anything, their text and purposes alone would seem to leave Congress free to promote the general 
flourishing of religion, as it did in the territories and in its provision of legislative and military 
358 As explained below, this question is bound up with the issue of how incorporation of the religion 
clauses against the states affects the states’ power to craft a church-state separation greater than the federal 
Establishment Clause requires.  See infra __.
359 See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 714 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; art. VI, 
cl. 3).
360 See supra notes __.
361
     Amar BILL OF RIGHTS at 33-34, 41, 246.
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chaplains.362  And, as we shall see, incorporation of the religion clauses against the states only lends 
additional weight against the general proposition that American constitutional law recognizes 
“disfavoring religion” as a valid normative premise.
So, Lupu and Tuttle’s first major objection—that the non-persecution rule condemns (and would 
therefore dismantle) a long-standing practice of American constitutional law—turns out to be overstated.  
What about their federalism objection?  Does the non-persecution rule unfairly handcuff the states in 
balancing their own church-state policy?  Perhaps in 1800, but certainly not since 1940 and probably not 
since 1865.  In other words, the federalism objection fails to take seriously the effect of incorporating the 
religion clauses against the states.
It is common doctrine that both religion clauses apply against the states, through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, with the same force as they apply against the federal government.363  As to free exercise, the 
effects of this are relatively easy to understand.  Free exercise is a paradigmatic individual and 
associational “right” against government overreaching, and so its application against the states should 
simply disable states from legislating to “prohibit” free exercise, just as the clause had, before, limited 
only the federal Congress.364  Thus, when the Supreme Court holds that a law trenches on someone’s free 
exercise rights, incorporation makes that the end of the story.  State legislatures cannot pass such laws any 
longer, and thus the Supreme Court’s decision (whether by a majority of five, six, seven, eight or nine 
Justices) in a real sense “den[ies] the states any room for their own church-state policy” on that issue.365
362 Id. at 248 (citing Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was 
Unconstitutional, 95 MICH L. REV. 2347 (1997)).
363 See supra notes __.
364
     Akhil Amar and Kurt Lash have suggested that the “reconstructed” free exercise clause can plausibly 
be interpreted to protect religious exercise more broadly than the original clause, requiring for instance religious 
exemptions from non-discriminatory general laws.  Amar BILL OF RIGHTS 254-56; Lash Second Incorporation of 
Free Exercise, supra, at 1149-56.
365
     Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 965.  Notice that the result would be no different if the invalidated 
policy had “been federal constitutional law a few short years ago”—i.e., if the Supreme Court had held previously 
that the policy did not violate free exercise, but reversed itself.  Id.
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The converse is slightly different.  If the Supreme Court holds that a law does not violate free exercise, 
then states have some latitude to accord their citizens greater rights under state law (provided these 
greater rights do not independently violate the Establishment Clause).  Thus, even as Smith interpreted 
federal free exercise not to command religious exemptions from general laws, the Court recognized (and 
arguably invited) states to legislate such exemptions under state law.366  In other words, states had more 
latitude to develop a distinctive “church-state policy” under their own laws.
As to non-establishment, the effects of incorporation are knottier.  It is not at all clear that “non-
establishment” is properly described as an individual or associational right against government—perhaps 
it is more accurately a “right of the public at large.”367  This makes it more difficult to say precisely what 
“rights” state citizens themselves gain when the Establishment Clause is incorporated against their state 
governments.368  Regardless, it is safe to say as a matter of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that 
incorporation means this:  whatever the federal government cannot do “respecting an establishment of 
religion,” the states also cannot do.369  Thus, when the Supreme Court holds that a particular government 
practice “establishes religion,” that is the end of the story.  States may no longer enact such practices and, 
to that extent, their prerogatives to experiment with different “church-state policies”—which they 
doubtlessly had before incorporation—vanish.370  But what about when the Court, as it recently did in 
Zelman, declares that an existing practice does not constitute an establishment?  Surely other states are 
not, at that point, required to enact such a practice.  But the crucial question is whether the Court’s non-
366 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
367
     Amar BILL OF RIGHTS at 252.
368 Id. at 33-34, 41, 251-54; McConnell Original Understanding, supra, at 1485 n.384.
369
   Even this statement becomes tangled when we notice, as Akhil Amar explains, that “what the 
Establishment Clause prohibited the federal Congress from doing” was, in large part, “meddling with state 
establishments.”  See Amar BILL OF RIGHTS at 33-34, 41.
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establishment decision sets some kind of maximum ceiling for a policy of church-state separation in the 
states.  Or, put another way, can the citizens of a state plausibly claim more non-establishment “rights”
under state law than the Court has identified under the federal Constitution?  And, if so, can they 
coherently claim such “rights” if their claims are not somehow connected to the free exercise rights (or 
other personal rights) that incorporation plainly gives them?
Akhil Amar has provided a complex but persuasive analysis of this question with his model of 
“refined incorporation” of the Bill of Rights.  According to Amar, incorporation of the Establishment 
Clause is an awkward matter because (1) the original clause was primarily a states’-rights provision 
forbidding Congress from disestablishing state establishments, and (2) consequently, it is difficult to 
identify what additional “personal rights” were guaranteed to state citizens through non-establishment 
incorporation.371  Amar argues that the object of the Fourteenth Amendment—designed to protect 
fundamental rights of United States citizens against state encroachment—suggests that collective or 
structural rights like “non-establishment” must be subtly “refined” to apply coherently against state 
governments.372  On this understanding of incorporation, state citizens could claim rights of “non-
establishment” against state laws that coerced their “bodily liberty and property,” such as “[t]o the extent 
a state created a coercive establishment, decreeing that individuals profess a state creed or attend a state 
service or pay money directly to a state church.”373  Amar notices, of course, that “all these examples also 
370
     Lupu and Tuttle do not address why this inevitable effect of incorporation is not equally “hostile to 
notions of respect for state law, and in particular to the tradition of independent state constitutional law.”  See Lupu 
Zelman’s Future, supra, at 965-66.
371
     Amar BILL OF RIGHTS at 33-34, 41, 246-56.
372 Id. at 251-56; see generally id. at 215-30 (explaining “refined incorporation”).
373 Id. at 252.
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seem like textbook violations of religious ‘free exercise,’” thus linking the rights citizens may claim under 
the incorporated Establishment Clause with their less-awkwardly-incorporated free exercise rights.374
Amar’s refined-incorporation proposal would, of course, significantly alter the Supreme Court’s 
non-establishment jurisprudence by allowing the states more latitude in legislating about religion.375  But 
notice its implications for our present question—may state citizens claim greater “non-establishment 
rights” than the federal Constitution “gives” them?  Refined incorporation suggests they could not.  First, 
since “personal non-establishment rights” are an elusive notion—especially when untethered from other, 
clearly personal rights like free exercise, free speech, or equal protection—it would not make sense under 
Amar’s formulation to say that incorporation has guaranteed any such phantasmal “rights” to state 
citizens against their own governments, much less “greater” ones.  Non-establishment was originally a 
structural and collective value, and so it is hard to explain how state citizens could coherently ask for 
“more of it” individually as a result of incorporation.  Second, Amar suggests that state citizens’ proper 
invocation of their incorporated “non-establishment rights” would occur only when the state coerces their 
consciences or property to support an official state church or creed, or when the state has violated basic 
norms of religious equality—all problems reached more comfortably by free exercise, free speech, and 
equal protection principles.  Thus, there is a sense that incorporated non-establishment values simply 
duplicate other incorporated rights.376  Finally, Amar’s broader view of incorporation supports a “no” 
374 Id.  Amar also suggests that state citizens might also claim certain refined non-establishment rights 
that are not strictly grounded in principles of “coercion,” but that sound rather in the “basic touchstones” of 
Fourteenth Amendment “ideals of liberty and equality.”  Id. at 253-54.  By this, he seems to mean that state citizens 
might be able to object to state laws on the basis of religious equality, such as if a state favored one religious 
denomination or declared itself “The Baptist State.”  Id.  At the same time, Amar admits that non-establishment 
incorporation “may not matter all that much” in such cases since “principles of religious liberty and equality could 
be vindicated via the free exercise clause (whose text, history, and logic make it a paradigmatic case for 
incorporation) and the equal-protection clause.”  Id. at 254.
375 Justice Thomas has picked up on Amar’s suggestion.  See Zelman, 122 S.Ct. at 2480-82 & n.4 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L. J. 1131, 1159 
(1991); Lietzau, supra, at 1206-07); see also Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 947-49.
376 Id. at 254.
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answer.  If incorporation of rights was designed to increase state citizens’ personal liberties against state 
governments (and it is hard to imagine it was not), does it really make sense to argue that, post-
incorporation, state legislatures have more power to define their own visions of church-state separation 
vis-á-vis federal standards?  In other words, should incorporation of the federal Establishment Clause 
against states tend to localize or nationalize a policy of church-state separation?  To say that incorporation 
tended to empower states to develop their own church-state policies runs counter to any plausible 
understanding of incorporation, refined or not.
Whether or not Amar is right, thinking broadly about incorporation suggests answers to my 
question.  For instance, we know that state citizens have equally as many free exercise rights against state 
governments as against the federal government.  And we know that states are bound, at the very least, by 
a minimum standard of “non-establishment”—that is, what the federal government cannot do, the states 
cannot do.  This tells us something about the limits on states when they “experiment” with greater
church-state separation (as Lupu and Tuttle insist they can).  When states do this, they are not acting on 
any affirmative grant of power or prerogative from the federal Constitution—they are obviously acting in 
their own state interests.  But they are always acting under an affirmative obligation not to violate any 
citizen’s federal free exercise rights, which plainly apply against state governments in full force.  This 
suggests that, whether or not state citizens can coherently ask state governments for more non-
establishment, what the state does in response is always limited by its citizens’ federal free exercise 
rights.  This also suggests that “more non-establishment” or “greater church-state separation” cannot be 
independent justifications for state policies.  Those policies must always be measured against the superior 
limitations of federal free exercise (not to mention free speech and equal protection).377
Lupu and Tuttle’s concerns with federalism and distinctive state “church-state policies” thus turn 
out to be question begging.  Whatever distinctive church-state policies a state wants to pursue will always 
377 See, e.g., DeForrest, supra, at 605-06 (generally discussing federal constitutional limitations on State 
Blaines that arise inevitably from incorporation).
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be limited by the demands of free exercise.  Incorporation of the federal Establishment Clause against the 
states cannot logically be interpreted as a charter for greater state power in defining its own separationist 
vision.  Given the logic of incorporation, the only legitimate direction a state can go in—at least in the 
area of individual rights—is in according its citizens greater free exercise rights than those guaranteed 
federally.  By this logic, of course, states could plausibly pursue greater “church-state separation” in ways 
that do not encroach on free exercise.  They could, for instance, decide not to employ legislative chaplains 
or not to use any religious language or symbolism in state speech or on state property.  But an argument 
that a principle forbidding “religious discrimination” or “religious persecution” unfairly limits states’ 
freedom to formulate their own church-state policies is an argument against incorporation itself.  By its 
nature, incorporation of the religion clauses limits states and it is beyond dispute that individual free 
exercise rights are one such limitation.  Thus, assessing the validity of State Blaine Amendments throws 
us, not back on incorporation and federalism, but rather onto the key question—which I have explored in 
this article—of whether they violate free exercise rights.
B. Selective Funding
State Blaine Amendments are in large measure concerned with the destination and use of 
government funds.  So, is my “non-persecution” argument against State Blaines open to the basic 
objection that the government can, indeed must, control how it spends its own limited resources?378  The 
black-letter principles supporting this rejoinder, all true in the abstract, roll off the tongue.  Government is 
under no obligation to fund the exercise of my constitutional rights—i.e., I have a constitutional right to 
378 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832 (noting the “unremarkable proposition that the State must 
have substantial discretion in determining how to allocate scarce resources to accomplish its educational mission”); 
McConnell Selective Funding, supra, at 989 (remarking that “[t]he government cannot spend money on everything.  
It must be selective.”).
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freely exercise my religion, but that alone does not entitle me to a government-funded Bible.379
Government may further its own policy choices through the government speech it funds and the 
government programs it sponsors—effectively refusing to endorse other legitimate policy choices and 
programs.380  Government may create incentives to undertake certain behaviors legitimately in the public 
interest through selective funding, even if, to that extent, it creates disincentives to undertake other 
behaviors—behaviors that may be “constitutionally protected.”381  Are these relatively straightforward 
maxims the answer to the State Blaine riddle?  Probing under their surface suggests these principles, 
better understood, actually condemn the operation of the State Blaines for largely the same reasons the 
non-persecution principle condemns them.
First, it should be clear that the rejoinder, “Government need not fund the exercise of 
constitutional rights,” adds nothing to the debate.  The non-persecution argument against State Blaines is 
not grounded on the naked demand that, simply because religion is constitutionally protected, religious 
persons and organizations are entitled to government funding.  Instead, the argument is that, because 
religion is constitutionally protected, State Blaines may not exclude persons or organizations from 
otherwise accessible government benefits simply because they are religious.  Non-persecution, therefore, 
is an argument against religion-sensitive exclusion, not an argument demanding religion-based inclusion.  
Furthermore, couching the debate in terms of “funding religion” is misleading.  Strictly speaking, non-
persecution does not ask that religion qua religion be funded at all.382  But when a government funding 
program neutrally furthers secular interests in, for instance, education, health care, or child care, a 
379 See, e.g., McConnell Selective Funding, supra, at 1001 & n.35 (stating that it is “surely correct that 
there is no … general obligation” for government to “provide the material resources necessary for the exercise of a 
constitutional right”) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200 (1989)).
380 See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001); Bd, of Regents of Univ. of Wis. 
v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 235 (2000); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-
95 (1991).
381 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312-18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474-76 (1977).
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religious person or organization seeks inclusion in the program on the basis of being a qualified 
education, health care, or child care provider—and not as a “religious” provider.  It merely asks not to be 
discriminated against because of its religious affiliation.383
When government spends money to facilitate its own speech—instead of creating public fora for 
the exchange of viewpoints—logically, it should be able to make choices about the content of that 
speech.384  This principle overlaps with the similar notion that, when government funds a program to 
convey a government message—i.e., “when it enlists private entities to convey its own message”—it may 
“regulate the content of what is or is not expressed” in that program.385  But, again, do these principles 
have anything relevant to say about the operation of the State Blaines?  First, notice that they are only 
relevant to the narrow question of how State Blaines might restrict a state government’s own speech or a 
state program enlisting private entities to spread a government message.  If the State Blaines would 
typically mean that the government itself cannot use its funds to speak in a “religious” voice or spread 
“religious” messages, then the State Blaines do not add anything significant to preexisting federal 
constitutional limitations on government speech.386  A different situation arises, however, if a State Blaine 
382 That request itself would run aground on the legitimate historical concerns behind the religion-funding 
controversies of the early republic.  See, e.g., Laycock Unity, supra, at 48-49.
383 See, e.g., McConnell Crossroads, supra, at 184 (arguing that “when the government provides financial 
support to the entire nonprofit sector, religious and nonreligious institutions alike, on the basis of objective criteria, 
it does not aid religion.  It aids higher education, health care, or child care; it is neutral to religion.  Indeed, to deny 
equal support to a college, hospital, or orphanage on the ground that it conveys religious ideas is to penalize it for 
being religious.”).
384 See, e.g., Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (observing that “[w]e have said that viewpoint-based funding 
decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker”) (citing Southworth, 529 U.S. 
at 229, 235); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (recognizing “the principle that when the State is the speaker, it may 
make content-based choices” such as when a public university “determines the content of the education it 
provides”).
385 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194; Widmar, 545 U.S. at 276); see also 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541.
386
     It is doubtful, for instance, that government could craft funding programs to further its own 
“religious” speech.  This would cut against the dominant non-establishment principle that government must have 
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would prevent government from including any person or organization in a “government message” 
program, simply because of their religious identity or affiliation.387  This restriction would have nothing to 
do with government shaping the content of its message—with regulating “what is or is not expressed” in 
the context of its own program—nor with government “tak[ing] legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure 
that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”388  Precisely because it is not plausibly 
related to the content of government expression, this kind of categorical exclusion savors of disabling 
religious persons and organizations because they are religious.  It is hard to see how such a policy would 
find constitutional shelter under the “government speech” doctrine.
Finally, outside the sphere of its own messages, government may use selective funding to create 
incentives to undertake certain private behavior, at least indirectly creating a disincentive to undertake 
other behavior.389  A contentious example is abortion: government may constitutionally structure 
Medicaid payments so that they are available to pay for “childbirth” but not available to pay for 
nontherapeutic abortions, thus creating an arguably strong incentive in favor of childbirth, and against 
secular purposes for its laws.  As for the use of religious speech by government itself—e.g., religious language in a 
presidential speech, or the employment of legislative chaplains by Congress—those instances are either non-
justiciable (presidential speech) or are permissible under the Establishment Clause (chaplains).  See, e.g., Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).  Perhaps a Blaine Amendment could be interpreted, by a state government, to 
forbid the funding of state legislative chaplains or prayers, or to prohibit public officials from using any religious 
language in public speeches, or to prohibit any religious symbolism whatsoever on public property.  As I explained 
above, however, those applications of a State Blaine to create a greater church-state separation than the federal 
Constitution demands would probably not run afoul of the non-persecution principle, because they do not plausibly 
limit anyone’s federal free exercise rights. See supra __.
387
     For example, one might claim that the inclusion of a religiously-affiliated organization in a 
government message program would—even if the organization fully complied with the speech requirements of the 
program—nonetheless run afoul of a State Blaine that forbade public funds from being spent “for the benefit of,” “in 
aid of,” or “in support of” any “church,” “religious society,” or “religious institution.”  Similarly, one might claim 
such inclusion would constitute an “appropriation” of public funds “in aid of” or “for the benevolent purposes of” a 
religious group.
388 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-200).  Nor would it be any less illegitimate 
if the same “anti-religious-participant” notion were expressed in the government’s definition of the program itself—
i.e., if the government program were described as a “non-religious child care program.”  See, e.g, Paulsen, supra, at 
666 n.32 (rejecting “definitional manipulation” of a limited public forum to incorporate “the precise definition that is 
substantively unconstitutional”).
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abortion, for Medicaid recipients.390  Is this the answer to the State Blaine issue?  Just as government may 
financially “incentivize” childbirth and thereby “disincentivize” the constitutionally-protected right to 
choose an abortion, may government also use selective funding to create financial incentives in favor of 
“secular” or “non-religious” behaviors and the concomitant disincentives to “religious” behaviors and 
affiliations?  This reasoning has some superficial appeal,391 but to accept it requires ignoring two basic 
propositions.  Generally, government may not use its selective funding power to unconstitutionally 
penalize the exercise of constitutional rights.392  Specifically, there is a profound difference between the 
constitutionally-protected right to choose an abortion and the constitutionally-protected right to free 
exercise of religion.
A distinction of constitutional magnitude lies between the government’s mere “refusal to fund” 
the exercise of constitutional rights and its “penalizing” the exercise of those rights by placing conditions 
on access to government funds.393  This is not the place to plumb the depths of the “unconstitutional 
389 See, e.g., McConnell Singling Out, supra, at 39-40 (commenting on government’s “power to create 
incentives for individuals to alter their conduct by providing financial support to one choice and not to a substitute”).
390 See Harris, 448 U.S. at 314 (constitutional protection afforded woman’s choice to have abortion “did 
not prevent [state] from making ‘a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and … implement[ing] that 
judgment by the allocation of public funds’” (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474); see generally McConnell, Selective 
Funding, supra, at 989-992, 1000-01 (discussing abortion funding decisions).
391
     It was, for example, the rhetorical centerpiece of Judge McKeown’s dissent in Davey.  See Davey, 
299 F.3d  at 764-66 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
392 See, e.g., Sullivan New Religion, supra, at 1415 (“Government use of funding leverage can exert 
coercion, as a long line of constitutional conditions decisions suggests.”); McConnell, Selective Funding, supra, at 
1015 (noting that “[a] common understanding of constitutional law is that although the government has no 
obligation (absent exceptional circumstances) to subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights, it is forbidden to 
penalize the exercise of those rights”).
393 See McConnell Selective Funding, supra, at 989 (asking “when is the government’s refusal to fund a 
constitutionally protected choice an impermissible ‘burden’ on the exercise of the right?”); see also Davey, 299 F.3d 
at 745-55 (stating that government “may selectively sponsor or pay for programs that it believes to be in the public 
interest” but “government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right”) (citing
Regan v. Taxation With Rep’n of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983)).
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conditions” doctrine,394 but its basic tenets reveal that the State Blaines go beyond “refusing to fund” 
religion and instead “penalize” religious identity, affiliation, and purposes.  As Michael Paulsen explains, 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that “government may not condition one legal right, 
benefit, or privilege on the abandonment of another legal right, benefit, or privilege,” provided that (1) the 
government could not directly command the abandonment of the right, benefit, or privilege, and (2) the 
condition is not “directly germane to (in the sense of being practically inseparable from) the nature of the 
right or benefit itself.”395  Crucial to applying the doctrine is “defining the exact nature of the ‘right’ 
which is being conditioned” in order to “provide a determinate, baseline point-of-reference against which 
the constitutionality of the condition may be judged.”396  How do the State Blaines fare under these 
principles?  Take Witters and Davey as examples.
On the strength of its Blaine Amendment alone, Washington State essentially said to Larry 
Witters and Joshua Davey, “You may have access to state educational aid, on the condition that you not
use the money for ministry training (Witters) or for a theology degree (Davey).”397  Apart from their 
religious plans, Witters and Davey were, of course, eligible for the funds.  Was Washington simply 
“refusing to fund” their religious choices, or was Washington wrongly “penalizing” the exercise of their 
constitutional right to free exercise?  First, we must define the “exact nature” of the rights being 
394 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra, at 665 n.30 (noting proliferation of scholarly refinements of unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine); see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 
(1989); Michael W. McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Implications for the Establishment 
Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the 
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988).
395
   Paulsen, supra, at 664-65.  The “directly germane” proviso is necessarily narrow, referring to 
“conditions that are directly ‘germane,’ in the strong sense of being inextricably intertwined with the nature of the 
right or benefit itself.” Id. at 666 n.32.  The exception is narrow, explains Paulsen, to prevent government from 
“circumvent[ing] the general rule against unconstitutional conditions by the expedient of simply defining its 
‘limited’ public forum in terms of the precise condition that is substantively unconstitutional.”  Id.
396 Id. at 665.  Similarly, Michael McConnell explains that, in assessing selective funding problems, one 
must first engage in “careful consideration of the nature of the constitutional right implicated by the funding 
decision, including the nature of the countervailing interests of the government.”  McConnell, Selective Funding, 
supra, at 992.
.111
conditioned.  It is not difficult to imagine, just as the Supreme Court did in McDaniel, that Witters’ and 
Davey’s free exercise rights encompassed their pursuit of religious vocations.398  Washington asked 
Witters and Davey to abandon those rights in order to participate in state educational funding.  
Washington, of course, could not have commanded this abandonment directly.  Nor, importantly, was the 
“condition” imposed on access to the funds “directly germane” to the nature of the funds themselves.  
That is, the fact that instruction was “religious” was not fundamentally at odds with the neutral provision 
of educational funds for the handicapped (Witters) or for high-achieving students in certain income 
brackets (Davey).399  It is thus difficult to escape the conclusion that Washington did more than “refuse to 
fund” the exercise of Witters’ and Davey’s constitutional rights; instead, Washington “penalized” the 
exercise of those rights by exacting the loss of all state educational assistance.400
But is this analysis inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions that allow government to 
fund childbirth but not abortion?  Briefly, no.401  The abortion right and the free exercise rights at issue 
here are not congruent.  Government is not required to act in an evenhanded way as between abortion and 
397 See supra notes __.
398 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626; see also id. at 632, 635 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that 
ministerial exclusion penalizes both religious belief and status).
399
     Imagine, by contrast, that Witters’ or Davey’s religious use of the funds would have independently 
violated the Establishment Clause.  Perhaps only in that sense would a “no religious use” condition on the funds 
have been “directly germane” to the funding program.  Of course, in that instance, the condition would merely 
duplicate the federal non-establishment constraints on Washington.
400
     The loss of all scholarship funds underscores the penalizing nature of Washington’s condition.  This 
was not a case where someone is merely forced to “bear the costs” of exercising constitutional rights, but rather a 
case in which someone is “made worse off than he would have been had he not exercised” those rights.  See
McConnell, Selective Funding, supra, at 1015 (emphasis added).  Because of their religious choices, Witters and 
Davey lost the entire scholarship, not merely the amount of money that might have gone toward “religious” 
instruction or training.  Compared to a scholarship student enrolled, say, in biochemistry or philosophy, Witters and 
Davey are not merely “poorer,” proportionally speaking; instead, they have been excluded from the funds 
altogether.  A wholesale exclusion from benefits, as opposed to a reduction in benefits only “to the extent of the cost 
of exercising the constitutional right,” is more in the nature of a penalty.  See generally id. at 1015-19.
401
     Michael McConnell exhaustively explores various answers to this question in his Selective Funding
article.  See supra note __.
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childbirth; it must refrain from imposing an “undue burden” on a woman’s choice to have an abortion.402
Government, however, has a legitimate interest in the protection of fetal life throughout pregnancy.403
Thus, short of “unduly burdening” abortion rights, government is free to promote “childbirth.”404  In other 
words, “encouraging childbirth” is a legitimate government purpose that is legally and logically separable 
from objective “hostility” to the abortion right.405  Government can therefore encourage childbirth in its 
own speech and can structure programs like Medicaid to fund “family planning” services that include 
childbirth but exclude abortion.
By contrast, government must adopt a distinctly more agnostic stance toward religion.  The 
notion that government funds could be spent in order to incentivize “the secular” over “the religious” 
simply flies in the face of a century-and-a-half of religion clause jurisprudence.  Non-establishment 
doctrine has long recognized that, just as government may not prefer religion over non-religion, it also 
402 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (state regulation violates constitutional 
guarantee of liberty only if it “imposes an undue burden” on woman’s choice to abort); see also Maher, 432 U.S. at 
473-74 (explaining that Roe did not declare an “unqualified constitutional right to an abortion” but rather protected a 
woman from “unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy”).  
Casey explained that an undue burden is “a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”  505 U.S. at 
877.
403 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (referring to “the recognition that there is a substantial state interest in 
potential life throughout pregnancy”); see also id. at 875 (observing that “in practice” Roe’s trimester framework 
“undervalues the State's interest in the potential life within the woman”).
404 See id. at 878 (stating that, “[t]o promote the State's profound interest in potential life, throughout 
pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is informed, and measures designed to 
advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth 
over abortion.   These measures must not be an undue burden on the right.”); see also McConnell Selective Funding, 
supra, at 1034-38 (describing, pre-Casey, an alternative to a pure “privacy” rationale for abortion rights, one 
recognizing that “the government’s interest in protecting unborn life is legitimate, but limited to non-coercive 
means”).
405 See McConnell Selective Funding, supra, at 1006 & n.49 (explaining difference between reasons for 
selective funding that are “hostile” to rights—i.e., reasons that “depend for their persuasive power upon antipathy to 
the exercise of the rights in question”—and “non-hostile” reasons that “could be accepted even by proponents of the 
affected rights,” even if they were not persuaded by them).
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may not prefer non-religion over religion.406  Similarly, the Free Exercise Clause, as originally understood 
and as confirmed by Smith and Lukumi, forbids laws that adopt a hostile stance toward religion—where 
laws overtly or covertly target religion qua religion—and not where neutral laws incidentally burden 
religious exercise.407  Finally, the religious speech cases, based on equal access to public fora for religious 
and non-religious viewpoints alike, are impossible to square with a government interest in furthering the 
“secular” over the “religious.”408  None of this is contradicted by the proposition that  laws must have 
“secular” objects—certainly they must, but they also cannot have “encouragement of non-religion and 
discouragement of religion” as an object.  That is, when laws have a genuinely secular purpose, they are 
simply agnostic toward religion; but when a law has as its purpose “the encouragement of non-religious” 
purposes, it is hard to understand that purpose, legally or logically, apart from an objective hostility to 
religion itself.409
406 See, e.g, Everson., 330 U.S. at 18 (stating that “State power is no more to be used so as to handicap 
religions, than it is to favor them” and that First Amendment “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with 
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary”); Grumet, 512 
U.S. at 714 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Religion Clauses prohibit the government from favoring religion, but 
they provide no warrant for discriminating against religion.”) (emphasis in original); see generally supra notes __.
407 See supra ___.  This forecloses the suggestion that there persists in free exercise jurisprudence a 
general form of balancing test analogous to the abortion-rights inquiry.  Admittedly, the Sherbert line of 
unemployment compensation cases engaged in such balancing.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (discussing  Sherbert
balancing test); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).  And, relying on Sherbert, Judge 
McKeown claimed in her Davey dissent that a “substantial burden” test was still the controlling standard for free 
exercise violations.  See Davey, 299 F.3d at 763-64 (McKeown, J., dissenting).  It is difficult to square that view 
with Smith, however.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-85 (confining applicability of Sherbert to cases, like the 
unemployment compensation context, where a benefit program invites “individualized governmental assessment of 
the reasons for the relevant conduct,” essentially empowering government to determine whether religious reasons 
justify compensation).  Smith explicitly excludes any form of Sherbert balancing from cases involving “across-the-
board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct.”  Id. at 884.  In my view, the best reading of these 
passages from Smith is that Sherbert is essentially dead, insofar as it advocates a “balancing” approach to free 
exercise challenges to general laws.  See id. at 885 (stating that “[t]he government’s ability to enforce generally 
applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, cannot 
depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development”) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added).
408 See supra ___.
409 See McConnell Selective Funding, supra, at 1006 & n.49; see also supra note __.
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Thus, the application of the Washington State Blaine to Witters and Davey appears to constitute a 
“penalty” on their exercise of religion, under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  This accords with 
Michael Paulsen’s broad statement of the doctrine as applied to religious persons and groups seeking 
equal access to public fora or public benefits.  Paulsen argues that “government may not condition a 
religious speaker’s or group’s equal access to a public forum, public benefit, or any otherwise generally 
available privilege on the religious speaker’s or group’s abandonment of rights of religious autonomy, 
identity, self-definition, self-governance, or religiously-motivated conduct.”410  Notice how Paulsen’s 
statement of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine interacts with the non-persecution principle.  
Government may not broadly and neutrally offer benefits—whether in the form of access to a public 
forum, to public funding, or to inclusion in government programs—but essentially exclude religious 
recipients by attaching religion-sensitive conditions to those benefits.
We can plausibly understand the State Blaines’ targeted exclusion of “religious” persons, groups, 
and purposes from public benefits in this alternate way, as a generalized “condition” that these persons 
and groups abandon their religious identity, affiliation, or purpose in order to access public benefits.  The 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine suggests that such a condition typically amounts to a “penalty” on the 
exercise of religion.  Government generally cannot condition access to a legal benefit on the abandonment 
of religious purposes, identity, or affiliation.  Of course, government could do so if it could command the 
abandonment directly—but when could government ever plausibly do so?  More importantly, when 
would such a condition be so “directly germane” to the benefits offered that government would have no 
choice but to exclude “religious” persons or groups from access to them?  One plausible answer, of 
course, is if the federal Establishment Clause affirmatively forbade religious inclusion in those benefits.  
But, as we have seen, non-establishment law today will rarely compel exclusion of religious persons or 
410
     Paulsen, supra, at 667.
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groups from neutrally-available government benefit programs.411  Thus, the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine suggests that when states, through their State Blaines, try to reach beyond the Establishment 
Clause in this way—excluding religious persons and groups from neutrally available benefits because
they are religious—states unconstitutionally punish religious exercise.412
Generally, this section addresses a rejoinder to my argument grounded in government’s ability to 
control how and why it spends money.  It suggests that the general proposition that government must 
selectively allocate its resources sheds no light on the debate.  It also suggests that, when government 
itself is speaking or spreading its own message through private entities, State Blaines may plausibly 
operate to require state government to speak in a non-religious voice.  But it is doubtful that State Blaines 
could legitimately require state governments to restrict the participation of religious persons or groups in 
government message programs simply because they are religious.  Such a categorical restriction has little 
to do with government’s ability to shape its own message.  Finally, the range of legitimate government 
purposes suggests that, while government may legitimately (albeit, non-coercively) structure subsidies to 
encourage childbirth over abortion, government may not legitimately encourage “non-religion” over 
411 See supra __.
412
   Much of the current debate over unconstitutional conditions on religious participation in public benefits 
addresses more subtle conditions on religious providers.  The debate centers on whether religious providers’ access 
to public benefits can be conditioned on their abandonment of principles or practices connected to their religious 
identity.  For instance, may religious schools’ participation in a neutral voucher program be conditioned on their not 
discriminating in selecting students on the basis of religion?  On their not discriminating in hiring teachers on the 
basis of religion?  On their agreement not to require voucher students to participate in religious observance or 
instruction?  On their agreement not to impart religious teaching that may run afoul of anti-discrimination laws?  
See, e.g., Paulsen, supra, at 662-63; Lupu Zelman’s Future, supra, at 972-82; see generally Public Values in an Era 
of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1212-1453 (2003) (Symposium).  This important inquiry is beyond the scope of 
this article.  But my assessment of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, as applied to State Blaines, does suggest 
some general answers.  It would seem, generally speaking, that such conditions cannot have the object or effect of 
circumventing the foundational principles of religious non-discrimination.  That is, if the general principle is that 
government may not exclude religious providers from otherwise available benefits, government cannot then 
condition participation in a way that essentially accomplishes the same thing.  Such conditions would not be 
genuinely neutral.  So, for instance, a public university cannot condition religious groups’ access to generally 
available funds or fora on the groups’ not “discriminating” on the basis of religion in selecting its officers.  See
Paulsen, supra, at 691.  Similarly, government cannot condition religious schools’ participation in a voucher 
program on the schools’ not teaching religious tenets that “discriminate” against other religions or against behavior 
116
“religion.”  Relatedly, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine suggests that government may not 
legitimately condition access to public benefits on recipients’ abandonment of religious identity or 
affiliation.  The State Blaines’ overall exclusion of religious persons, groups, and purposes from 
participation in public benefits appears to run aground on these principles.  More generally, however, the 
“funding” rejoinder to my non-persecution argument, much like the “federalism” rejoinder, begs the 
foundational question posed by non-persecution:  in the allocation of otherwise available public benefits, 
may government constitutionally discriminate against religious persons, organizations, or purposes 
because they are religious?
VI.  Conclusion
This extended analysis of the State Blaine Amendments has focused on the historical context in 
which the State Blaines developed and also on the legal context in which they currently operate.  The 
State Blaines arose during a period of divisive national upheaval over the issue of funding Catholic 
schools.  They are a legal residue of that crisis, representing a set of judgments about the relationship 
between religion and the public square, and they persist to the present day in almost forty state 
constitutions.  The State Blaines use a variety of linguistic formulas, but they are united by an overarching 
purpose—to exclude religious persons and groups from the equal enjoyment of public benefits.  Given the 
sentiments motivating their birth, we should not be surprised that the general operation of the State 
Blaines, from today’s vantage point, is out of harmony with the foundational currents of the Supreme 
Court’s religion clause jurisprudence.  One of those currents in particular calls the State Blaines into 
serious question—the Court’s consistent condemnation of laws that target religious belief, worship, 
status, and affiliation for disfavored treatment.
In this article, I have focused on the likely operation of State Blaines implicated when public 
benefits are made generally available to religious and non-religious persons and groups on a neutral basis.  
objectionable from their religious standpoint.  The issues here quickly become far more complex, but this is not the 
occasion to explore them more fully.
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As broad and varied as the State Blaines are, they will likely operate legitimately in some limited areas.413
But in this increasingly common context—seen in the rise of “voucher” programs and “charitable choice” 
movements—the operation of the State Blaines raises serious constitutional questions under the First 
Amendment.  When the State Blaines exclude persons and groups from participation in broad-based 
social programs, they single out religion for disfavored treatment.  That disfavor cannot be justified by 
states’ own federalism interests, nor by their prerogative to selectively fund certain activities over others.  
The Supreme Court has never approved a law that singles out religious persons or groups for special 
burdens because of their religious character.  When the Court finally takes the constitutional measure of 
the State Blaines—and it will have that chance early next term—the State Blaines are likely to fall.
*  *  *  *  *
413 See supra notes __.
